THE ANTI-W5 MOVEMENT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TORONTO'S CHINESE COMMUNITY

MARIA Y. M. YAU 1983

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THE ANTI-W5 MOVEMENT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR TORONTO'S CHINESE COMMUNITY

by

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(e)

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INTRODUCTION

The period between October 1979 and April 1980 marked a turning point in the history of Chinese Canadian community.[1] Never was there such a large concentration of energies and commotion being focused on a single event. It was the anti-W5 movement--a protest campaign against a segment of the CTV public affairs show titled "Campus Giveaway". According to the campaigners, the programme was guilty of labelling all Canadian residents of Chinese descent as foreigners, and questioning the rights of Chinese Canadians to higher education. Over 2,000 protesters of Chinese extraction demonstrated outside CTV's headquarters in sub-zero temperature. About 600 supporters from the community helped in publicizing the issue and organizing the campaign. According to a campaign leader's estimate, if one has to measure the time and efforts dedicated by the volunteers in monetary terms, the amount could reach as high as $500,000.[2] Though all Chinese community members were not as active and vocal, many endorsed the campaign by signing petition letters and donating money for the cause. Still more striking, the outburst which originated in Toronto soon mushroomed to other Chinese communities across the country, thus escalating a local campaign to a national Chinese

Canadian movement--something unprecedented in the Chinese Canadian history. It is true that the movement experienced its lowest ebb when the dispute was dragged into an indefinite stalmate for almost six months; but it did end in victory when CTV finally apologized to the Chinese Canadian community on April 16, 1980.

Aside from being an extraordinary and unprecedented event, the anti-W5 movement also had broader meaning for the Chinese Canadian community. It eptomized and, at the same time, invigorated a new spirit of ethnic consciousness and political activism in the community. This historic incident and its implications are the subjects of this study, which attempts to describe and analyse the roots of the movement, its fascinating and dramatic course of events, its final victory, and its effects on the Chinese Canadian community.

No pretensions are made, however, that this study covers the whole story of the anti-W5 movement. That would require a much wider scope that this study would allow. Strictly speaking, the anti-W5 movement was not the domain of the Chinese Canadians. Other institutions also protested against the programme. Among them were top officials at the University of Toronto , and other educational organizations such as the Canadian Bureau for International Education, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, and the Canadian Association of University Teachers.[3] Indeed, they were among the first to react to the programme, even before

Toronto's Chinese community got involved in the dispute. Later on, government officials, politicians, the English language newspapers and other ethno-cultural communties also broke their silence and publicly denounced "The Campus Giveaway" as distorted and biased report. Nonetheless, by far the most active, vocal and determined group to fight against the programme was the Chinese Canadian community. It was the latter which moved the W5 issue into the arena of public controversy, and formally launched an organized protest campaign. In the present work, we shall examine the incident from the perspective of the Chinese Canadian community, though not in isolation from the rest of the wider society.

Yet, it is also important to note that the Chinese community referred to is specifically the one in Toronto. No attempt has been made to study the movement across the country. Although other Chinese Canadians in other cities had also played their parts in the campaign, their degree of involvement, mobilization and commitment differed considerably from one to another. Moreover, since each Chinese community in different parts of Canada has its unique historical, political and socio-ecomonic background, it is difficult to generalize from one case to another.[4] The Toronto's Chinese community was the centre stage of the movement, where the outburst originated, the controversy took place, most actions were undertaken, and the largest number of people were involved. It was also where the

effects of the campaign most directly felt.

Just as it is important to understand the scope of this thesis, it is also important to identify the sources and nature of materials this study builds upon. Since there has been a general lack of detailed and comprehensive studies of this movement,[5] most of the data are based on various primary sources. One of the most important sources is interviews with the key participants in the campaign. As a student of Chinese descent, I would argue that I had the advantage, generally unavailable to non-Chinese scholars, of gaining direct access to and eliciting frank and forthright answers from the Chinese interviewees, who might be reluctant to unveil the "unfavorable" side to outside observers.[6] Most of the interviews were conducted in both Chinese and English and were open-ended, in the hope of gathering not only detailed information but also participants' opinion about the incident.[7] In sum, interviews provided much of the invaluable first-hand knowledge of and insight into the internal picture of the events, which was generally unknown to the public.[8]

It is understood that the data derived from interviews is inevitably tainted by the informants' subjectivity, personal bias or faulty memory.[9] In order to alleviate these problems, two measures were taken. First, every effort was made to interview not only the key actors in the campaign but also different group representatives and marginal

figures in the community who were involved in protesting against the programme.[10] It is hoped that by collecting data from different sides, one could check and correct possible distortions and bias involved in the interviewing of any single informant. Another way to validate these eyewitness accounts, and, at the same time, to supplement their information was through the multitude of written documents and records from various sources, including those outside the Chinese community.[11] These include great files of personal letters, institutional correspondence, speech drafts, minutes of the executive meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario against W5, petition letters, flyers and leaflets, position papers, newsletters of various Chinese organizations and government departments, official statements for news release, written advice from various lawyers, and other internal records such as written reports, plan sheets, proposals, personal papers and even handwritten notes. Other primary sources that have proved important for the research are a few short papers written by some anti-W5 participants on the movement,[12] as well as reports and commentaries in the local Chinese community press, the English language dailies, and the campus press.[13] A documentary film on the anti-W5 campaign produced by the Chinese Canadian National Council also provided a source of information.[14]

Aside from the primary materials, this study also relies heavily on secondary sources. These include a number of articles on the Chinese Canadian communities, especially the one in Toronto, and scholarly works dealing with other ethnic groups, such as the black movement in the United States and Italian community in Toronto. The former gave important references and background knowledge about the ethnic community organization, while the latter provided some new ideas and insight into our present study. Sociological and theoretical monographs on ethnicity, race relations and other related topics as well as general literature on political science, mass behavior, leadership, and group dynamics were also employed to provide the important guidelines and conceptual scheme on which this analyses is based.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 contains a brief summary of "Campus Giveaway" and analysis of the "gross inaccuracies", "selective editing" and "offensive assumptions" presented in the programme, which made the latter such a provocative issue. There is no way of comprehending the subject, without first understanding what the programme was about, and why it was so controversial.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are mainly a narration of the W5 incident. While many people tend to take the campaign for

granted, very few realize that it was by no means a spontaneous and immediate reaction of the Chinese community to the programme. For over a month and a half after the show was broadcast, the community did not have the slightest inkling what "Campus Giveaway" was about. Neither were there any signs of outburst within the community. Moreover, the show was essentially an on-campus issue; not a word about Chinese Canadians or Chinese community was mentioned. How then could such a short, low-profile and seemingly limited programme set off a storm of protest from Toronto's Chinese community almost two months after it was telecast?

In order to answer this question, one has to explore the origin of the dispute. It was discovered that while the documentary did not bring immediate outcry from the Chinese community, it did incur censure, indignation and even protest actions from a group of Chinese students at the U. of T. shortly after the programme was broadcast. It was the students' reaction which unintentionally became the bridge between the programme and the outbreak of the community protest. Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of the indispensable, but little-known, role played by the students in paving the way for the involvement of the Chinese Canadian community.

In Chapters 3 and 4, we shall take an indepth look at the growth of the movement after various Chinese organizations assumed the initiative in directing the

protest. Special attention will be paid to how the students' cause was transformed into a Chinese Canadian issue; how a previously obscure protest developed into a highly publicized community campaign; how the local action escalated to the national level; and how the campaigners tackled the internal conflicts and problems that beset the movement until CTV finally backed off.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 together are an analytical examination of the event and its implications for the ethnic community. While the narration is important for appreciating the movement and accounting for how "The Campus Giveaway" eventually became a cause for the outburst, an important question still remains unanswered: Why were there a group of Chinese Canadians willing and ready to take up the students' initiative and launch a community-wide movement? This question becomes even more intriquing when one is reminded that the Chinese community has been marked by a low political profile. While particular personalities provide a partial answer to this question, their willingness and readiness also depended much on the social, political and historical conditions of Toronto's Chinese community in the last decade. Chapter 5 will examine how these preconditions and larger forces explain the outbreak of the movement.

Chapter 6 is an analysis of the success of the movement from two perspectives: the ability to mobilize public

opinion and support within the ethnic community, and the victory over CTV. In other words, why did community members previously politically apathetic respond to the campaigners' initiative? And why did CTV, a national television network, finally bow to the demands of an ethnic minority after almost six months of impasse?

Finally, it will not be a complete study without evaluating the historical significance and meanings of the movement and its success for the ethnic community. Chapters 7 and 8 are thus directed at a broader assessment of the impact of the campaign on the Chinese people in Toronto, the leadership pattern within the ethnic group, and the image of the community in the wider society. A survey on the two-year events following the campaign will also be offered to substantiate the appraisal made in these two final chapters.

CHAPTER I

"CAMPUS GIVEAWAY"

On September 30, 1979 CTV broadcast a 12-minute segment of its W5 public affairs show called "Campus Giveaway". In brief, it was a documentary on the question of foreign students in Canada. Helen Hutchinson, host of the show, opened the programme with the following remarks:

> Here is a scenario that would make a great many people in this country angry and resentful. Suppose your son or daughter wanted to be an engineer, or a doctor, or a pharmacist. Suppose he had high marks in high school, and that you could pay the tuition--but he still couldn't get into university in his chosen courses because a foreign student was taking his place. Well, that is exactly what is happening in this country.[1]

These introductory statements clearly set the theme of the programme: there were too many foreign students in Canada and they were crowding out Canadian university students, especially those in the professional faculties. Basically, the programme was accusing two groups of people: universities authority and foreign students. The former was attacked for accepting too many foreign students, and the latter for robbing university seats from Canadian students. The arguments used by W5 can be classified into five types.

First, W5 reported a host of figures to show that Canadian universites were being overwhelmed by foreign students. For example, it suggested that there were at least 100,000 foreign students on Canadian campuses, about 10 percent of the university students across Canada. According to Hutchinson, the most serious areas were the professional and technological programs, such as engineering, applied science, commerce and computer science, in which over 20 percent of the students were foreign. She further pointed out that "Thousands of Canadian students, who can't get into medicine, are forced to study in private foreign schools, while in Canadian schools almost 400 students are foreign."

The second way to substantiate its contention was to use a case study of a first-year University of Toronto (U. of T.) student called Barbara Allen. According to the programme, Allen was denied a place in U. of T. pharmarcy department despite of her "good" high school marks of an average of 79.5 percent. The alleged reason given by W5 and Allen herself was the overseas students who made up 10 to 30 percent of the pharmacy class. Allan's father, himself a pharmacist, also expressed his discontent that his tax money was being used for "other people" instead of "our own".

The third argument was directed toward the foreign students themselves. The programme claimed that most of the students were "the children of the wealthy" coming from

southeast Asia, especially from Hong Kong. These students, according to W5, could easily become landed immigrants and get their way to the professional faculties. Furthermore, they were exploiting the Canadian tax money, while their parents enjoyed exemption from education tax in their own countries.

To prove that its allegation was well-supported, the programme interviewed a number of Canadian students and a few university officails.[2] All except John Helliwell, director of the Canadian Bureau for International Education, were quoted as agreeing with W5's contention. Helliwell statements, which tended to defend the foreign students, were all refuted by Hutchinson. Finally, realizing that the most convincing proof was through seeing with naked eyes, W5 manipulated some film segments, mainly taken at the U. of T., to create the impression that there were large numbers of foreign faces on Canadian campuses.

To most viewers, who were not familiar with the subject and who trusted the reliability and accuracy of the news programme such as W5, "Campus Giveaway" seemed well-grounded and strongly supported by its various sources of evidence. However, it did not take long before the university community--such as the CBIE, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC), U. of T. officials, and the Chinese Students' Association of the U. of T. (UTCSA)--to unveil that not only was the show highly biased in its

argument, but was also fraught with distorted information, misleading statistics, and unfounded allegations.[3]

As Allan Earp, president of the AUCC, points out, the figures used in the programme were grossly distorted and highly inflated.[4] For instance, while W5 suggested that there were at least 100,000 foreign students on Canadian campuses, the actual number according to the Statistics Canada was 21,000;[5] instead of the 10 percent claimed, the official figure showed that only 5.3 percent of the total university student population were foreigners. The quoted 20 percent of overseas students at professional faculties was also highly exaggerated. According to the U. of T., which was used by the programme as the prime example, there was a 5 percent quota for foreign students in engineering.[6] The figure of 400 overseas students enrolled in medical schools reported by W5 was also erroneous. The reality was that during 1978-79 there were only 85 and among them 66 were from the United States. At the U. of T., only two out of the 256 medical students in the first-year class were foreign.[7] Again, according to Earp, W5's allegation that 60 percent of the foreign students were from Southeast Asia was wildly inaccurate.[8]

Aside from statistical errors, other information presented in the documentary was also grossly inaccurate. For instance, according E.W. Steib, associate dean of pharmacy department at the U. of T., the whole story about

Barbara Allen was slanted.[9] First, as Steib stressed, his faculty did not accept any foreign students. Second, Allen did not obtain 79.5 percent in the subjects required for admission to the program. Another unfounded allegation was that "the students enter on special visas, but easily become landed immigrants, if they need to, in order to get into courses whih restrict enrolment." This charge was refuted by te Department of Manpower and Immigration, which pointed out that since changes in the immigration act in 1972 and 1973, it was no longer possible for visa students to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada.[10] Furthermore, W5's assertion that there were no education tax in Hong Kong was also unfounded. While there was no "education tax" as such in Hong Kong, 17.5 percent of the colony's total budget was devoted to education.[11]

While these factual errors were already controversial enough, what made the programme even more offensive and provocative was its non-spoken implications, selective editing and choice of film being presented. For instance, Helliwell pointed out later that his comments were edited "very selectively".[12] While his interview lasted for 40 minutes, the programme only used a few seconds of the conversations and his comments were taken out of context. Another example was the filming of UTCSA's orientation party. The gathering was supposed to be variety show with the presentation of both the Chinese and Western programmes. W5, however, only chose to film those parts that looked and

sounded strange to the non-Chinese, and ignored the other segments of the orientation programmes.[13]

By far, however, the most offensive part about the programme was its innuendo against students of Chinese descent. Although Hutchinson did not verbally define the term "foreign students",[14] by screening almost exclusively students of Chinese descent and without mentioning the fact that there were also large numbers of foreign students from the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union, the programme suggested that all Chinese students were foreigners, and all whites were Canadians. For instance, while pictures of students of Chinese origin were shown, the narrartor read, "...the classes are just packed with foreign students," or "There are so many Oriental foreign students and that they rarely mix with their Canadian classmates," or "It's as if there are two campuses at Canadian universities--foreign and domestic. Certainly this Chinese theatre attracts a full house, but not one Canadian student attended."[15] It is, however, later rectified by the UTCSA that most of the students filmed on the programme were indeed either Canadian students or landed immigrants.[16]

It was this implicit assumption, manipulative use of words and pictures that made "Campus Giveaway" such an explosive and offensive issue. As Donald Savage, executive director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, writes in his letter to CTV:

> Screening film footage of Chinese-looking students with the explicit assumption that such people could not be Canadians while reciting incorrect statistics and information about the rampant takeover of our Canadian universities clearly smacks of warnings about the Yellow Peril. 17

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN OF THE ANTI-W5 MOVEMENT

THE STUDENT REACTION

In searching the origin of the anti-W5 movement, it was found that the "Campus Giveaway" did not bring immediate outcry from the Chinese community. Indeed, when the programme was aired on September 31, 1979, very few of those who were later involved in the anti-W5 movement had actually seen it. Even most of the campaign leaders were unaware of the programme until a month or so after it had been broadcast.[1] The twelve-minute report did, however, unleash a wave of protests from the university community and the Chinese student body at the University of Toronto; and it was the latter which eventually led to the involvement of the Chinese community in the W5 controversy.

Yet, it is interesting to note that not many Chinese students watched the programme on that Sunday evening. In tracing the root of the student protest, it was found that the incident began with three U of T students of Chinese descent, who, independently, happened to see the show when it was telecast. Although these students did not know each

other and watched the show in different places, they had a common reaction: they were disturbed by the biased report and, above all, the innuendoes against students of Chinese origin.

One of the students was Norman Kwan from dentistry department. According to him, he was angry because the report "was obviously wrong. It was not simply controversial."[2] Immediately after the programme, he phoned CTV for an explanation but failed to get in touch with W5 officials. He tried continuously for two weeks; but each time his call was turned down for various excuses.[3] Kwan was so frustrated that he finally decided to approach Alderman Ying Hope, with whom he was acquainted. Hope said that he had already filed a written complaint with CFTO president.[4] Kwan, however, wanted something more than individual protest letters. He then turned to the Chinese Students' Association of the University of Toronto (UTCSA) in the hope of getting some group action. To his surprise, by that time--that was mid-October, the UTCSA had already begun to deal with the issue.

How did the UTCSA learn about the programme? It was found that none of the executive members of the association had seen the "Campus Giveaway" when it was telecast.[5] According to Bernard Lau and Christina Chu, it was the other two individual students who had seen the show and informed some UTCSA's executives immediately after it was broadcast.[6]

Not knowing what actually happened about the programme, two of the executive members turned to the International Student Centre (ISC) of the U of T the following day and asked its director Elizebeth Paterson about the incident.[7]

Coincidentally, U of T officials at that time were also inquiring into the programme. As Paterson recalled in an interview, someone at the Admissions Office of the U of T had watched the "Campus Giveaway" when it was telecast. She was disturbed to find not only the inaccuracies of the report but also the indirect accusation made against the University's admission policy. Her grievance reached the Admissions Office the next day. The latter then made a special arrangement with a commercial outfit, which specialized in taping all television programmes, to get hold of a copy of the telecast .[8] The Admissions Office also invited other U of T administrators to view the videotape and make recommendations and comments about it.[9]

That was why when the two UTCSA's executive members approached Paterson, the latter invited them to view the videotape with other University officials. Having seen the programme with their own eyes, they were so infuriated that they immediately informed other UTCSA executives and promptly convened an emergency meeting.

Immediate Reactions of the Chinese Student Body

The first thing the UTCSA did was to urge other Chinese students on campus to see the programme in Sigmund Samuel Library, an undergraduate library at the University of Toronto.[10] The message, however, was largely spread out by word of mouth with little or no publicity. According to Dinah Cheng, then president of the UTCSA, she and her fellow executives feared that without the copyright of the film, it would be illegal for them to screen the tape publicly. Moreover, at that early stage, the executives were still uncertain of what actions they should take; and if the issue was publicized, it might cause a backlash from CTV before they could do anything about the programme. Despite little publicity, the chain network of the Association was so widespread that within a few weeks a large number of Chinese students at the downtown campus, as well as those at the two suburban campuses--Scarborough and Erindale Colleges--had already viewed the programme in the Sigmund Samuel Library. The reactions of the students were similar to those who had watched it--indignation and determination to take "some" actions.

Why were the students so resented and resolute to take actions against the programme? As clearly noted in the UTCSA's position paper issued a few days after the broadcast, while the students felt uneasy about the inaccuracies presented, they were more concerned with the implications of the presentation.[11] Most of them perceived the "Campus Giveaway" as a two-pronged sword attacking both

the foreign and the Chinese Canadian students. On the one hand, the host of the show Helen Hutchinson made direct charges against foreign students, especially those of Chinese origin, alledging that they had knocked off the seats from the rightful Canadians--the white Canadians. This accusation aroused the resentment of many Chinese foreign students, who felt that they had already been subjected to countless restrictions imposed on them by the Immigration Act and by the university policy, and that they were in no way taking away the positions of Canadians. Moreover, they disturbed by the fact that they were the only group of foreign students being identified and criticized in the programme, while the presence of large numbers of white visa students on campus was never mentioned.

On the other hand, by only screening students of Chinese descent as foreign students without making distinction between visa students and Chinese Canadian citizens or landed immigrants, the programme offended those Chinese Canadian students who felt being treated as foreigners. As stated in the UTCSA's position paper:

> By implicitly labelling Asains as foreigners, the program impressed upon the minds of T.V. viewers the association of Asians to foreigners, thus achieving its intended goals of channeling resentment and anger it created toward foreign students to resentment towards Asians.[12]

In effect, the programme antagonized almost all Chinese students, regardless of their legal status in Canada. Most students felt the W5 programme was using scare tactics to

incite public resentment and bitterness against them.

Yet, it is interesting to note that it was mainly the Chinese students at the University of Toronto who were most active and determined to fight the issue. Their counterparts at other universities were comparatively less involved, at least during this early period. According to UTCSA executives, they had informed the Chinese students' associations at other Ontario universities of the programme within two weeks after it was broadcast.[13] But, aside from offering their moral support for UTCSA's action, these Chinese students' associations had not taken any substantial actions. Probably the majority of Chinese students at these universities did not have the chance to view the programme, except some students' representatives who watched the videotape at U of T.[14]

There were, however, other reasons why Chinese students' associations at the U of T were particularly active and determined to pursue the issue. First, though the programme was talking about "foreign students" across Canada, those at the U of T were almost exclusively used by W5 as the prime example. The feelings of being directly attacked and being indiscriminately labelled as foreigners explain in part why the U of T Chinese students, especially those in the faculty of pharmarcy, were most angry and resolute to take action against the programme.

There was another important factor which prompted the UTCSA to action. According to the executive members of the Association, they were particularly resented because they felt being manipulated by the television network.[15] Before the broadcast of the "Campus Giveaway", W5's officials approached the UTCSA in early September for permission to film its orientation gathering, with the reason that they were preparing a programme on foreign students in Canada.[16] Not knowing the real intent of CTV officials, UTCSA executives were more than pleased to allow the television network tape its orientation activities. To the great surprise and indignation of UTCSA members, the film clips were being used to create a scenario of classroom situation with a full house of "foreign students" with no Canadian students involved. This manipulation of the pictures and allegation fueled intense resentment among UTCSA members and enhanced their determination to protest against the programme.

The UTCSA's Actions

The chief goal of the UTCSA was to have "CTV publicly acknowledge its erroneus presentation and remedy the false impressions it created."[17] But being uncertain of what actions they should take, the executive members turned to the ISC, which was considered by the students at that time as the most accessible and reliable source for advice.[18]

As director of the ISC, Paterson gave the students two suggestions: one write protest letters, the other a boycott campaign.[19] When the students asked about the effectiveness of having a demonstration, she dismissed the idea by saying that it would possibly worsen the Chinese students' image.[20] Paterson's advice was well taken by UTCSA executives. They agreed that a protest march might be harmful to their image--something they were very concerned about especially after the airing of the "Campus Giveaway".[21] Many others felt that protest march were too political or radical. There were, however, other practical reasons. Even if the executives wished to stage a demonstration, they realized that they had not yet rallied enough momentum and support from the Chinese student body to ensure an impressive result.[22] Morevoer, the Association was concerned that because half of its members were visa students with insecure legal status, a mass rally might endanger their positions in this country.[23] Finally, one should remember that it was in the middle of the Fall term, in which most students had neither the time nor energy to organize such large scale action.

The options left for the Association were writing letters and a boycott campaign. The students chose the former, which was by far the easiest, most economical--both in terms of money and human resources, and the most immediate action UTCSA executives were able to take at that time. Thus, for the first two weeks, the Association busied

itself writing to CTV and other institutions such as the Ontario and Canadian Human Rights Commissions, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail.[24] Through these channels, the students hoped to rectify the negative image projected by the W5 programme, and, at the same time, pressure CTV for a public apology.

To the disappointment of the students, these sources gave them little or no positive response. CTV simply ignored the students' demand by sending a short letter to confirm its stand.[25] This was anticipated. What was unexpected, however, was the cold shoulder they got from other institutions . The Ontario Human Rights Commission's reply to the students was that since the programme was nationally broadcast, the matter should be dealt with by the federal Human Rights Commission.[26] The latter in turn said that because the issue was related to electronic media, which was not under its legislation, the students should refer the case to the CRTC.[27] The response of the CRTC was, however, not much better than the two Commissions. Though the CRTC had the authority to issue a license, as said in its reply, it had no legislation to control what the television network broadcast; all it could do was to transfer the students' appeal letter to CTV attention.[28] In other words, the CRTC could not do much to help the students. Indeed, the transfer of the students' letter to CTV had caused the television network to take a stronger

stand against the students. On October 26, 1979, CTV issued a seven-page rebuttal letter, which further denounced the Chinese foreign students as well as other Chinese immigrant students for taking away the seats of "rightful" Canadians.[29]

The response of the two newspapers was by no means encouraging. In fact, The Globe and Mail did not even have a word about the controversy. The Toronto Star, while publishing some individual letters concerning the pros and cons of the issue, did not accept the UTCSA's request to publish its position paper.[30] The students' plea for institutional support thus fell on deaf ears.

The U of T Chinese Students' Union Against CTV

After almost two weeks of little or no significant results, the UTCSA began to turn to other Chinese students' organizations within the campus, in the hope of getting some concerted efforts--mainly in terms of more petition letters from more student groups. The W5 controversy did bring the five Chinese Students' Associations (CSAs) and two other Chinese students' groups at the University together for the first time. These seven groups were the UTCSA, the Scarborough College CSA, the Erindale College CSA, the Chinese Pharmaceutical Society, the Chinese Engineering Student Association, and two unofficial groups--the Chinese medical and dentistry students. They joined together and

formed a Union against W5. This was a significant move. For years attempts had been made to amalgamate these several bodies into a united UTCSA; but owing to the differences in interest, political inclination and background, all attempts had failed to materialize. This time the "Campus Giveaway" provided the different groups, at least for a while, with a common cause behind which they rallied together for some colllective action.

On October 18, 1979, the Union held its first public forum at the ISC. The main objectives were (i) to get other Chinese students at the University involved, and, (ii) above all, to inform them of the formation of the Union.[31] About two hundred Chinese students turned out at the meeting.[32] But to the amazement of some Union representatives and the rank and file, aside from the students, about ten Chinese professionals--including lawyers, physicians, accountants and engineers--were also present at the gathering.

According to Norman Kwan, these professionals were not invited by the Union. Rather, they had been called to the forum by a number of pharmacy and medical students. These individual students, most of whom were either Canadian citizens or immigrants, were impatient with letter-writing campaign and wanted more decisive action. One strategy they had in mind was to sue the W5 programme's officials. Shortly after watching the videotape, a number of pharmacy students consulted a well-known lawyer in Toronto's Chinese

community, Fred Ken.[33]Since Ken showed interest in helping, he and his partner Bob Mark were invited to the forum to express their legal opinion to other students. Meanwhile, some medical students, who were acquainted with some of the directors of the Federation of the Chinese Canadian Professionals (FCCP), also invited them to the meeting, hoping to solicit the Federation's support for their cause.[34]

Not surprisingly, the attention of the Union's forum was shifted to these professionals. FCCP representatives were both cautious and moderate. They asked the students not to pass any judgement or called the programme racist before they could prove that the information and statistics used were indeed erroneous.[35] The two lawyers Ken and Mark appeared to be most enthusiastic. Ken urged the students to take action against CTV with his statement: "We have been hit; we have to hit them back!"[36]His remarks stirred the emotion of the audience, which then burst into applause--though some students remained skeptical about the lawyer's rhetoric.[37] Mark even proposed organizing a demonstration. His suggestion was, however, immediately rejected by a UTCSA spokesman with the reason that such action would only intensify the already-negative image of the Chinese students.

Although the Union dismissed the idea of having a protest march, some students continued to consult the lawyers about the possibility of filing a libel suit against

CTV. Ken, who had just aroused the students' sentiment, said that if they could find someone who had been shown in the programme, and who was articulate enough and willing to be a plaintiff, then the case could be possible.[38] Hearing this, those who hoped to take legal action were exhilirated with optimism. They thought that they could finally have an effective way to seek justice.

The Internal Conflicts

The final decision of whether or not to sue CTV still had yet to be discussed among Union representatives and other interested students at a closed-door meeting two days after the forum.[39] It was at this meeting that conflicts within the Union began to emerge. The two main disagreements among the students were over the priority of the W5 issue and the tactics to counter CTV.

On the one side, there were the Scarborough and Erindale CSAs--which had a large majority of visa student members--joined by the representatives of the Chinese Engineering Society.[40] These student representatives wanted to treat the problem mainly as a foreign student issue. According to them, since it was the foreign students against whom the programme directly attacked and not the Chinese Canadians, the former should be given priority over the latter.[41] On the other side, the Pharmaceutical Society, the

medical and dentistry students' representatives--most of whom were either Canadian citizens or landed immigrants--wanted to fight the programme as a Chinese Canadian student issue. According to them, the real intent of the programme was to use foreign students as a pretext to attack the Chinese Canadian students.[42] The UTCSA was in an ambiguous position, since half of its members were foreign students and the other half Canadian citizens or landed immigrants.[43] After long deliberations and debates, the Union finally decided to fight for both issues with equal emphasis.

While the question of priority was temporary resolved, the question of tactics was the main source of dissension. From the outset, representatives of professional faculties, particularly the faculty of pharmacy, wanted to take stronger actions than using pen and paper. To them, letter writing was not as effective and forceful as legal action in pressing CTV for an apology. In order to sue the television network, they continued to argue, there must be external support in terms of money, experience, power, and resources; and since the UTCSA had failed to gain any institutional backing in the larger community, the only possible channel they could turn to was the Chinese community.[44] Indeed, the impressions given by the two lawyers at the October 18 forum were so positive that some students began to consider them a good source for support and assistance. Moreover, other students sensed that since the programme labelled the

Chinese Canadian students as foreigners, the controversy also indirectly involved the general Chinese Canadian public. The latter should, therefore, at least be told about the programme.[45] For these various reasons, the more active students demanded the need to approach the Chinese community.[46]

The other party, however, including some members of the UTCSA, insisted on staying aloof from the community, especially the Chinese organizations. Most of these students were unfamiliar with the community organizations and skeptical about the political inclinations and personal motives of their members.[47] They were afraid of being manipulated by any of these groups. Moreover, the students had a feeling that if they involved the Chinese community, they would eventually be dragged into politics, an area which they wanted to avoid. Furthermore, since most students of this side were visa students, they did not want to participate in any political or 'radical' actions that might jeopardize their legal status in this country. Therefore, the only tactic they were ready to take was writing letters.[48]

The debate went on until the active groups finally succeed to persuade UTCSA representatives to go over to its side.[49] By the end of the meeting, the Union finally passed by a narrow margin that it should approach the Chinese community for support.[50] The passing of the motion did not,

however, bring about a settlement to the dissensions. Indeed, the very resolution was the main reason for the withdrawal of the Scarborough College CSA, Erindale CSA and the Engineering CSA from the Union a week after.[51] Hence, by the time the active students began to approach the Chinese community, the students' coalition was dissolved less than a month after its formation.

In retrospect, the withdrawal of the foreign student groups was significant to the later development of the anti-W5 movement. After their resignation, the protest action was predominantly led by the Chinese Canadian students. Not surprisingly, the foreign students' cause was gradually, albeit unconsciously, overlooked.[52] For instance, after the dissolution of the Union, the remaining students formed another group called the Association of Chinese Canadian Students and Graduates (ACCSG). Significantly enough, the name itself did not include Chinese foreign students. This clearly points to the conscious or unconscious neglect of the foreign students' cause in the movement. Perhaps, as Norman Kwan commented, the name ACCGS was deliberately used for strategic reason, since at that time the students were begining to solicit support in the Chinese community, and the emphasis on Chinese Canadian students instead of foreign students might attract the attention of the community.

It is, however, important to note that by this time--that was almost a month after the broadcast--even those Chinese students with landed immigrant or citizenship status also gradually shrank from active involvment. There could be several reasons. First, after almost a month of little or no significant results, the momentum gradually faltered. The students who had once been enthusiastic about the issue began to lose optimism in countering the seemingly powerful and unchallengeable media. Second, aside from most foreign students who wanted to remain apolitical, many Chinese Canadian students were also reluctant to be drawn into politics. The time factor was also important. It was already late October and early November when most students' school work was in a critical period. Many could not afford further time or energy to the issue, while leaving their academic work unattended.

Only a handful of committed students--five to six individuals--remained to carry on their protest against CTV.[53] In fact, these active students were so small in number that they could no longer represent their respective students' associations. That was why they had to fight the issue under a general name--the Association of Chinese Canadian Students and Graduates. What sustained their continued commitment to the cause were their own determination and deep sense of responsibility and justice. They did not want to relinquish their action when the issue was still far from being settled.[54] Moreover, these students had a strong hope

that a lawsuit would vindicate their cause.[55]

With this hope, the handful of students approached Fred Ken, who spoke about the possibility of legal action at the students' forum. To the astonishment and disillusion of these students, the attitude of the lawyer changed dramatically from that of before.[56] He told the students sarcastically and indifferently that unless they could find an articulate student plaintiff and a sum of $15,000, they could not pursue the case. The impression the students received from the lawyer, especially the demand of the large sum of money, was that legal action was impossible. As some students recalled, they were so desperate and disappointed that they had virtually lost all their hope and confidence in continuing their anti-W5 protest.[57]

At such a low ebb, an active law student, Kai-wing Tsang, consulted Joseph Pomerant, a lawyer for whom Tsang did articling, hoping for one more opportunity.[58] Surprisingly, Pomerant not only promised to help the students file a libel and slander suit against the W5 officials, but also agreed to assist them at no cost. He also strongly adviced the students to continue soliciting moral and financial support from the Chinese community, not only the organizations but from the people as well, for their legal action.[59] According to Norman Kwan and Dinah Cheng, despite his personal credibility and integrity, which

were later questiond by many people, Pomerant's promise and encouragemet were indispensible to the continuation of their anti-W5 action. In time of little hope and desperation, his strong advice was the real force behind the students to resume their fight. Without this reinforcement, the students admitted that they would have probably been forced to give up the issue.[60]

With Pomerant's encouragement and support, three students endeavored to sue the programme's officials on behalf of themselves and of other Chinese Canadian students. On November 8, 1979, they served notices on three W5 officials.[61] Simultaneously, the students planned to resume their approach to the Chinese community for support.

Meanwhile, another U of T medical student accidentally met with Dr. Joseph Wong, president of the Action Committee for Southeast Asian Refugees, at a friend's farewell party.[62] Knowing that Wong was actively involved in the Boat People campaign during the summer of 1979, the student told him--who was still unaware of the W5 issue--about the programme and complained to him about the students' failure to gain support from the Chinese community. Wong showed concern about the issue and promised to meet with other students a few days later on November 6.[63]

Although the students had already decided to approach the Chinese community by the time they met Wong, the November 6 meeting further encouraged and eased the

students' contact with the community. Wong also called a few members of the Action Committee and the Chinese Canadians Mutual Advancement (CCMA) to the meeting.[64] These organizations' members encouraged the students to publicize the W5 controversy in the Chinese community. As representative of the Action Committee, Wong even donated a hundred dollar to the students for their publicity campaign.[65] Beyond this, the students also obtained from Wai-man Lee, editor of Peimei News (Chinese Daily), the names and sources of different Chinese organizations in Toronto. This information was valuable to the students, who were unfamiliar with the internal structure of the Chinese community.[66]

With the reinforcement and the available sources, the students undertook their first serious attempt to arouse the awareness and support of the community. They began by distributing leaflets in Chinatowns.[67] The students also planned to hold a community forum in mid-November at Cecil Community Centre near Chinatown. The purpose was to provide a public screening of the "Campus Giveaway" to the community and to solicit its support. Though the students had been met with refusal from Chinese businessmen, who disallowed them to distribute their materials,[68] posters and flyers were continued to be disseminated in Chinatowns, inviting people from all walks of life to attend the mid-November forum.

Aside from contacting the masses, the students attempted to lobby some organizations in the community. At that time, they learned from newspapers that the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO) was about to hold an annual conference on November 10-11 in Toronto. It would be, the students thought, a good opportunity for them to publicize the W5 issue and to plead for support. They contacted, Irene Chu, a conference organizer, for permission to present their case to the convention. In a telephone interview, Chu admitted that at that time she was quite hesitant about the students' request. First, she was not familiar with the W5 controversy. Second, the schedules for the conference had already been set. Nevertheless, Chu finally approved the students' request on the condition that they would provide a copy of the programme and present their positions to CCCO organizers the night before the conference.[69]

At that time the students did not have their own videotape of the programme. Norman Kwan thus asked CTV for the film. As was predicted, the television network refused to release it. Kwan then turned to Sigmund Sameul Library[70] of U of T; but for some unknown reasons, U of T officials also refused to release the videotape out of the library. Kwan was, however, determined to get hold of the tape. He knew very well that without it, he and other students would have a hard time convincing CCCO officials of their cause. Moreover, the students had already announced to the

community via their flyers that they would screen the tape at Cecil Community Centre a week after. In desperation, Kwan, without acknowledging other students, smuggled the tape out of the library and had a copy made.[71]

With the videotape copy of the programme, the students were finally able to convince the CCCO board of directors the importance and seriousness of the issue.[72] They also successfully obtained permission from CCCO officials to present their case at the final section of the conference.

To the surprise of the CCCO organizers, however, the students, notably Norman Kwan, pushed the issue aggressively at the conference the next day. Instead of limiting their presentation within the time assigned, the students took every opportunity on the floor to raise the issue to the attention of the audience.[73] Their way of presenting the case as well as their commitment and intensity swayed the opinion of the audience, who showed sympathy with their cause.[74] It was particularly so at the "Political Awareness" and "Racial Discrimination and Prejudice" panels, which were attended by the largest number of people.[75] At these two panels, the students succeeded in gaining most of the attention and sympathy from both the panelists and the attendents. The students even invited the audience to their first community forum, which was to be held two days later. Some organizers later commented that the students were so aggressive in introducing the issue that they interrupted the schedule of

the panel and diverted the focus of the conference to the W5 controversy. As Gordon Chong, one of the directors of the CCCO, wrote:

> ...there was a lot of discussion centred around this program. Invariably, questions and statements from the participants indicated a strong desire to discuss the W5 programme and available avenues of recourse rather than the scheduled topics. Feelings of anger, resentment, frustration and helplessness permeated the conference whenever the programme was discussed....[76]

In any event, the conference, particularly the two panels, gave the students an opportunity to meet with those individuals who had some degree of political and social consciousness. The overwhelming concern expressed by the people was indeed unexpected by the students.[77] It gave the latter the impression that there were individuals or groups in the community who were ready to deal with the issue seriously. Partly due to this impression, the students gradually changed their original idea from solely soliciting support from the community to having it play an active role in the protest. As Irene Chu put it, "the National Conference served as the kickoff point for the students' campaign to involve the community".[78]

After the conference, Kwan decided to rally all these concerned individuals and groups together to draw a unified course of action against the W5 programme. The day after the conference Kwan, on his own accord, went to see Bob Mark who had shown deep concern about the issue during the conference.[79] Mark promised to help Kwan call a meeting for

all concerned groups and individuals on November 20, 1979 at the Mon Sheong Home. This was a significant move. As we shall see in the next chapter, it sowed the seeds for the active involvement of the Chinese community in the W5 incident during the succeeding months.

Before the November 20 meeting, however, the students still had their long-awaited community forum to be held at Cecil Community Centre. About three hundred people, including both individuals and organizational representatives, were present.[80] At the forum the students screened the programme publicly for the first time. Ironically, it was also the last anti-W5 activity organized by the students. In any event, the response of the attendents was on the whole enthusaistic. Before the evening was out, several young individuals even decided to form a special organization to seek out and prepare strategies against the programme.[81] With this opportunity, the students invited all concerned individuals and organizations to their November 20 meeting, which was intended to form a united front against CTV.

Most groups except the FCCP accepted the request. Dr. Chap-yung Yeung, president of the Federation, strongly disagreed with the idea of forming another organization to deal with the issue. He argued that there were already more than a hundred different associations in Toronto's Chinese community alone; if people continued to form a group for

every event, there would be further divisions in the already-fragmented community.[82] Furthermore, at that time, Yeung did not see any usefulness and effectiveness of setting up a special group in dealing with the issue.

The students, however, still wanted the FCCP to join the November 20 meeting. They realized that the Federation was well-established and well-recognized in the local Chinese community; and its presence at the attempted alliance could perhaps enhance the coalition's credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Yeung initially initially refused to join the meeting; but after Kwan persuaded him for almost half an hour, he eventually gave in.[83]

The November 20 meeting finally arrived. It marked the turning point of the anti-W5 movement--namely the waning role of the students and the active involvement of the Chinese community. The reasons why the Chinese community took up the issue and led the movement will be discussed in Chapter 5. It is, however, important to note that the diminishing role of the students was due largely to their own limitations. As things developed, it became increasingly clear to the students that owing to their small number and limited resources, they could no longer handle the problem on their own. Furthermore, most of these students, who had already been involved in the fight for almost two months, were already exhausted and hoped that

some other groups would continue their leading role in battling CTV.[84] One must also remember that the university examination time was drawing near, and these handful of students could afford no further time nor attention to the issue.[85] Under these circumstances, they began to think of transferring their protest action to those community organizations and individuals who had expressed concerns about the issue.

Indeed, after the complete takeover of the issue by Toronto's Chinese community in late Novemver, all of the students originally involved, except Norman Kwan and Kai-wing Tsang, gradually withdrew from active participation in the anti-W5 campaign.[86] The November 20 meeting thus marked the formal transfer of the students action to the Chinese community movement against W5.

CHAPTER III

THE CHINESE COMMUNITY MOVEMENT AGAINST W5

STAGE ONE

The Prelude

The November 20 meeting marked the beginning of the active and serious involvment of the Chinese community in the W5 controversy. Before this time, however, there were a few organizations and a handful of individuals in the community which had already learned about the issue through the students and had expressed their concern in one way or another. For instance, William Tam, a recent U of T graduate and chairman of the Chinese Canadians for Mutual Advancement (CCMA), had personally participated in some of the students' anti-W5 activities. The CCMA itself, however, had not taken any actions against the programme. According to Tam, the organization was too small and too loosely-bounded to have adequate resources, manpower, fund or an external network that it could offer to the students.[1] Also, at that early stage, Tam, as did many other people, saw the controversy solely as a student issue and had never imagined that it would evolve into a Chinese community movement. Hence, he had not seriously thought of

introducing the issue to his association.[2]

The Federation of Chinese Canadian Professionals (FCCP) did protest against the programme.[3] After attending the students' forum in mid-October, FCCP president Dr. Chap-yung Yeung wrote a protest letter to CTV, demanding a public apology and a retraction of "the provocative and discriminatory statements" made in the programme.[4] Simultaneously, the Federation filed formal complaints with various authorities such as the federal and Ontario Human Rights Commissions, the Canadian Radio-Television Commission (CRTC), the provincial Minister of Culture and Recreation, and the federal Minister of Multiculturalism.[5] The FCCP requested each of these institutions to take measures against the programme and to prevent any recurrance of similar incidents.

As in the case of the students, FCCP's letters yielded no significant results. CTV replied to the Federation with the same seven-page rebuttal letter it sent to the students.[6] The CRTC, while indicated it would investigate the issue, took no signifcant action. Both the federal and Ontario Human Rights Commissions replied that the issue was not within their jurisdictions, and provincial Minister of Culture and Recreation did not want to pass any judgement until he had viewed the programme.[7] The federal Minister of Multiculturalism did express concern about the matter but no substantial steps were promised.[8]

The Chinese Cultural Association of Hamilton had also shown its concern by writing letters. On October 24, it sent a protest letter to the Hamilton Spectator, but it was never published.[9] Later the Association filed a complaint with Lincoln Alexander, Hamilton M.P. and then Minister of Labor, but to no avail.[10]

As mentioned previously, the Action Committee for Refugees in Southeast Asia did assist the students by donating one hundred dollars. It also encouraged the students to publicize the issue in the Chinese community and gave them a list of Chinese organizations in Toronto. Apart from providing this assistance, however, the Committee seemed unprepared to become actively involved in the issue. According to Dr. Joseph Wong, president of the Committee, one reason was that many core members of the Committee, including he himself, had not viewed the "Campus Giveaway"; thus, they did not have the sense of seriousness and urgency as those who had seen the programme.[11] As did many others, they saw the controversy mainly as a student issue. In addition, at that time the Committee was preoccupied with its Boat People campaign.[12]

The Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO) was the last organization approached by the students before the November 20 meeting.[13] After viewing the programme the night before the November 10-11 conference, CCCO board of directors passed a resolution that the Council should look

into the matter. The day immediately after its conference, the CCCO issued a news release to its members, asking for an individual or a collective effort "to ensure that deliberate distortions do not recur and that Canadians of Chinse descent are acknowledged as complete Canadains."[14] Before November 20, one Council director Gordon Chong, who was recently appointed to the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM), addressed the issue at a CCCM national meeting held in Toronto on November 16-18. In response to Chong's appeal, the Minister of State Multiculturalism Steven Paproski expressed his concern about the issue.[15]

As far as individuals were concerned, there were a number of Chinese Canadians who were informed of the programme the next day in the Toronto Star or from their friends.[16] In interviews, some of these people recalled that they did sense something wrong; but without watching the programme, they admitted that they were not aware of the seriousness or provocativeness of the issue and had thus not done anything about it.[17] There were a few Chinese people who actually watched the programme on September 30 and subsequently voiced their complaints in the Toronto Star.[18] The number of concerned individuals in the community, however, remained very small until the early and mid November when the students addressed the issue in the CCCO Conference and again when they screened the programme publicly at Cecil Community Centre. On these two occasions,

the students were able to rally a small crowd of concerned individuals, many of whom did not know each other and did not belong to any organizations in the community. These Chinese Canadians, mostly young professionals, gathered at the University Settlement House and formed a nine-member Steering Committee to deal with the issue.[19]

Nevertheless, despite the expressed concerns and efforts of these various groups and individuals, there were no indications that they intended to collaborate with one another; nor was there serious attempt to inform or to involve the Chinese community at large.[20] Their protest actions were limited to individual endeavors. Furthermore, their isolated efforts failed to provide any breakthrough in the stalmate with CTV. The latter remained its intransigent stance. In fact, there were informal reports that the television network planned to produce a one-hour follow-up programme of the "Campus Giveaway" to reinforce its previous argument.[21] As far as governments were concerned, they had been reticent about becoming involved in the controversy.

Nonetheless, despite their limited and sporadic attempts, these handful of organizations and individuals were virtually the only ones in the Chinese community that had shown their concerns about the W5 issue at that time. Other organizations and the general public in the community were simply unaware of the ongoing dispute. Therefore, though their efforts were fragmented and mostly ineffective,

their concerns and protests were important preludes--giving the students an impression that they were the potential allies for a united front against CTV.

The United Front

At the request or prodding of the students, most notably Norman Kwan, all concerned groups and individuals in Toronto's Chinese community finally got together on November 20, 1979, at the Mon Sheong Home. About fifty to sixty people, among them representatives of nine organizations, attended the meeting.[22] Before the assembly ended, a new committee was born. All of the nine organizations present became members of the committee. These included the Association of Chinese Canadian Students and Graduates (ACCSG), the Federation of Chinese Canadian Professionals (FCCP), the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO), the Action Committee for Southeast Asain Refugees, the Chinese Canadian Mutual Advancement (CCMA), Hamilton Chinese Cultural Association, the Toronto Cathy Lions' Club, the Mon Sheong Foundation, and the Asianadian Workshop.

It was expected that the first six organizations would particpate. They had been approached by the students and had expressed their concerns in one way or another. The last three organizations, however, might at first seem odd

partners on the new Committee. A look at their representatives would, however, show that their inclusion was not surprising. Bob Mark, who helped Norman Kwan organize the November 20 meeting and who was a chartered member of the FCCP, joined the new committee representing the Toronto Cathay Lions' Club. Gordon Chong, a director of the CCCO as well as a founding member of the FCCP, was the spokesman for the Mon Sheong Foundation. The representative of the Asianadian Workshop was Cheuk Kwan, one of the young professionals who had joined the nine-member Steering Committee a few days before the November 20 gathering.

In addition to the nine organizations, four persons were elected among the remaining attendents as individual members. The four members were also from among the young professionals who formed the Steering Committee.[23] Before the evening was out, a thirteen-member committee was created. The coalition was the first of its kind in Toronto's Chinese community. A glance at the social background of these members reveals that the committee was overwhemingly dominated by non-students, mostly white-collar professionals--physicians, lawyers, engineers and researchers. The students, who were represented by Norman Kwan, had only one seat on the committee. Furthermore, all members except Gordon Chong were immigrants from Hong Kong. One may also be struck by the obvious absence of traditional organizations such as the Chinese Cultural Centre,[24] and other clan and family-name associations in the alliance. All

organizations on the newly-formed Committee were recent groups of less than ten years of history.

Yet, in spite of these common characteristics, a close examination of these members and the organizations they represented indicate that the coalition was by no means a homogeneous one. Instead, it consisted of groups with diverse age brackets and political outlooks. Some of the nine organizations had already established rapport with one another prior to the coalition; but there were groups which never before had any connections with the others.

For instance, the FCCP, the CCCO, the Cathay Lions' Club and the Mon Sheong Foundation were closely affiliated. For instance, the charter members of the FCCP were also executive members of the other three groups.[25] In general, they represented the established, elite groups in the community, and had developed an amicalbe relation with the high echelon officials in the host society. On the other hand, the CCMA and the Action Committee for Southeast Asian Refugees were more grass-roots oriented. They were formed mainly by younger, recently-graduated professionals and social workers.[26] Owing to their different orientation, there was little communication between the established groups and the young.[27] The Asianadian Resource Workshop was a different association originally organized by a group of young Asian Canadians to publish a quarterly magazine by and for Canadians of Asian descent.[28] Nevertheless, it was not a

well-known association in Toronto's Chinese community. Hamilton Chinese Cultural Association was also little heard of among Toronto's Chinese Canadians, because of its location and its few public activities.[29] As far as the student group was concerned, it had always had little contact with the community and was somewhat confined to the compus.

What brought these heterogeneous groups together was their common concern about the W5 issue and the students' initiative. At this early stage, their concern over the issue and the fact that some of the members were unfamiliar to the others had obscured their diverse outlooks and inclinations. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the differences would not be hidden for long. It soon became apparent that mutual suspicion and dissension were inevitable. Before turning to the internal conflicts and strains in the alliance, however, let us first look at what the united front did during its first month.

The First Month of the Coalition

Ironically, Dr. Yeung of the FCCP, who once vehemently opposed the idea of creating another organization to tackle the issue, was elected chairman of the new committee during the very first official meeting. Perhaps some members thought it was a wise tactic. According to Norman Kwan, Yeung was elected because some members felt that by electing

him, who had once vehemently opposed the formation of the committee, they might minimize any potential conflicts in the newly created coalition. Other members recalled that Yeung was chosen because he appeared to be the most mature, articulate and experienced member at the time.[30] In addition, the organization he represented was an elite group which had developed many contacts with the provincial and local governments. By electing the FCCP president as the chairman of the committee, it might ease any committee's plans to lobby politicians and governments in the future.[31]

At the second committee meeting, the coalition adopted the name the "Ad Hoc Committee of Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO) Against W5" (hereafter the Ad Hoc Committee). On December 6, the Committee issued its first position paper, which clearly delineated the Committee's interpretation of the programme.

> On September 30, 1979, the CTV Network telecasted a documentary entitled "The Campus Giveaway" creating a prejudicial and damaging effect towards the Chinese community.
>
> By manipulating the film content and distorting the statistics, the programme depicted the universities as being taken over by "foreign students". It portrayed students of Chinese origin as foreign (regardless of their citizenship status) and created resentment towards the Chinese community by saying that these "foreigners" have taken away positions that "Canadian" should occupy in the university.
>
> The effect of the programme can only be to create an admissions policy which discriminates against visible minoirities, particularly those of Asian origin, and subsequently reduce their chances of becoming full active participating members of the overall Canadian community.

> Surely this is an unfair and unjust assessment to be made in light of the history of Asians in this country and their longstanding contribution to Canadian society as a whole.[32]

The interpretation offered by the Ad Hoc Committee was significantly different from that of the students. While the latter perceived the telecast as an attack against both the foreign and the Chinese Canadian students, the Ad Hoc Committee members interpreted it more as an assault on the Chinese Canadian community at large. In interviews with a few Committee members, they asserted that the foreign student issue simply did not stand out in the controversy. Some members did not even consider it as an issue.[33] They reckoned that the real target of the "Campus Giveaway" was not foreign students but the Chinese Canadians in general.

The Committee's three objectives were also clearly stated in the position paper:

> (1) To demand a public apology from CTV and an equal opportunity to present a fair and accurate report to repair the damages dones by the W5 programme;
>
> (2) To take necessary steps to ensure that CTV does not air similar programmes misrepresenting and damaging the images of any ethno-cultural group;
>
> (3) To educate the public about the contributions of the Chinese Canadians to Canadian society.

The objectives were quite ambitious. Not only did the Ad Hoc Committee want an open apology from the national television corporation, but it also wished to take the opportunity to foster a more positive image of the Chinese

Canadians to the public. To achieve the three goals, three subcommittees were set up--research, publicity and fund-raising.[34] At the same time, the Committee listed a number of pressure groups to be approached. They included the Chinese community, different ethnic minority groups, university community, politicians, other concerned organizations as well as the general public.[35]

Among the various target groups listed, the Chinese community was the Committee's first priority. This was understandable. It would be absurd to fight the issue--which was being publicly claimed as a matter of the Chinese Canadians' concern--without the awareness and support of the community itself. Furthermore, some Committee members saw the W5 incident as an opportunity to arouse and unite the people in the Chinese Canadian community, which had previously been divided and indifferent to social and political matters. Hence, two weeks after its formation, the Committee began busying itself publicizing the W5 issue in Toronto's Chinese community. On weekends, booths were set up in Chinatown to distribute fact sheets and flyers and to solicit donations and signatures from the people to support the anti-W5 campaign. According to a Committee report, the response of the people was gratifying. During two weekends in December, they collected $1,100 in contributions from Toronto's Chinese community.[36]

In mid-December the Ad Hoc Committee held its first public forum at Cecil Community Centre. The intent was to screen the film to the community people and to arouse their awareness. About two hundred people of Chinese origin turned out at the meeting.[37] What was more encouraging was the enthusiastic response of the audience. Many suggested various actions such as demonstrating, boycotting, and advertisement in newspapers to protest against the programme. Some members of the audience even showed interest in joining the Ad Hoc Committee. Before the forum adjourned, approximately sixty people had signed up as volunteers.[38] The scene was one of a growing, though not yet significant, support from Toronto's Chinese community. As a matter of fact, it was the enthusiastic response of the audience which prompted the Committee's decision to stage a demonstration in late January.[39]

By late December, the Committee took a further step. It began to contact the Chinese communities of other cities. At that time, Dr. Joseph Wong, one of the members, was about to take a trip in Western Canada. He suggested he take the opportunity to approach the Chinese communities in Alberta and British Columbia. Having obtained the consensus from nine of the thirteen members, he took along the videotape and visited the Chinese communities in Edmonton, Calgary and Vancouver. The response of these communities was surprisingly encouraging. Not only did they pledge their full support for the Committee, but they voluntarily

set up their local Ad Hoc Committees to assist Toronto's anti-W5 campaign. This was a significant move. Never in the history of the Chinese Canadians had there been such a close cooperation among the various Chinese communities across the country. This successful solicitation gave added impetus to the movement.

Aside from approaching the Chinese communities, some Committee members had also successfully enlisted support from representatives of some other ethnic minorities such as the Japanese, Jewish and black communities.[40] In the meantime, preliminary plans and arrangements were being made to lobby politicians and other concerned organizations in the larger community.

So far everything appeard to be going smoothly. However, things within the Committee were not as unruffled as seen from outside. As publicity and solicitation activities were taking place, behind the scenes bitter quarrels and conflicts among the members deeply divided the Committee into two opposing camps.

The Internal Conflicts

From the outset, the coalition demonstrated an uneasy coexistance. During its first month, almost all meetings were marked by heated debates, arguments and disagreements, which became so implacable that a schism finally emerged.[41]

(1) The controversy over the nature of the Committee:

As early as the November 20 meeting, at which the Ad Hoc Committee was formed, there were already signs of disharmony. It seemed that the conservative groups, notably the FCCP, were uneasy with the presence of a large majority of young and unfamiliar representatives on the Committee. Perhaps, it was for this reason that Cathay Lions' Club and Mon Sheong Foundation, which had never expressed their concerns previously, were enlisted as members of the Committee.

Yet the established groups constituted only a minority in the coalition. To counterbalance the overrepresentation of the young majority, Yeung at the initial official meeting introduced two motions for the Committee.[42] First, he wanted to extend the membership of the Committee to other Chinese organizations--preferably the more "mature" and "experienced" groups in the community.[43] Second, Yeung suggested that the Committee should only play a liason and advisory role for the participating members. In other words, member organizations were not obliged to comply with any decisions drew up by the Committee, and each could act according to its own interest. Ideally, if the two resolutions were enacted, it would have the effect of minimizing the steering power of the young majority in the Committee.

There were strong arguments about the two proposals. The progressive members wanted to maintain the present size of the steering body and wanted the newly created committee be a united front for collective actions.[44] Yet, despite the disagreements, Yeung's two resolutions passed. Perhaps most members voted for the resolutions in order to avoid any conflicts in the alliance at its incipient stage.

It is, however, interesting to compare the wording of the first resolution when passed at the first meeting to those of the same resolution after ammended upon the insistance of the FCCP at the second meeting. The first resolution when passed read:

> To form a 13-member committee from nine orgnizations and four individuals elected, and membership of this committee may be enlarged to include other organizations in the Chinese community as needs arise.[45]

But at the second meeting, the resolution was ammended by the FCCP as follows:

> To form a 13 person interim committee including a representative of each of the nine organizations present that night together with four other elected members. This interim commitee should be enlarge its membership to include more representatives of Chinese orgnaizations as time goes on.[46]

It is intriguing to note those terms like "a 13-member committee" versus "a 13 person interim committee", "may be" versus "should be", and "as needs arise" versus "as time goes on". The former resolution implied that the Committee had little commitment to expand its membership, while the

latter indicated the FCCP's strong will to do so. As far as the second resolution was concerned, the majority members passed the resolution with the notion that the Committee would still pursue collective actions; if the FCCP or some other groups objected to any particular measures, they could simply refuse to observe them.[47]

To some Committee members, the passing of the two resolutions was just a matter of formality. But for Yeung and other conservative members, the two resolutions were an assurance that they would not be outflanked by the young majority. It soon became apparent, however, that the conservative members had overestimated the effectiveness of the two resolutions. Although they had never been officially repealed, the resolutions were never applied. A new motion passed two weeks later virtually nullified the first resolution and gave the Committee a mandate of four months from November 20, 1979.[48] This implied that the Committee would not have to increase its membership for at least four months. As a matter of fact, four months later the mandate was further extended until the W5 dispute was satisfactorily resolved.[49] As far as the second resolution was concerned, the majority members had never treated the Committee as solely a liason or advisory council. Instead, they had always considered it a committee mandated to take collective actions.[50] All actions were taken under the name of the Committee after a majority vote.

The defiance of the two resolutions disconcerted the FCCP and estranged it from the majority members. There were, however, other more vocal and direct disagreements that further intensified the strains in the alliance.

(2) The argument over the name of the Committee:

Another early disagreement concerned the name of the Committee. Initially, the CCCO, one of the member organizations, proposed to call the Committee "CCCO--Project I: Civil Rights".[51] Yeung promptly rejected the idea of using the title of any existing organizations in the Chinese community. Gordon Chong then suggested the "Ad Hoc Committee Against the W5 Programme".[52] While many agreed, the CCCO argued that the new Committee should still come under the auspices of a well-recognized organization in order to give the new group a stamp of legitimacy and forcefulness. The CCCO then recommended to call the Committee the "Ad Hoc Committee of CCCO Against W5".

According to the CCCO, there were three reasons for using this name.[53] First, unlike some organizations in the community, the Council opened its membership to all Chinese Canadians in Ontario. Therefore, it could claim to have the mandate to represent the Chinese community in the province. Second, through its two annual conferences in 1978 and 1979, it had been recognized by the Ontario government as a representative organization of the Chinese community.[54]

Finally, it was in the CCCO Conference that the W5 issue was made known to a group of concerned individuals and organizations which formed the present committee. The three points sounded reasonable to most members, who then voted to adopt the name "Ad Hoc Committee of CCCO Against W5". The FCCP could do nothing but comply, albeit reluctantly, to the majority decision.

(3) The debate over the anti-W5 demonstration:

When it came to the questions of tactics and policies, it became obvious that reconciliation or compromise was simply impossible. In fact, it was the wide differences of opinion on tactics that caused an open split in the Committee. One of the strategies which was under constant debate was whether or not the Committee should launch an anti-W5 demonstration. As early as the second Committee meeting in late November, the publicity subcommittee, headed by three relatively active members , proposed to stage a protest march in downtown Toronto.[55] The conservative and established members were not enthusiastic about the proposal. They argued that protest march might provoke a public backlash against the Committee, since it would foster an image of an "unruly mob".[56] Furthermore, a protest march would open up the possibility for the intervention and manipulation of other political groups, especially the leftist organizations both within and without the community.[57] If this happened, it would discredit the Committee. Instead

of staging a demonstration, they suggested holding an indoor conference or rally, inviting all politicians, especially those members of Parliament and candidates who held ridings in areas with a considerable Chinese population to speak on the W5 issue.[58]

All members agreed with the idea. They understood that it was a good opportunity to invite the members of Parliament and candidates to speak for them, since the February 1981 federal election was about to take place in a month-and-a-half time. The few active members, especially those who had organized a Boat People demonstration a few months ago, however, insisted that the indoor rally should only be a supplement to the protest march, not a substitute.[59] They contended that a peaceful demonstration would not endanger the image of the community, since it was legitimate to do so in Canada. Moreover, successful protesting would attract immediate attention from the general public and would demonstrate to CTV that the Chinese community was able to organize itself against the programme. A well-planned and well-organized demonstration, they continued to argue, would minimize the risk of manipulation or intervention by any political groups.[60]

While the debate went on between the conservatives and a few activists, most members wavered between the sides.[61] On the one hand, they were hesitant about the idea of staging a public demonstration; but on the other hand, they saw its

merits. It was only after seeing the enthusiastic response of the people at the Committee's first community forum in mid-December that a majority of members finally decided to hold both rally and demonstration on January 26.

(4) The controversy over the students' legal action:

What escalated the tensions most within the Committee was a bitter quarrel over the students' legal action. Before the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, three U of T students had already served notices on three W5's officials. According to the legal procedure, the students had a three-month period, from the day of the W5 broadcast on September 30, in which they could file a writ to the Supreme Court. Beyond the time-limit, the students would forever lose the chance to file a libel suit against CTV. Undoubtedly, they did not want to miss the opportunity. As a matter of fact, it was with planning of the legal action that they initially approached the community for support. Hence, shortly after the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, the five student plaintiffs asked the Committee to back them up both morally and financially.[62]

According to the students, there were two important reasons for taking the case to the court.[63] First, they took their lawyer Joseph Pomerant's advice that a lawsuit was an effective pressure tactic against CTV, since the television network would certainly want to avoid any adverse publicity

caused by the litigation. Second, even if the students lost the case, they believed that at least in the Court of Justice they could publicly expose "the deliberate malicious intent behind the programme" and could "bring injustice to the open in order to prevent similar recurrances of abuse in the future."[64] Most Ad Hoc Committee members were sympathethic to the students' positions.

The FCCP, later joined by two other members, however, vehemently opposed the students' arguments. Even before the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, there were already signs that the FCCP did not favor the idea of filing a libel suit against CTV. As early as late October and early November, the FCCP, learning of the students' intent to sue CTV, had its legal subcommittee look into the possibility and the probable outcome of launching a legal suit. Of the twelve lawyers in the subcommittee, all but one cautioned against the lawsuit.[65] They argued that there were no existing regulations under the Human Rights Legislature that would permit the case. They also reckoned that since there was no precedent of a similar successful case, the students would not win in the court. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the time and financial commitment for the action would be so enormous that it was not worth pursuing. According to them, the time and money would be better spent on public relations and lobbying. Finally, they had been advised by a prominent lawyer that "the potential backlash on the Chinese community for losing [the] case in court would be so great that he

personally, with his vast civil proceeding experience, would advise strongly against it."[66]

Yeung's disagreement with the legal action became even more vocal after Committee members met with Pomerant in early December. Yeung and a few other members showed strong antipathy toward the lawyer. They had misgivings about Pomerant's motive, integrity and sincerity in persuading the students to pursue the case. To Yeung and a few Committee members, the lawyer was untrustworthy: while he promised to help the students at no cost, he indicated to Ad Hoc Committee representatives at the meeting that he expected an honorarium of between $1,000 to $25,000, depending on the complexity of the case.[67] Furthermore, according to Yeung, the lawyer was often associated with criminal cases; and if the students retained such a "crooked and bad-imaged" attorney, even if they won the case, it would not be a glorious victory.[68] In other words, the association with the lawyer would only discredit the Committee and the community at large.

Seeing the diverging opinions, Gordon Chong, who also disagreed with retaining Pomerant, proposed that the students obtain a written legal opinion from their lawyer, while he, in turn, would get professional advice from other more reputable law firms.[69] His proposal was passed; and all members agreed to make their final decision on whether the Committee would support the students' action on December

31--the deadline for filing the writ.

Chong consulted a number of "distinguished" law firms.[70] He even attempted to file the writ for the students with one of those "respectable" lawyers he consulted. His offer was, however, rejected by the students, who wanted to retain their original attornery.[71] Chong was ruffled by the rejection. In any event, he finally obtained legal advice from various "prominant" lawyers. To the surprise of the students and some Ad Hoc Committee members, the legal opinion obtained confirmed the FCCP's earlier contention--that legal action would be ineffective and inplausible, and that it would only be a waste of time and money.

One of the law firms even provided an eleven-page written opinion expounding why the case could not be maintained.[72] In brief, considering the present state of law, it argued, the libel suit was neither probable nor practical in Ontario. First, it was legally and practically difficult for the five student plaintiffs to file a libel suit on behalf of themselves and on behalf of other Chinese students, unless every member of the Chinese student community would establish a right and would bring a personal action for defamation.[73] Second, unless the individual plaintiffs had been shown in the programme and been personally attacked, the action for libel could not be maintained. In this case, all but one of the student

plaintiffs had never been screened or personally accused in the programme. Finally, the letter reiterated the point that since the case had no precedent in Ontario, it would be difficult for the students to win in the court.[74] Instead, the lawyer recommended that the Committee spend their time and money on public relations.

In view of these legal opinions, two member organizations the Mon Sheong Foundation and the Cathay Lions' Club joined the FCCP's camp. They rejected the action unequivocably as "failing to be one of the acceptable and prudent avenues of recourse."[75]

The other members, however, did not accept the arguments. According to them, the fact that the case was unprecedented did not necessarily imply the suit must fail or be impossible.[76] They also contended that the enormous amount of money involved should not be a reason for opting out the action.[77] They believed that with more than 100,000 Chinese population in Metropolitan Toronto, they could solicit enough funds to support the students. Moreover, some of these members had consulted a number of broadcasting insiders and civil rights lawyers, who agreed that a libel and slander suit would be a powerful weapon against CTV, since the lawsuit would adversely affect the image, reputation and publicity of the television network.[78] Furthermore, the primary concern of these members was not so much whether or not the students would win or lose the case,

but rather that it would be an effective pressure tactic against CTV.[79] They believed that by the very act of filing a libel suit against the television network, they would be able to pressure the network's officials to seek out-of-court settlements. If the case was finally brought to court, it would be a step toward justice. As Dr. Wong put it:

> If it goes to court and we win, of course, it would be a great great plus to not only the Chinese Canadians, but all other ethno-cultural groups, because they have a precedent to follow for the future.... The most likely course is we lose the battle but win the war. We win the war if the judge says, "You lose not because you are wrong, but because laws in this country are inadequate to protect you."[80]

Furthermore, the students received Pomerant's opinion letter, which delt with the merits of pursuing the legal action. In short, Pomerant argued that the "Campus Giveaway" did fall into the category of defamatory words; thus, a libel and slander action was maintainable.[81] Second, the possibility of having the five student plaintiffs pursue the lawsuit on behalf of other Chinese students in the university community was "available and realistic".[82] Finally, he added:

> ... While the case is complex, the chance of success is excellent. The need to sue is great, as it is the only realistic method of obtaining redress and preventing further attacks against the Chinese community in Canada.[83]

The conflicting opinions concerning the students' lawsuit intensified the polarization of the Committee. Those who opposed the legal action were upset to find that before they could present the legal advice they obtained, the majority of members had already had a "preconcevied determination" to pursue the action and to retain the original lawyer, and that they were uninterested in accepting the "experts'" advice.[84] What added fuel to the flame was that before the agreed December 31 deadline, the students with the support of the majority members had already issued their writ to the Supreme Court and had begun to solicit donation for the legal action.[85] These moves offended the three opposing members, who felt that the majority was only "playing time tactics to indicate willingness to listen to expert opinions but turning around to take on things entirely on their own without actual listening to reasoning."[86]

However, the majority members did not consider themselves having violated their earlier agreement to keep the option of legal action open until December 31. They argued that it was precisely because of this that they supported the students in filing the writ and in soliciting donations before the required deadline.[87] If the writ was not served by that time, they contended, the students would forever lose the chance to sue the W5's officials. On the other hand, if the writ was filed, the students would have retained the right to pursue or to withdraw the case in the

future. The majority members argued that:

> Without this decision, the option to sue and the threat of law suits against CTV would have been lost forever. It was for this reason that the Committee had no choice but to decide to raise a specail fund and to ear-mark it for this purpose at an early stage. Failure to take these steps....is irresponsible. It would certainly have prematurely given away this valuable option forever.[88]

As a result of the bitter quarrel over the students' legal action, relations between the two camps moved toward a rupture by late December.

The Formal Split

By the end of the first month, it became obvious that an open split was imminent. On December 17[89], Dr. Yeung proposed to resign from the Committee. Other members accepted his resignation but retained him until the Committee decided on a new chairman.[90] A few days later, Bob Mark of the Toronto Cathay Lions' Club also seceded. In early January, Gordon Chong followed suit. His letter of resignation stated, in part:

> I cannot comprehend some other individuals' behaviour without ascribing to them certain ulterior motives.... I cannot condone the equally deplorable insensitivity displayed by we Chinese Canadians toward the non-Chinese Canadian community. We cannot continue to take and give nothing in return.[91]

Aside from the three organizations, one individual member also withdrew from the Committee in early January. His

reasons were not given to the remaining Committee members.[92]

Although the resignation of these four members was accepted without any objections, the other members at that time considered a setback to the Committee.[93] Many feared that an open split would impair the Committee and the movement at large. First, the schism would give the community, the general public and particularly CTV an impression that the Committee was not a united force. This would undermine the forcefulness and legitimacy of the Committee. Secondly, some remaining members worried that the withdrawal of these conservative groups would stir speculation among the outsiders that the Committee must be so militant and radical that it scared away the mature, well-established professionals. Again, this might further reduce the community support for the movement.[94]

Whatever the remaining members feared, both the FCCP and Gordon Chong did attempt to discredit the Ad Hoc Committee. On January 15, 1980, Dr. Yeung, president of the FCCP, published a letter to his 500 members explaining his withdrawal from the Ad Hoc Committee.[95] In the letter, Yeung pointed out that he believed the Committee did not have the mandate to represent the Chinese community.

> ... I objected right from the beginning the imbalance of the Committee which does not represent proportionately the various orgnizations and community at large among ethno Chinese Canadians... Attempts made to enlarge this Committee to include more representatives from other organizations including people with more experience and more mature thinking, have

> not received the approval by 'the majority' of this Committee.
>
> Due to the lopsided representation in this Ad Hoc Committee, most of the actions and decisions are apparently taken on by a group of young, highly enthusiastic people who from the majority in this Committee.[96]

Yeung further censured the majority members of the Ad Hoc Committee by saying that many actions were being taken by the young majority "without actual listening to reasoning" and before the Committee had made its final decision.[97] These accusations were considered by the remaining Committee members "a grave disservice to the present difficult struggle of the Chinese Canadian community."[98]

Gordon Chong took an even more dramatic step. Before his formal resignation, Chong had already attempted to undermine the majority members. On January 7, 1980, he proposed to CCCO board of directors that they oppose the students' legal action and dissociate itself from any groups involved in the action.[99] He further recommended two alternative plans which the Council should enforce upon the Ad Hoc Committee: (i) to have the Committee discontinue the legal action and to replace the students' original lawyer with one of the law firms he had consulted as the Committee's legal counsel; or (ii) to simply dissolve the whole Committee so that no organizations or individuals could "carry on business in the name of the Committee"[100]

Quite surprisingly, CCCO directors were not convinced by Chong's proposals and unanimously voted against them.[101] Bitterly, Chong resigned from both the Ad Hoc Committee and the CCCO. As his letter to the Committee, his note to CCCO president was equally blunt.

> It has become painfully obvious to me in recent weeks that certain people connected wtih the Ad Hoc Committee of CCCO and the CCCO Board itself, have an interest in this matter that goes beyond concern for the Chinese Canadian community. To flog an issue simply to justify an organization's existence is reprehensible; to support a cause for self-serving reasons is equally fraudulent.[102]

To some, his letter left the impression that he believed Ad Hoc Committee members were unreasonable, extreme, unconcerned with consequences and used "underhanded and arbitrary measures" to achieve their self-serving purposes. Chong's letters angered both Ad Hoc Committee and CCCO members. Indeed, Chong did two other things that strongly antagonized the Ad Hoc Committee. First, he publicized his and other members' withdrawal in a local Chinese newspaper, the Chinese Express Daily Nes, a week before the Committee's demonstration.[103]Second, he sent copies of his two letters to friends and acquaintances, including politicians and civil rights leaders. He even personally asked to some public figures not to support the Committee's actions, since, as he argued, some of its members were doing things which had "ulterior motives".[104]

In response to Yeung's letter, the Ad Hoc Committee sent a rebuttal letter to FCCP members, refuting almost every point made by its president.[105] As far as Chong was concerned, however, the Committee did or could not do much to counteract his actions.[106] Surprisingly, in retropsect, Yeung and Chong's attacks did not have serious repercussions for the Ad Hoc Committee or the movement at large. It is true that the Ad Hoc Committee had lost the support of a number of better known and established groups such as the Mon Sheong, the Toronto Cathay Lions' Club and the FCCP. A group of Chinese medical doctors, for instance, who had promised to aid the Committee by donating one hundred dollar each suddenly withdrew their promises at the time the FCCP decided to resign from the Committee.[107] There was the possibiibity that Chong might also have succeeded in convincing a few public figures to withhold their support for the Committee.

Fortunately, the impact was not widespread enough to seriously deter the Ad Hoc Committee's anti-W5 campaign. There could be several factors for these limited effects. First, despite the heated debates and implacable disagreements, the Ad Hoc Committee was able to contain its internal dissensions within its caucus without much publicity. Even when the four members formally resigned from the Committee, the local Chinese newspapers--either

because of their lack of knowledge or on purpose--kept those conflicts in low key.[108] Owing to the lack of publicity, the split did not seriously affect the community support for the anti-W5 movement. Second, both Yeung and Chong's letters were addressed to a certain group of people--FCCP members and some non-Chinese public figures. Therefore, at most, only a limited circle of people would be influenced by their actions. In fact, as we shall see in the following chapter, by the time the four members seceded from the Ad Hoc Committee, the anti-W5 movement was beginning to gain increasing support and momentum in Chinese Canadian communities across the country.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANTI-W5 MOVEMENT

STAGE TWO

With the collapse of the united front, the community movement against W5 entered its second stage, which, paradoxically, became larger in scale and more complex than its earlier phase. Before the split, the Ad Hoc Committee was an umbrella organization under which all concerned groups and individuals in the Chinese community worked together against the W5 programme. But now the Committee, though still playing a leading role in the movement, was not the only active anti-W5 group in the community. The FCCP and Gordon Chong continued their own actions against the programme.

Surprisingly, although the Ad Hoc Committee, the FCCP and Chong were simultaneously but separately battling CTV, there was little serious tension between them until much later. Perhaps it was due to the fact that both sides had little or no communication with one another since the breakup of the coalition. This could have minimize chance for a possible clash. More important, both groups pursued

their actions along different avenues. While the Ad Hoc Committee continued to emphasize publicity for popular support, the FCCP and Chong inclined to work behind the scenes with power groups such as provincial Cabinet ministers. Both sides attempted not to overlap each other, until much later when there were signs of a possible settlement with CTV in early April. Let us first look at what the Ad Hoc Committee had done since the schism in early January.

The January 26 Rally and Picketing

Although the alliance had proven to be a partial failure and the Ad Hoc Committee Against W5 had lost almost one-third of its members, the split somehow smoothed the course of action within the Committee.[1] The nine remaining members were more in tune with one another without their ex-members present. Though differences in opinion still existed, they were in most instances compromisable. Thus, instead of spending most of their time arguing and debating over tactics, the members could concentrate on planning and executing them.

After the withdrawal of the four members, the Ad Hoc Committee resumed its publicity activities in the Chinese communities of various cities. By mid-January, the Committee had successfully enlisted support from Vancouver,

Edmonton, Calgary, Montreal and Windsor.[2] Meanwhile, the Committee also officially began to contact some non-Chinese groups, For instance, in mid and late January, the Ad Hoc Committee sent its first official letter to various ministries requesting their statements of support.[3]

All the while, the Committee was preoccupied with the preparation of its forthcoming rally and picketing, which were scheduled for January 26. Committee members attempted to stage a well-organized and well-contained rally and picketing not only to prevent any coat-tailing from other "undesirable" groups but to impress the general public that the Chinese community was able to mobilize itself peacefully and forcefully against the television network. About two hundred volunteers, many of whom had once been involved in the Boat People protest march, were recruited by the Committee to help organize the January 26 mass demonstration.[4]

Aside from ensuring tight security and discipline, the Ad Hoc Committee was also determined to draw an impressive turnout for the rally and picketing. Letters were sent to virtually all Chinese organizations across the country in an effort to enlist their support. Meanwhile, thousands and thousands of leaflets and pamphlets in both Chinese and English were being distributed to urge the community people as well as any other sympathetic groups to join the rally and protest march. More significant, the Committee had

obtained permission from several local Chinese newspapers, three Chinese cinemas and some restaurants in the community to advertise its upcoming events free or at low cost.[5] The cooperation was evidence of growing support from the community.

In order to increase the legitimacy and forcefulness of the rally and picketing, politicians, civil right leaders as well as representatives of other ethnic groups were invited to address the people at the rally.[6] Nine members of Parliament and other candidates for ridings with heavy Chinese population agreed to join the rally. Eleven civil rights leaders and ethnic groups' representatives were also listed as guest speakers.[7] Furthermore, the Committee was able to have two Toronto's major newspapers, The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, report its forthcoming events.[8]

A few days before the January 26 rally and picketing, there were already encouraging signs that the dual occasions would be a success. The Committee had received endorsement from over one hundred and sixty organizations across the country, most of which were Chinese.[9] In Toronto alone, there were some forty groups which pledged their support for the anti-W5 demonstration. These organizations included social service agencies, some traditional groups such as clans and family name associations, and a number of Chinese cultural associations.[10] There was, however, an conspicous absence of established organizations such as Chinese

Canadian Centre (Toronto chapter) and the three former Ad Hoc Committee member groups--the FCCP, the Mon Sheong Foundation and the Toronto Cathay Lions' Club. Aside from the Chinese organizations, there were a number of non-Chinese groups which also gave their countenance to the Committee's campaign. These included Jewish, Black and Italian associations, the International Committee Against Racism (ICAR), and a number of university student unions.[11]

January 26, 1980 was the climax of the anti-W5 movement. More than 1,300 people, mostly of Chinese descent, attended the indoor rally which was scheduled at the auditorium of the Faculty of Education at the U of T.[12] Failing to accomodate the enormous crowd at the scheduled site, Committee workers had to open eight adjacent classrooms. Still, they were jammed with enthusiastic overflow crowds, who listened to their guest speakers through the P.A. system.[13]

Of the twenty speakers invited, only two could not attend. They were federal Minister of Employment and Immigration Ron Atkey, and national president of Canadian Jewish Congress Rabbi Plaut. However, both had given their strong anti-W5 statements in writing. Dr. Donald Chu, new chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in his opening speech, reiterated the three demands of the Committee: (i) a public apology and a programme of equal length to refute their mistakes, (ii) an assurance that CTV would not air similar

programmes, and (iii) a chance to tell the public about the contributions of Chinese Canadians. Following his speech, a long line of guest speakers delivered their statements against the W5 programme and offered their support for the anti-W5 campaign. The one-hour rally finally ended as Dr. Joseph Wong, coordinator of the publicity subcommittee, invited those gathered to join the protest march following the rally.

Almost all attendents joined the protest line. Along the way, the number of demonstrators swelled from one thousand to more than two thousand.[14] Most protesters were of Chinese orgins. There were a few as old as sixty to seventy, and some were as young as two or three years of age.[15] The great majority were young people of Chinese origin, including students, professionals and workers. There were also delegates from Hamilton, Waterloo, Kingston, Ottawa and Montreal.[16] Most suprising was that all ex-Ad Hoc members except Gordon Chong were also among the crowd.[17]

Aside from the enormous turnout, the order and the organization of the march were impressive.[18] First came the national flag of Canada, then a large banner: "Ad Hoc Committee of CCCO Against W5". They were then followed by some 2,000 protesters holding and chanting the four banners proclaiming the Committee's demands. Despite the below-zero temperatures, the spirits of the demonstrators were high. They marched four abreast east along Bloor Street for a mile

and a half from the U of T Faculty of Education on St. George Street to CTV's headquarters on Charles Street. Along the way, the orderly but high-spirited demonstration attracted a swelling crowd of onlookers.

When the demonstrators finally arrived outside CTV's office, its main entrance was locked. The crowd chanted even louder than before, but CTV still refused to allow Ad Hoc Committee representatives to go into the building. It was only after two Metro policemen stationed themselves in front of the door that CTV's security people accepted delivery of the protesters' petition letter.[19] At that time, CTV's officials refused to make any comment. After the crowd dispersed, CTV, however, reportedly allowed some members of the press to the back of the building.[20] It was here that, W5 producer Lionel Lumb issued the following statement:

> As producer of W5, I strongly disagree with the position taken by today's protesters. But in view of the fact that certain parties have chosen to have the courts judge the veracity and accuracy of statements contained within W5's campus story, I cannot comment further because that might prejudice CTV's case before the courts. This is based on a writ for libel against CTV which was filed with the courts on or about the 19th of December last year.[21]

On the same day, a supporting demonstration was held in Edmonton, attended by some 500 Chinese protesters, including representatives from Calgary and Vancouver.[22] These simultaneous demonstrations in two different cities marked

the crescendo of the community movement. Although the protesters failed to win any satisfactory concession from CTV, the rally and the protest march did suggest a rising momentum of the anti-W5 campaign. More than 2,500 Chinese Canadians openly protested against the programme; some 20 politicians and civil right leaders publicly attacked CTV's "irresponsible journalism"; and more than 160 organizations across the country pledged their support for the campaign.

Apart from bolstering up the campaign, the January 26 rally and demonstration also served to give the movement instant and widespread publicity. Prior to January 26, the general public was largely ignorant of the W5 controversy. The protest march, however, immediately aroused the awareness of the public. Furthermore, before this time media people from both within and without the Chinese community had generally ignored the controversy and the ongoing campaign. The only exceptions were the Toronto Star, The Varsity (a U of T student newspaper), and The Peimei News (a local Chinese paper). The Toronto Star had reported the controversy since the next day after the broadcast of the "Campus Giveaway", though not so much the Chinese community's reaction. The Varsity had criticized the programme since early October and had shown sympathy to the UTCSA's cause. The Peimei News began to closely follow the anti-W5 movement in mid-November. Beyond these three sources, there was little or no mention about the controversy in the public media. It was only after the mass

demonstration on January 26 that other public press began to pay some attention to the W5 dispute.

The most notable example was Dick Beddoes' column in The Globe and Mail. For the following three months, the column had a series of more than seven reports and commentaries on the W5 dispute.[23] Since most of the media reports seemed to be more sympathatic to the Chinese community's cause than that of CTV, they not only helped publicize the community movement but constituted a form of public pressure on the television network.

Did the growing spirit, support and publicity manifested by the January 26 rally and picketing have any effect on CTV's attitude toward the dispute? It was clear that before this time, CTV had remained intransigent toward its controversial programme. For instance, in early November, CTV sent its seven-page rebuttal letter to those who made their formal complaints. The letter not only asserted the programme's argument but also expanded it against Chinese immigrant students. In late November, there were informal reports that the television network planned to produce a one-hour follow-up programme of the "Campus Giveaway" to affirm its previous stand. According to Professor Rosenthal at the University of Toronto, when he and some other faculty members inquired CTV about the programme, its officials replied with the inference that: "We have freedom of speech, don't try to interfere with us."[24]

Even during the January 26 demonstration, CTV's officials still refused to meet with Ad Hoc Committee delegates and subsequently restated that they did not agree with the protesters' position.

Quite surprisingly, however, a week or so after January 26, CTV's officials themselves initiated a private meeting with Ad Hoc Committee representatives.[25] On February 5, Donald Chu and Joseph Wong met with CTV vice president and producer of the W5 programme. This was the first talks between the two parties since the broadcast of the "Campus Giveaway" four months earlier. At the meeting, CTV's officials spelled out a condition for a settlement with the Ad Hoc Committee--that was, to have the students drop the lawsuit.[26] The two Committee representatives, however, refused to approve the condition unless CTV was ready to accept their three demands. No definite concession was made by either side. While Chu and Wong insisted on the Committee's three objectives, CTV's officials refused to back down.

Ad Hoc Committee members doubted CTV's motive for requesting the meeting, which yielded no tangible progress. They suspected CTV of trying to use the talks, which might appear to the public a sign of reconciliation, to shake the Committee's resolution to further pursue actions against it.[27] With a doubting in mind, the Committee issued a news release on February 12 informing the people in the Chinese community

about its first meeting with CTV and urging them to continued their support for the Committee.[28]

At the same time, however, Committee members realized that this meeting, though fruitless, might also be an important precedent for any future negotiations. In order to handle further talks more efficiently and effectively, the members decided to employ a prominent and competent lawyer as the Committee's legal counsel and negotiator.[29] Although the students had retained Pomerant as their attorney, remaining Committee members still had misgivings about the lawyer's liability and integrity.[30] On February 11, the Committee retained Ian Scott, a prominent civil rights and libel suit lawyer.[31]

Development after the January 26 Demonstration

Although the January 26 rally and demonstration was the climax of the anti-W5 movement, it was by no means a one-shot affair. Ad Hoc Committee members realized that to get a major national corporation, such as CTV, to apologize publicly and accept the Committee's three demands was a formidable task.[32] An open apology might mean a loss of face, a blow to its reputation, and create a wave of bad publicity. Therefore, in order to get a satisfactory settlement with CTV, Committee members believed that they had to continue exerting pressure on the television network

from all possible fronts.

A libel suit had already been filed by five U of T Chinese students, but the Ad Hoc Committee wanted to reserve the lawsuit as a last resort until every other tactics failed.[33] Boycotts and an advertisement campaign in major newspapers were also under consideration; but the Committee did not think that they would seriously affect CTV.[34]The Committee had also filed its own complaints with both the federal and Ontario Human Rights Commissions. Committee members did doubt whether the two institutions could help much, since they did not have legislative power over the electronic media.[35] There was, however, publicity to be gathered from filing a complaint.

Perhaps, the most powerful institution that could affect CTV was the CRTC. The latter was the only authority which has the power to renew or withdraw the licence of the television network. In fact, even before the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee, both the students and the FCCP had separately filed complaints with the Commission and asked for a special hearing into the programme.[36] In January University Affairs also appealed to the CRTC for actions. The Commission, however, had not taken any action nor made any public statements. Still, the Ad Hoc Committee wanted to push the CRTC again for a public hearing. A campaign was thus planned to collect as many as 50,000 to 100,000 signatures on a petition to the CRTC.[37]

Committee members believed that public pressure from all possible target groups was indispensible in order to get CTV yield to their three demands. Hence, in the period after the January demonstration, the Committee began its intensive and extensive lobbying activities both within and without the Chinese community. Before January 26, the Ad Hoc Committee tended to concentrate on lobbying federal MPs and candidates for public office. It had generally ignored the local and provincial governments. After the rally and demonstration, the Committee began to court their local aldermen and provincial leaders. In mid-February, with the assistance of Alderman Ying Hope of Ward 5, the Committee showed the programme and presented its case to Toronto's City Council.[38] Three days after the presentation, Ying Hope proposed a motion in City Council condemning the programme as irresponsible and requesting the CRTC to hold a public hearing into the programme. Surprisingly, the motion was unanimously passed by the Council.[39] This was by far the most forceful act adopted by government.

In late February and March, Committee members began lobbying certain provincial leaders. With relative ease, they obtained support from both opposition parties' leaders Stuart Smith and Mike Cassidy, though neither had the power to initiate action on a par with that of City Council.[40] Meanwhile, the Committee continued to maintain its lobbying with various members of Parliament. The stakes could be high for them. For instance, as a hint of power, the

Committee organized people in the community to vote for federal candidates who backed the Committee's campaign.[41]

While all this lobbying was taking place, the Committee had not forgotten the Chinese community itself. In fact, this was one of the major differences between the Ad Hoc Committee and the FCCP. Volunteers continued their street-corner campaign to disseminate newsletters in Chinatown, to solicit donation for the students' legal action and for the publicity campaign, and to collect signatures for a CRTC hearing.[42] Although the Committee had not added any more member organizations to its board of directors, it continued to rally many other Chinese organizations for moral and financial support. These included family associations, traditional social organizations, Chrisitian Church groups in the community, women's associations as well as martial arts clubs.[43] The Committee also held several fund-raising activities in the community, such as a dance and variety show, which always drew a large turnout.[44] On the whole, the response of the community continued to be supportive, though a large majority of the people and organizations had not taken an active role in the movement. By early March, the Committee had raised approximately $18,000 from Toronto's Chinese community.[45]

More significant, the Ad Hoc Committee had secured active support from the Chinese communities in other cities

across the country. Before the January 26 demonstration, there were only four anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committees--Toronto, Edmonton, Calgary and Vancouver; but after the protest march the movement mushroomed out to other Chinese communities across Canada. More and more Chinese Canadians in other cities became aware of the controversy and the ongoing movement. As a sign of support, they organized local forums and invited Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee members to speak to their communities.[46] Generally, the reaction of these communities was enthusiatic and positive. By the mid of March, the number of Ad Hoc Committees grew one after another from four to sixteen. Twelve new Ad Hoc Committees were organized in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Guelph, Hamilton, London, Windsor, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon and Victoria.

The emergence of these affiliates augmented the forces of Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee substantially. Each of these local Committees sent protest letters to its CTV's offices, filed complaints with its local Human Rights Commission and the CRTC, lobbied their local politicians, and contacted other ethnic groups in their areas. All these activities multiplied the pressures on CTV and the CRTC.

Nonetheless, as the number of branches grew, the Central Ad Hoc Committee in Toronto faced increasing problems. It began to encounter increasing complaints from local chapters about the communication and coordination

problems. Although delegates were being sent to different cities, the affiliates still found it difficult to maintain close contact with Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee. This was particularly so for the Western groups.[47] Since the centre of the movement was in Toronto, these more distant Committees faced the problems of maintaining the community enthusiasm and momentum of the anti-W5 movement. They were frustrated that they could not keep up with the development in Toronto. As Patrick Chen, chairman of Vancouver's Ad Hoc Committee, wrote:

> We never find out the effect in Toronto of actions taken here Vancouver until it is no longer relevant.....There is a need for immediate feedback to give a sense of progress and to sustain the enthusiasm of our committee members......We must co-ordinate our actions so as to avoid any relapse into the apathy and feeling of futility that has held back our community for so long in the past.[48]

As early as mid-February, both Vancouver and Edmonton's Committees, the two most active groups outside Toronto, began to complain about the problem and urged Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee to set up a better communication and coordination network among the different centres.[49] Their complaints and request prompted the Central Ad Hoc Committee's decision to hold a national conference for all local Committees two months later in late May or early June.[50] The aim was to coordinate national actions more directly and efficiently.

For the time being, Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee decided to restructure itself so as to set up a better coordination

and communication system, and, at the same time, look into a more efficient method of handling the increasing workload of the Committee. In late February, four persons were elected to the Committee to fill in the vacancy left by the four members who resigned earlier.[51] These new members were accepted as indivdual members without representing any organizations. Beyond this, the Committee also increased the number of its subcommittees from the original three to six.[52] They were fund-rasing, publicity, research and tactics, resources and services, public education, and public relations. The last subcommittee was mainly set up to coordinate a nationwide concerted effort against W5. The thirteen-member Ad Hoc Committee constituted the central committee, feeding out to the Chinese and larger community through the six subcommittees as well as coordinating the continuing activities of volunteer groups. What began as a simple coalition of various concerned groups had quickly formalized into a sophisticated and hierarchical organization. In mid-March Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee sent its first national report to all the local Committees across the country.[53]

FCCP and Gordon Chong

Although the Ad Hoc Committee played an active and leading role in the anti-W5 movement, it should be pointed out that its earlier opponents, the FCCP and Gordon Chong, also took anti-W5 actions independent of the Committee.

Predictably, their tactics were in line with what they advocated before and after the formation of Ad Hoc Committee and what eventually led to their resignations: that was, to quietly deal with power centres like politicians and governments.

A few days after his formal resignation from the Ad Hoc Committee, Gordon Chong screened the "Campus Giveaway" to the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM).[54] In response, Yuri Shymko, chairman of the Advisory Council on Multiculturalism and Citizenship, immediately sent a strong statement to CTV describing the programme as a piece of irresponsible journalism.[55] Aside from winning over the CCCM, Chong addressed the issue to a provincial cabinet minister meeting. He also appeared before a committee meeting of the CBC's people in Ottawa and had personally filed complaints with both the federal and Ontario Human Rights Commissions.[56]

As far as the FCCP was concerned, it had contacted the Canadian Bureau of International Education (CBIE) "on joint efforts to fight W5 programme."[57] At the same time, the Federation continued to press the CRTC for a special hearing into the programme. In mid-February Dr. Yeung of the FCCP together with Chong were interviewed by Larry Grossman in Channel TV 10.[58] They condemned the "Campus Giveaway" and demanded a public apology from CTV. The Federation had also contacted the Ontario Premier's Office, which promised to

look into the matter.[59]

Although the anti-W5 activities of both Chong and the FCCP were largely unknown to the Chinese community and the general public, their letters and lobbying did reinforce the community movement. It remained a distinctive characteristic of the Chinese community--at least to most first generation immigrants--to keep any internal dissensions within their own ranks, without revealing it to the outsiders.[60] Except for Chong, neither group made public their internal conflicts and disagreements. Hence, whether it was the FCCP or the Ad Hoc Committee which made a move, in the eyes of the outsiders, their actions would still be considered as part of a single community movement against the programme. Secondly, the groups approached by the FCCP and Chong were, in most cases, different from those of the Ad Hoc Committee. For instance, while the Committee succeeded to obtain the support of Stuart Smith and Mike Cassidy, the FCCP and Chong were able to lobby the Ontario Premier and cabinet ministers such as Larry Grossman and Ruben Baetz.[61] This obviously helped to diversify and multiply the pressure on CTV.

The March 16 Statement

By the middle of March, pressure was being applied to CTV from different fronts. CTV was not only facing the growing protests from the Chinese communities across the

country, but also from some major press media and various government departments. For instance, influential columnist Dick Beddoes of The Globe and Mail had written three articles on the issue within a month and a half between Janaury 26 and mid-March. In one of the articles, Beddoes not only talked about the "Campus Giveaway" but commented on another segment of the W5 programme "Strawberries Are Better Than People" as "distorted portrayal of VIA Rail Canada Inc."[62] This could not help but cast doubt on the credibility of the W5 programme at large. Added to this was Toronto's City Council which had officially condemned the programme and appealed to the CRTC for a public hearing. Furthermore, in early March the CCCM seriously urged CTV, the CRTC and the Canadian Human Rights Commission to take immediate steps against the programme.[63]

Against this background, CTV, without any advance notice, aired a statement on March 16 at the opening segment of its weekly W5 programme. The statement, which pertained to the current anti-W5 dispute, was read out by Helen Hutchinson, the narrator of the "Campus Giveaway".

> Tonight W5 would like to refer back to one of our stories that had caused controversy. That story... was called the Campus Giveaway.... The story upset two groups of Canadians: the universities, who said the facts were inaccurate; and the Chinese Canadian community, who said the programm was racist and cast slurs upon its members.... In the meantime, W5 would like to say this: it was never our intention in doing the program to give offence to any Canadian community: We sincerely regret any offence that may have been unintentionally given to the Chinese Canadian

> community. As for the accuracy of our figures: we should not have estimated that there are 100,000 foreign students in our schools. That estimate was wrong. We had used a process which included putting together all non-citizens:visa students, landed immigrants and those here on special permits. That process was misleading: we should have stuck with the latest official estimate from the Department of Immigration of 58,000 visa students at all levels....[64]

Presumably, CTV hoped this statement would end the long-festering dispute, which gave signs of being so disadvantageous to its image and credibility.

This March 16 statement caught the Ad Hoc Committee off guard. Committee members did not expect CTV to suddenly issue a statement on its own initiative. What was more perplexing was the content of the statement. On the one hand, it appeared to be an apology or at least a sign of retreat on the part of CTV. On the other hand, however, the statement had not addressed the three demands of the Ad Hoc Committee. The ambiguous statement threw the members into confusion. Should the Committee accept the statement as a settlement? For a moment, this question again split the Committee.[65] On the one side were some hardline members who found the statement utterly unacceptable. According to them, it was only a whitewash and by no means a sincere and thorough apology. The statement, they asserted, had not touched on the central issue of the dispute: that is that "the Chinese Canadians were stereotyped and being cast as foreigners in the programme." Second, it had only corrected one of the many largely inflated statistics, while other

distorted information was not mentioned. Furthermore, instead of really apologizing to the Chinese Canadians, it only said that "W5 sincerely regrets any offence that may have unintentionally given to the Chinese Canadian community". To over half of the members, this was neither sincere nor thorough enough to be considered as an apology.[66] These members wanted to reject the statement and continue the anti-W5 campaign until their three conditions were met.

On the other side were the moderate and cautious members, who felt that the Committee should take a more conciliatory position on the statement. For instance, they suggested the Committee to accept the statement and publish its acceptance in major newspapers.[67] Though these members agreed that the statement was not enough, they also cautioned that an outright rejection would possibly provoke a backlash against the Committee. First, it was highly probable that CTV would not make any further retreat; and if the Ad Hoc Committee did not accept the statement, the dispute might only drag on to a deadlock. There was also a fear that if the Committee continued to push ahead too hard, CTV might react negatively. Above all, there was a great dread that their earlier supporters both within and without the community might accept the statement as an apology and consider the dispute as resolved. And if the Ad Hoc Committee continued, not only would it lose the support of the people but would possibly alienate their earlier sympathizers, who might think the Committee was too

aggressive or unreasonable.

The apprehension over losing support and the possible backlash did haunt many members, including those who wanted to reject the statement. The dilemma facing the Ad Hoc Committee led to vacillation and delay in making its formal reply to CTV's pseudo-aplology. It was only after long deliberation that the Committee finally decided to denounce the statement.

While the Ad Hoc Committee was still uncertain of the outcome of its decision, it was, however, clear that its branches across the country were ready to support it. For instance, Vancouver and Montreal's Ad Hoc Committees rejected out of hand the statement as a token gesture "wholly inadequate to redress the damage done by the story to the Chinese Canadian community."[68] They urged all Ad Hoc Committees to continue pressing CTV and the CRTC until their three objectives were reached. This was a strong reassurance to Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee members. Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee also called other branches to assure that they were taking the same stand. Halifax, Edmonton and Winnipeg's Committees also renounced the statement as an "unaccpetable apology".[69] The remaining Ad Hoc Committees agreed to follow whichever decision adopted by the central Ad Hoc Committee.[70]

With the backing of all other branches, on March 19, 1980, Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee had its lawyer Ian Scot

send a formal reply to CTV, stating that the Chinese community was not ready to accept the statement.[71] Two days later, the Committee released its first public response to various local Chinese newspapers. The open letter clearly stated that the Committee was disturbed by the March 16 statement, which did not address the main issue of the dispute. At the same time, it hinted that the Committee was prepared"to consider any reasonable proposal that CTV may wish to make."[72] This points to the Committee's readiness to sit down and work out some settlements with the television network. Following the formal reply to CTV, the Committee further issued a detailed analysis of the March 16 statement to all its supporters, explaining why the Committee rejected the statement and pleading the people to continue their support for the Committee.[73]

Surprising to some, neither Gordon Chong nor the FCCP accepted CTV's March 16 statement as an apology. On April 4, the FCCP sent a letter to CTV complaining the statement was not extensive enough to be considered as a real apology.[74] Futher, the FCCP and Chong continued their appeal to various institutions.

In the wake of the March 16 statement, the Ad Hoc Committee resolved to step up even more forceful and immediate pressures on CTV than before. The reason was that Committee members were still worried that the statement

would likely be the first and the last concession CTV was prepared to make if no further pressures were exerted.[75] With this in mind, the Ad Hoc Committee took two drastic steps. First, Committee members decided to resume its most "powerful" option they had in hand, namely the legal action. Henceforth, the Ad Hoc Committee asked its legal counsul Ian Scott to prepare the libel suit in case CTV refused to yield to the three demands. Simultaneously, the Ad Hoc Committee wanted Scot to inform CTV about its intention to sue the three W5 officials. The purpose was to intimidate the television network. It was important for CTV to know that unless a settlement was reached, the Ad Hoc Committee was determined to launch its legal action.[76]

The second drastic move taken by the Central Ad Hoc Committee was to advance the date of its national meeting, originally scheduled for the end of May, to mid-April. The unexpected March 16 statement convinced Committee members of the need for an earlier national conference.[77] They worried that the March 16 statement might have defused the enthusiasm and determination of their previous supporters, who might accept the statement as CTV's apology to the Chinese community. And if the Committee still had to wait for another two months before having its national meeting, the momentum might have sunk to a low ebb.

This fear of losing support and momentum was not totally unfounded. There was evidence that some anti-W5

sympathizers did take the March 16 statement as an apology. When CTV sent a copy of its statement to U of T International Students' Centre (ISC), the ISC director did think at first it was a settlement. In a letter to Dr. Allen Earp, she wrote: "...I was impressed by the tone of the statement. It looks like a victory!"[78] A few days after the broadcasting of the statement, university newspapers at the University of Toronto, the University of British Columbia and Concordia University reported: "The CTV Television Network apologized publicly Sunday for airing a report on International students, on the W5 program."[79] Furthermore, the report pointed out that director of Canadian Bureau of International Education was pleased with the statement. If CTV continued to move in the conciliatory tone of the apology, the director commented, those fighting the programme would be satisfied. He was quoted as saying: "I consider it a major victory. I'm delighted with it."[80]

On March 21, even a local Chinese newspaper reported that CTV had already made its public apology to the Chinese community, only that the anti-W5 Committee had not yet released its formal response.[81] Dick Beddoes of The Globe and Mail, who had reported the controversy since the mid-January, also did not understand why the Ad Hoc Committee refused to accept the statement and approached an Ad Hoc Committee volunteer for an explanation.[82] In his April 8 commentary, Beddoes still called the statement an apology, "The tone of the CTV apology is conciliatory, but it fails

to satisfy the various Ad Hoc Committees of Chinese Canadains against W5."[83] It is apparent that some people did think the March 16 statement was an appropriate apology in the chronic dispute, now into its sixth month.

Fearing of losing support and momentum, the Central Ad Hoc Committee saw an urgent need to rally all the sixteen Ad Hoc Committees together for a national meeting. It needed to orchestrate the anti-W5 actions across the country in order to rejuvenate momentum and to show the television network of its national strength.[84] There was other force which pushed the Central Ad Hoc Committee to call the national meeting a month and a half ahead of its original schedule. It was the persistent urge from Vancouver and Edmonton's Ad Hoc Committees, which pressed the central Ad Hoc Commitee to hold a national meeting as soon as possible in order to boost the sagging morale of the people in their communities.[85]

Two Unexpected Interventions

As the Central Ad Hoc Committee began busying itself to prepare the national meeting, which was to be held two weeks later in Toronto, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) suddenly intervened in the W5 dispute by offering itself in the role of mediator between CTV and the Chinese community. In late March, Dr. Bhausaheb Ubale and Mark Makamura of the

Commission convened a meeting for the two parties at the Commission's office to be held in early April.[86]

The intervention of the OHRC was quite a surprise. Although the Commission had received many complaint letters for the past six months, and though Ruben Baetz of the Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation suggested to the Commission in late January that it act as a conciliator between the two sides,[87] the Human Rights Commission had thus far not taken any active part in the controversy. According to the Commission, its inaction was mainly due to the fact that the controversy was not within its jurisdictions. Hence, despite the fact that two Commissioners Dr. Armstrong and Rabbi Plaut made their support known during the January 26 rally, the Commission as a whole was not fully aware of the community's outrage until early February, when some Ad Hoc Committee members personally contacted the Commission.[88] After screening the programme on February 7, the OHRC made this comment: "It (the "Campus Giveaway") was unanimously judged to be unfair and detrimental to human relations."[89] The Commission also promised to look into the matter. It was, however, not until the late March, after CTV issued its first statement and after the Ad Hoc Committee had made its response, that the OHRC offered to mediate between the parties.

In any event, under the initiation and good auspices of the Commission, the two parties met again for the second

time on April 4. During the talks, CTV's officials complained that it had already made its apology on March 16 and did not understand why the community still rejected the statement.[90] According to Cheuk Kwan, one of the Committee's representatives at the meeting, it appeared that CTV was still unaware of the main concern of the Chinese community. It was only after this dialogue that CTV's officials seemed to realize the Chinese Canadians were upset to see themselves being "labelled as foreigners" on the programme.

During the talks, CTV's officials also requested the Ad Hoc Committee to discontinue its anti-W5 publicity campaign.[91] Committee members, however, refused to accept any conditions unless there were signs of settlement. The OHRC then interceded by suggesting that if the Ad Hoc Committee continued to push further, it might face some unfavorable consequences.[92] At the same time, the Commission requested CTV to make a more extensive statement than the one on March 16.[93] The television network agreed to give its decision the following week. Again, no tangible agreement was made from both sides. Before the meeting adjourned, however, both sides promised to keep their talks confidential and to meet again for further negotiations--but no definite time was set for the meeting.[94]

While the Ad Hoc Committee was about to wait for further talks, another unexpected incident occured which

dramatically affected the Committee's operations. This time the interruption did not come from outside but from within the community. The day before Committee representatives met CTV at the Ontario Human Rights Office, Dr. Wong, vice-chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, received a sudden telephone call from Alderman Ying Hope.[95] The latter told Wong that the Ontario Human Rights Commission had recommended that he join the negotiation meeting the next day. Wong's reply was that the Ad Hoc Committee should have a final say whether the alderman could join the negotiation. Wong then promised to give Hope an answer the next day. Shortly after the telephone conversation , Wong received another call. This time from Dr. Ubale, chairman of the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Ubale told Wong that he just had just spoken to Ying Hope, who, on his own initiative, said that the Ad Hoc Committee had asked him to join the talks with CTV. Wong was shocked to hear it and questioned the alderman's integrity and his underlying motives. Wong then presented the case to the Committee, which in turn rejected the alderman's involvement in the talks.[96]

The reasons for the Committee's rejection of Hope's request were more personal than tactical. Most Committee members felt that the negotiation talks, which offered signs of possible settlement, were earned by the long struggle and hard work of the thirteen members and the some fifty volunteers; therefore, the meeting should only be attended

by Ad Hoc Committee representatives.[97] Furthermore, they argued that the alderman had not contributed or done enough about the issue. When there were signs of possible settlement, he wanted to intervene. It appeared to Committee members that the alderman was just trying to jump on the bandwagon, a move which was utterly unacceptable to the Committee members. Moreover, they felt that the alderman's presence would only complicate their negotiation with CTV.[98]

The next day Wong then told Alderman Hope that the Committee did not want the involvement of a third party. As was expected, Hope was upset. He argued that the W5 controversy was not only the Ad Hoc Committee's issue but a matter of the whole Chinese community concern, therefore, any Chinese Canadian representatives should have the right to participate in the talks. He then made it clear to Wong that whether the Committee allowed him or not, he would still negotiate with CTV by forming another group in the Chinese community to deal with the issue.[99]

Although the Committee had rejected Hope's intervention, his threat was by no means ignored by the Committee.[100] The latter took it very seriously. They knew that with his reputation in Toronto's Chinese community and his influence in various established Chinese organizations, the alderman would likely muster enough support and resources to form another committee in the Chinese community

to negotiate with CTV. Indeed, in his letter of complaint to the chairman of the OHRC on April 8 over the matter of the Commission's failure to invite him to the negotiation the alderman was able to obtain endorsement from president of the FCCP, president of Toronto's Chinese Business Association, both president and former president of the Chinese Cultural Centre, and Gordon Chong.[101] If the new group was formed, these people would likely be the alderman's allies. Indeed, there were rumours that in the upcoming FCCP's April 20 meeting, the proposal to form a new group would be announced.[102]

Understandably, the Ad Hoc Committee did not want a rival group. Although the FCCP and Gordon Chong had dealt with the issue separately from the Ad Hoc Committee since the split four months ago, they had not posed any serious threat to the Committee's operation. At least, so far, the FCCP and Chong had not publicized their actions. Their target groups were in many instances different from those of the Ad Hoc Committee's. Furthermore, there was no open interference in each other's actions; but now with Hope's threat to form an alternative group against W5, the Ad Hoc Committee was confronting an open challenge. In the first place, a new group might discredit the operation of the Ad Hoc Committee as unrepresentative of the Chinese community. Secondly, the formation of another anti-W5 organization would clearly reveal to its supporters and CTV alike the disunity of the Chinese community in fighting the issue.

Both of these possible problems would in turn undermine the bargaining power of the Ad Hoc Committee in its further negotiations with CTV.

There were two alternatives to forestall Hope's intimidation: either to allow the alderman to join the negotiation or resolve the dispute with CTV before he and his allies would have any chance to form another anti-W5 group. The first alternative was rejected, since the Ad Hoc Committee members were determined not to allow the alderman interfere in their talks with CTV. The only way left was the second option. Hence, during the emergency meeting, the Committee decided to accelerate its whole process of action by urging CTV for an earlier settlement.[103]

To do this, they had to employ both the stick and the carrot. On the one hand, the Committee prepared some conditions and compromises that it would offer to CTV. It was hoped that their settlement package would provide a breakthrough to the impasse.[104] Simultaneously, the Committee tried to have its lawyer Ian Scot push CTV for an earlier negotiation meeting. However, since Scot was out-of-town for a week, the Committee had to wait for another week before it could take any steps.[105] For the time being, Committee members were careful not to make known Hope's threat outside the caucus--not even to its lawyer.[106] They feared that any leak would weaken its bargaining position in their future talks, though they were prepared to seek

compromises if necessary.

When the Ad Hoc Committee finally got in touch with its legal counsel Scot, the latter informed their clients that CTV, through a letter from its lawyer, was annoyed by the continuous anti-W5 publicity.[107]In particular, the television network was disturbed by Dick Beddoes's April 8 article in The Globe and Mail and his quote of Montreal's Ad Hoc Committee strong statement:

> We do not consider the token gesture of CTV anywhere near a sincere and honest response.... We intend to press CRTC to launch a public inquiry into the show.[108]

Furthermore, in its letter, CTV made it clear that it was uneasy with the Ad Hoc Committee's upcoming national meeting, which was to be held a week later.[109]

In view of CTV's concerns, Scot advised the Ad Hoc Committee to minimize its publicity activities in order to maximize the chance for a compromisable negotiation. In light of the delicate and critical situation, Committee members accepted their lawyer's advise. They understood their own limits and knew well that it would be difficult to hold further negotiation once the situation was jeopardized.[110] The Committee then decided to take Scot's words and see what happened after their publicity activities were downplayed. Here one can see that the Ad Hoc Committee had moved from its adamant stand to one of compromise. In the face of the critical situation, a threat within the community and signs

that the enthusiasm of the community was waning, it was understandable that the Committee had to soften its earlier position in order to win a satisfactory settlement as soon as possible.

The Unexpected Triumph

In any case, the Ad Hoc Committee finally initiated a third meeting with CTV on April 15.[111] At the meeting, Committee urged CTV for an earlier settlement. To the surprise of the Committee representatives, before they could offer its settlement package, CTV had already revealed its plan to produce another programme with the consultation of the Chinese community.[112] More significant, it agreed to issue another public statement on its own terms the following day.[113] In part, the pronouncement, which was delivered by CTV president Chercover, read as follow:

> On Sunday, March 16th, CTV broadcast an apology for the controversial W5 program, The Campus Giveawy. CTV does not believe that the statement went far enough, especially in answering the widespread belief that the program was racist in tone and effect.
>
> We now wish to issue a further apology to all Chinese Canadians, in particular, and to Canadians of all backgrounds, who felt that we had singled out a minority group for an unfair attack that was based on inaccurate statistics.
>
> .... We were clearly wrong in our presentation of the facts and W5's initial defence of the program.
>
> Right after the program was broadcast our critics--particularly Chinese Canadians and the

> universities--criticized the program as racist: they were right, although it was never our intention to produce a racist program. There is no doubt that the distorted statistics combined with our visual presentation, made the program appear racist in tone and effect. We share the dismay of our critics that this occured. We sincerely apologize for the fact that Chinese Canadians were depicted as foreigners, and for whatever distress this stereotyping may have caused them in the contest of our multicultral society.

The statement continued,

> ... As a result of the criticism and our internal investigations, corrective measures have been taken. We believe we have now instituted a better system of checks and balances in respect to editorial content and presentation of programs. We have also reviewed our editorial and management systems and changes have been made, both in those systems and in personnel...[114]

The extensiveness of the content was simply beyond the expectation of the Ad Hoc Committee members.[115] They had never imagined that CTV would make such a far-reaching concession without any further negotiations. Of course, the Ad Hoc Committee accepted it as a sincere and thorough apology, as clearly declared in its joint statement with CTV:

> The discussions between both parties have been fruitful and have produced a large measure of understanding and goodwill. They have also resulted in a tentative settlement which both parties hope will begin to repair the rift caused between CTV and Chinese Canadians, and which would also be beneficial to our multicultural society as a whole.[116]

However, the exact nature of the settlement was not yet spelled out in the statement:

> The terms of this settlement are confidential for the time being. They will be presented on Sunday, April 20 in Toronto to the Natianal Meeting of Ad Hoc Committees of Chinese Canadians Against W5 from seventeen cities across Canada.[117]

Hence, after April 16, there were still private meetings between the two parties. So far, the Committee had attained a major part of its three demands: an open apology from CTV and an assurance that similar programmes would not be aired in the future. However, the two conditions remained unresolved. They were (i) to present "a fair and accurate report to repair the damages done by the programme", and (ii) to inform the public of the contributions of Chinese Canadians. These were the major items that had to be discussed in the next few days.

Before these meetings, CTV had already made a verbal agreement to produce another programme with the consultation of the Chinese community. At that time, the Ad Hoc Committee requested Dan Hill and Alan Borovoy of the Canadian Civil Liberty Association as consultants of the follow-up programme.[118] Both Hill and Borovoy as well as CTV suggested they produce a programme on "unconscious racism". The Ad Hoc Committee also agreed with their idea; but after reading the proposal of the script, disagreements emerged--not between CTV and the Ad Hoc Committee but among the members themselves.[119]

According to Norman Kwan, the script did not have any direct reference to the "Campus Giveaway" or the Chinese Canadian community. He and a few other Committee members wanted the programme be related to the W5 controversy and/or the Chinese Canadian community as stated in the three objectives. Even if not on the two particular issues, it should be something on racism in mass media. Kwan argued that since the follow-up programme was won by the community people and the students, it should have some relation to them. However, a majority of the members did not agree with his contention, and decided to go with CTV's and the two consultants' proposal. They did not intend to push CTV too far and wanted to show CTV's officials as well as the outsiders that they too were reasonable. In addition, the Committee accepted the good intent and dignity of the television network. Moreover, some felt that to produce a further show on Chinese Canadians might cause antipathy from the general public.[120] Afterall, most members were already gratified by CTV's second statement.

The agreement to produce a future programme on "unconscious racism" was finally ratified by the delegates from the sixteen cities, who just arrived for the national meeting. At the April 20 press conference, the Ad Hoc Committee issued its official response to CTV's April 16 apology. The mild tone of the statement was in great contrast to those strong remarks made a month before.

> Ad Hoc Committees from seventeen cities on April 19 in Toronto accepted CTV sincere apology. It

> takes courage to admit one's mistakes. We congratulate and salute CTV for their courage...[121]

Patrick Chen, chairman of Vancouver's Ad Hoc Committee, then announced the settlement agreement:

> CTV agrees to produce a programme segment on W5 on the subject of "Unconscious Racism in Canada". The general aim of the programme was to restore the image of minority group adversely affected by W5's "Campus Giveaway" programme on last September 30... The programme will be a standard W5 segment about 12 minutes in length. The programme will be aired within the first five W5 programme of the 1980-81 fall session.[122]

On the same evening, the sixteen Ad Hoc Committees across the country celebrated their victory in a 1000-person banquet, which was orignally scheduled as an anti-W5 gathering. Again politicians, civil rights leaders, representatives of other ethnic communities and certain journalists were invited to address the people.[123] The mood was jubilant.

Nevertheless, there were some members and volunteers who had reservations about the settlement.[124] First, some people, especially the students, were dissatisfied that neither CTV's apology nor the joint statement had mentioned a word about the foreign students. To them, the negotiators had simply ignored the foreign student issue.[125] Some felt sorry for those foreign students who had initially played an active part in the early anti-W5 movement, and who, in the end, were never mentioned.[126] It was only at the April 20

press conference that Dr. Wong of the Ad Hoc Committee breifly mentioned that the joint statement had left out the foreign student issue.[127]

Another discontentment was that while the banquet hailed the efforts of the community in winning the battle, the indispensible role played by the students had been forgotten. Again it was only Professor J. Malawala, member of the Ontario Advisory Council of Multiculturalism, reminded the people in his brief speech the important role played by the long-suffering students at the early stage.[128] Finally, some volunteers and community people were disillusioned by the follow-up programme.[129] While they had expected a telecast related to the "Campus Giveaway" or the Chinese Canadian community, it turned out to be something without any direct reference to their particular cause.

In any event, the community had finally won a major battle. As Bob Rae, then NDP member of Parliament in the federal riding of Broadview-Greenwood, pointed out at the banquet, it was the first time in the history of Canada that a broadcasting institution made an open opology to an ethnic community.[130] The April 20 celebration banquet thus formally marked both the triumph and the conclusion of the anti-W5 movement.

CHAPTER V

THE CAUSES OF THE MOVEMENT

The anti-W5 campaign in Toronto's Chinese community has hitherto been described from its inception in October 1979 to its final victory six months later. The narration has explained in part how a twelve-minute programme on "foreign students" led to a movement of the Chinese community, which originated in Toronto and later spread across the country. The course of events, however, cannot adequately account for the outbreak of the movement, particularly when they occured in a community which before the incident had been politically inactive; nor can these events alone sufficiently explain the success of the campaign.

Both the outbreak and the eventual success of the protest were results of the interactive forces of historical, social and political conditions of the ethnic community, the characteristics and the ideological outlooks of the participants, as well as other situational factors. In this chapter, an attempt is made to study the various immediate and long-term factors that contributed to the rise of the movement. The reasons for its success as well as its

implications and significance for contemporary Toronto's Chinese community will be discussed in the following chapters.

Needless to say, the event that triggered the anti-W5 movement was the programme "Campus Giveaway". Its strong criticism against students of Chinese descent, especially those in the professional faculties, sparked off an unprecedented political movement in Toronto's Chinese community. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the campaign was by no means an immediate or spontaneous outburst of Toronto's Chinese community against CTV. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it took almost a month and a half after the broadcast before some Chinese organizations began to take serious actions against the programme, and it took another month or so before the community at large was aware of the dispute. Given these facts, what were the other forces at work that eventually led to the rise of the movement?

The Causes for the Students' Reactions

In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that the first and foremost cause of the anti-W5 campaign was the students' initiative at the University of Toronto. Though their actions were short-lived and limited in scope, in retrospect they played an indispensable role in paving the way for the movement. They initiated the protest action, informed the

community of the issue, and finally forged a united front among different groups in the community against W5. Without their initiation and efforts, it is doubtful whether the anti-W5 movement would have ever got off the ground. Hence, to understand the outbreak of the movement, one should first examine why the students reacted so seriously and actively to the programme.

As outlined in Chapter 2, Chinese students, especially those at the University of Toronto, were disturbed by the programme. It is, however, important to note that the "Campus Giveaway" was not the first public attack against Chinese University students in Toronto. Several similar allegations had been made long before the W5 incident. In 1974 Dr. Bette Stephenson, then president of the Canadian Medical Association and current Ontario Minister of Education, publicly expressed her fears that there were "too many" Chinese students in the medical school of U of T. "We are excluding our own children," she warned, "and turning out an unrepresentative group of doctors without a well-grounded understanding of Canadian culture."[1] Her outburst was then echoed by the Medical Post, an established medical journal, which stereotyped Chinese medical students as working eighteen hours a day, "with no time to play, no time for any interest outside their textbooks, no time to fall in love, no time even to look up to see what the rest of the world is doing."[2] Dr. Morton Schulman, former new Democratic member of the Ontario legislature, went so far as

to suggest quotas be imposed on the number of non-citizens entering medical schools.[3]

These outbursts were as provocative as the W5 programme. They treated all Asian faces--whether they were Canadian citizens, landed immigrants or visa students--as foreigners.[4] These earlier anti-Chinese remarks, however, did not elicit any open reactions from either the Chinese student body or the Chinese community at large. When Henry Fong, a fourth-year Chinese student, was expelled from the U of T medical school in 1975, charges of anti-Chinese prejudice were levied against the school. A legal skirmish broke out between a number of Chinese lawyers and the University authority. It seems that the student body and the Chinese community were either reticent about the incident or simply unaware of it.

How was it, then, that a twelve-minute programme could provoke such a serious reaction from the students, while Stephenson and Shulman's comments did not? A comparison between the W5 issue and the other cases will shed some light on the question. Although all of the earlier charges were aimed at Chinese professional students at Canadian universities, the nature of attack in these cases were different from that of the "Campus Giveaway" in several important ways. Whereas the attacks made before the W5 incident focused exclusively on Chinese medical students, the targets of the "Campus Giveaway" were all Chinese

university students. In addition, by openly attacking Chinese foreign students and explicitly labelling all students with Asian faces as foreigners, the programme in effect antagonized all students of Chinese descent, regardless of their status. In effect, the sweep of the W5 attack enhanced the explosiveness and provocativeness of the issue.

The second difference between the W5 prgramme and the former cases lay in the nature of their attacks. Though Stephenson and Schulman's charges were largely inaccurate and unfair, it is difficult to pinpoint any factual inaccuracies as libel and slander. Their comments were mainly their own opinion and perception of Chinese students, unsupported by either statistics or concrete facts. Hence, there was little ground for the students to rebut their charges. On the other hand, the "Campus Giveaway" was clearly guilty of misinformation, statistical errors and factual misrepresentation The verifiability of this case provided a strong base for the students' protest. When the students resorted to legal action, they believed they had substantial grounds for suing the television network.

The early cases did not have any direct or personal involvement save that of Henry Fong's dispute. Yet, Fong's expulsion was an individual problem. However, the W5 programme did directly involve two specific groups of Chinese students at U of T: the UTCSA and Chinese pharmacy

students. The former felt they had been deceived and manipulated when they discovered that its orientation party had been filmed by CTV to support the programme's argument against Chinese students. Chinese pharmacy students at U of T were deeply disturbed because they were being directly accused of robbing seats from qualified "Canadian" students. The groups' feeling of being manipulated and maliciously attacked encourged the determination of these two groups of students to do something against the programme.

The fourth difference between the former cases and the "Campus Giveaway" was that the latter was a public affairs telecast, while the others were personal comments from individual, albeit important, persons. Moreover, it was clear that their statements were subjective. The "Campus Giveaway" was, on the other hand, a national broadcast which generally conveyed an impression of being objective and credible. The viewing audience, the students feared, might not question the accuracy of such documentaries and would thus form a negative opinion and attitude toward them. This accentuated the students' sense of the seriousness of the issue. Furthermore, the audio-visual effects of the programme deeply incited resentment among the viewers. As many anti-W5 activists admitted, when they first heard about the programme or even read the transcript, they were not as disturbed as after they saw it.[5]

Finally, it is important to note that the W5 programme did not alienate only the Chinese students but the university community generally. Stephenson and Schulman's remarks might have won tacit approval from the medical faculty members and some University officials,[6] but W5's blunt and unfounded accusation against Canadian university admission policies, especially those of the U of T, alienated the university authority which swiftly and strongly rebutted the programme through protests to CTV. The University's reaction provided institutional backing and legitimate basis for the students' protest. It is probable that without this support and the sense of legitimacy, the students would be more hesitant to take action against the television network.

It should also be noted that the Chinese student body in Toronto was by no means a politically active group. It was widely assumed that the Chinese students of the late 1970's were much less politicized than their predecessors. They tended to eschew direct involvement in any political issue. For instance, during the Boat Campaign in the summer of 1979, no Chinese students organizations, except for some support from a few individual students, formally endorsed the campaign.[7]

The students' determination to take action in the W5 case was due largely to a small group of students at U of T. Senior executives and active members of the Chinese Students

Associations can be said to fill the continuum between radicalism and conservatism. Though they were not politically active, they indicate some degree of concern about issues such as social injustice, racial equality and human rights.[8] Hence, after seeing the programme, they at least felt an urge to arouse the awareness of other Chinese students on campus about the issue and wished to take some action against the programme.

Since these students were far from being political activists, their initial action were cautious and moderate. For instance, while the UTCSA turned to the U of T International Stedents' Center (ISC)--a university sponsored institution--for advice, it rejected any offer of help from the International Committee Against Racism (ICAR)--an active anti-racist organization.[9] The only thing that the students were ready to do at that time was organize a letter-writing campaign. They were unprepared for any confrontational tactics. As noted before, the Chinese student organizations did not want to hold a demonstration. They also took time in discussion before they finally agreed to sue CTV. Furthermore, the students had never thought of escalating the dispute by involving the larger Chinese community. During the incipient stage, the students treated the controversy mainly as an on-campus issue. Their initial protest was thus a discreet and moderate reaction to the programme. In fact, after a month of frustration in dealing with CTV, most angry students lost their fervor and

confidence in their struggle. One by one, the various Chinese student associations withdrew from active participation.

There remained, however, a few committed students who continued their fight, which eventually led to the involvement of Toronto's Chinese community. Yet, as discussed previously, the students did not expect the community to play an active role in the controversy.[10] However, the coincidental acquaintance with the president of the Action Committe for the Southeast Asian Refugees--a small but socially and politically active group--and the unexpected enthusiastic response of people during the CCCO conference convinced the students that they were groups in the community which would be actively willing to support their cause. Under the initiation and prodding of these students, a coalition of various community organizations was formed. Henceforth, the students' protest, which had been relatively obscure, eventually developed into a political cause in Toronto's Chinese community.

The Reasons for Community Involment

This leads to the second part of the question: why were the various organizations and individuals in the community willing to pick up the issue and actively launch a massive political campaign against CTV? To find the reasons

for the community involvement, one has to look at the background of those participants, their value systems and the social and political structures of Toronto's Chinese community in which they operated.

Significantly enough, as previously indicated, the main actors of the campaign were university-educated, white-collar professionals and intellectuals. There was a disproportionate underrepresentation of businessmen and blue-collar workers. Apparently, owing their educational backgrounds, these white-collar professionals and intellectuals were more akin and sensitive to the "Campus Giveaway" controversy than the other two sectors of the Chinese population. Naturally enough, the students approached this particular group of people in the community. Yet, this is inadequate to explain why these professionals were sympathetic to the anti-W5 cause and responded much more actively and seriuosly to it than to Stephenson and Schulman's comments or the Henry Fong's incident.

These professionals did not act in a vaccum. There must be certain historical and social circumstances which allowed them to take an active role in this incident. One important factor proved combination of timing and the socio-political conditions of Toronto's Chinese community. It should be remembered that Stephenson and Shulman's comments and the Henry Fong incident occured before the mid-1970's, when most of the organizations involved in the

W5 movement had not yet been formed.[11] The late seventies, however, witnessed a proliferation of new groups and activities in Toronto's Chinese community which attempted to define the ethnic identity and roles of the Chinese in Canadian society.

Let us examine how the recent development of Toronto's Chinese community created conditions for the outbreak of the movement. As a result of the new wave of Chinese immigration since the late sixties, Toronto's Chinese community experienced a dramatic structural change and expansion during the last decade.[12] Before the 1970's the community was by and large a small and modest ethnic enclave confined to the little Chinatown near the city center.[13] The overwhelming majority of the Chinese population at that time were male manual laborers, working in the community small service business--restaurants, laundries and grocery stores--owned by a handful of small merchants. Undoubtedly, the latter were the elites or leaders of the community responsible for internal control and external relations with the host community.[14]

The social and political milieu was disrupted in 1967 when the Canadian government passed a new immigration act, which adopted a universal "point system" based on one's educational, occupational and linguistic level.[15] As a result of the new and more liberal policy, large number of Chinese immigrants arrived in Canada. Between 1967 and 1972, about

91,000 Chinese people immigrated to Canada.[16] In Toronto alone, the number of Chinese population jumped more than three-fold within the five-year period between 1966 and 1971.[17] It continued to increase at an annual rate of 5,000.[18] By late 1970's, the population tripled again and it was estimated that Toronto's Chinese community was 100,000 strong.[19]

Unlike the early settlers who came from a poor rural area in southern China, the newcomers migrated from various overseas Chinese communities all over the world.[20] In Toronto, however, immigrants from Hong Kong--a highly urbanized British colony--constituted the largest group of newcomers. Within a few years they formed the majority members of Toronto's Chinese community. According to Richard Thompson, author of "Ethnicity Versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", about 85 per cent of the new Chinese immigrants in Toronto were from Hong Kong.[21]

Another difference between the older community and the newcomers was that the latter came from a wide spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds. There were blue-collar workers, wealthy entrepreneurs as well as middle-class, white- collar professionals and prospective professionals who had originally come to Canada as university students.[22] This new breed helped expand and diversify Toronto's Chinese community in all spheres--population, geographic and

economic expansions. By the late 1970's Toronto's Chinese communty has become one of the largest and most prosperous Chinese communities in North America.

Concomitant to this change and growth, the political structure of the community also underwent a drastic transformation during the past ten years. The traditional merchant-elites have gradually lost their power and control to the new elements of the community.[23] Old leadership role were slowly pushed aside by the emerging middle-class, white-collar professionals, who constituted a significant proportion of Chinese population in Canada and who also became the dominant force of the community.[24]

The shift of power was accentuated by an undercurrent of "quiet movement", which has taken place in the community since the last decade. Unlike the anti-W5 movement, this quiet movement was not an organized political movement under certain generally acknowledged leaders or organizations. It did not have any formally proclaimed ideological goals, nor did it involve the whole Chinese community. Rather, it was a gradually growing process of new ethnic awareness and consciousness[25] among a growing, but still small, proportion of the recently immigrated Chinese professionals and intellectuals.

Before looking at the "quiet movement", it is important to first understand the general political atmosphere of Toronto's Chinese community. By and large, Chinese

Canadians in Toronto were politically passive or removed. They had low rates of participation in the Canadian political arena. This phenomenon can be attributable to the historical and social backgrounds of Toronto's Chinese population. Having experienced chronic social ostracism, coupled with their own formidable cultural and language barriers, the early immigrants had little ground to develop their identification with the receiving society. Instead, their political ties were directed toward the Old Country.[26] While their Canadian born children would be a potent political force in the community, in Toronto they were too small in number and most were too young--many were under early twenties during the late 1970's--to form an identifiable group.[27] Moreover, unlike the case in Vancouver, most Canadian born Chinese in Toronto were merely second-generation, who had a tendency to identify themselves with the dorminant society rather than with their ethnic community.[28]

The post-1967 immigrants, who now formed the majority members of Toronto's Chinese community, had also a low degree of political and ethnic consciousness. Their recency of immigration explains in part their lack of sense of belonging to the new country. They might not comprehend the Canadian political process as readily as those who had been in the country for a long time.[29] Their low rates of political participation also had to do with the social climate of their original homelands. Hong Kong was a

British colony with a non-participant political system. Politics was viewed with apathy in the colony. Other overseas Chinese community--such as, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries--from which other Chinese immigrants came, were one-party states where people did not have any political rights. In light of this, it was not suprising that many recent Chinese immigrants were politically indifferent despite their westernized and urban backgrounds.

Once these immigrants arrived in Canada, there were other constraints and preoccupations which inclined to perpetuate their apolitical attitude. This was particularly so for the newly immigrated blue-collar workers. Most of them either worked in the community service business--mainly, restaurants--or outside in highly immigrant-concentrated industries such as the garment trade located near Toronto's Chinatowns.[30] Their little interaction with the dominant segments of the larger community tended to decrease their sense of identity with Canadian society. Furthermore, their long, irregular working hours, little command of English language and general ignorance of their rights and privileges as Canadian residents and workers had all together rendered them less conscious about their identity and rights in this multicutural society.[31]

As far as the new wealthy entrepreneurs were concerned, they were too preoccupied with their own enterprises,

especially in the face of fierce competition both in and out of Chinatown, to have time and energy for ethnic and community issues. As Peter Stollery, Member of Parliament representing Spadina area, points out, their commitment was more to the business than to the community at large,[32] except when thir interests were at stake as discussed in Richard Thompson's study.[33] Even the majority of those university-educated professionals were largely unconcerned with or simply ignorant of the general welfare of their ethnic community. They were preoccupied with their own careers, or they just wanted to live peacefully in the suburban areas. Although they still enjoyed the facilities in Chinatowns--restaurants, grocery stores, travel agencies, cinemas, etc., many of them were not associated with any community organizations. In other words, they had a low degree of community identity and consciousness.

Nevertheless, beneath this apolitical environment, one can observe an undercurrent of growing political and ethnic consciousness among a significant minority of middle-class white-collar professionals and intellectuals, most of whom were post-1967 immigrants.[34] To borrow Jeffery Reitz's term, it was a kind of "middle-class ethnicity".[35] Unlike the old immigrants who were forced to confine to their ethnic enclave,[36] these upper- and middle-class university-educated professionals were anxious to establish themselves socially and economically, sometimes even politically, in the larger community. Upward social mobility and economic advancement

outside their ethnic group invariably required a high degree of integration to and identification with the host society.[37] Hence, these professionals were ready to identify with and and participate in the mainstream of Canadian society.

There were other factors which spurred their new sensitivity toward ethnicity. Although many Chinese professional such as physicians and lawyers still had a clientele made up mainly of members of their ethnic group, an increasing number of others including doctors, dentists, lawyers, technicians, computer experts, civil servants and academicians--were working in the mainstream of Canadian society. Their constant interaction and competition with the dominant members of the larger community reinforced their desire for social acceptance and group recognition in the wider community.

Paradoxically, despite their integration into the larger civic and economic environment, these immigrants were at the same time not ready to discard their cultural roots. Even if they were prepared to reject their own ethnic traditions, their cultural distinctiveness and racial visibility had made it difficult for them be fully assimilated into the white society.[38] The only way to accomodate this ambivalent situation was to preserve their cultural uniqueness and at the same time struggle for equal rights and opportunities in the wider society. Their unique bicultural and bilingual background facilitated their search

for a dual identity.

This new ethnic consciousness did not stem only from their self-cognitions. It was also generated by a number of external forces. Among one of them was the emergence of "ethnic rediscoveries" in North America during the sixties and early seventies. Being highly educated, many of these immigrants were exposed to its influence. As Anthony Chan suggests, the Chinese Canadians' new ethnic awareness was inspired by the black civil rights movement, Asian American movement, Quebecois Nationalism and the Third World Strike of the Sixties and early seventies.[39]

The social climate of the wider community and the Canadian government policies also reinforced the desire of these new immigrants for greater acceptance by the receiving society. Since the late sixties, their attempt to fit themselves into the established social, economic and political environment of the dominant society was facilitated in part by the increased racial tolerance of the host community. There was significantly less racial hostility against colored groups than before, though subtle form of discrimination and prejudice still persisted. More important, the adoption of the liberal immigration act in 1967 and the advocation of the multicultural policy in 1970 legally and officially promised social, economic and political equality for all ethnic groups. With the government initiative, these professionals felt it both

necessary and legitimate to demand greater acceptance and group recognition by the larger community.

Ironically, this new ethnic awakening was further provoked by the recent revival of anti-Chinese sentiment, albeit subtle, during the 1970's. Although Stephenson and Schulman's public remarks and the Henry Fong incident failed to elicit any imminent protest from the community, they did generate the awareness among professionals and intellectuals about their position and rights in Canadian society. As Jeffery puts it:

> ..members of a group may become more sensitive to discrimination once they have achieved middle-class status than they are in the working class.[40]

Finally, these professionals saw themselves as having an obligation to play an active and leading role in their ethnic community. It is evident from interviews with Stollery and the 1978 CCCO Conference that these Chinese Canadian professionals were taking upon themselves the roles of leaders and spokesmen for the community.[41] This is not surprising when one considers the fact that these professionals and intellectuals did enjoy certain priveleges and advantages that allowed them to take such active roles. Their established careers, proficiency in English, relatively high socio-economic status and material security, advanced educational backgrounds together with their leisure time all made it possible for them to take a leading role in

those ethnic issues and community activities.[42]

Nonetheless, this new sensitivity was a gradual process. During the early 1970's, the ethnic consciousness was limited to an individual self-awareness or a personal experience of alienation or acceptance within the dominant society. There were no articulated concepts nor group action pertaining to this new ethnic and community awareness. This was understandable. Prior to the mid 1970's, the population of Chinese professionals was still relatively small. Moreover, having recently immigrated into Canada during sixties and early seventies, these newcomers needed time to adapt and establish themselves in the new environment. One must also remember that most of them still held the status of landed immigrants and had not yet attained their citizenship. Not having secured their legal status or having established themselves, these new immigrants were less vocal and active at this point in time. Furthermore, many professional who were active during the late seventies were still university students in Canada or in the United States in the early seventies.[43] Though some of them might have been influenced by the student activism of the late sixties and early seventies, as professional students (either as visa students or landed immigrants) with demanding course work, they were not in an advantageous position to engage in any protest action. Thus, when there was a rising anti-Chinese sentiment at Canadian medical schools during the early seventies, these professionals and

would-be professionals could not take any serious actions.

After the mid-1970's the situation changed. Many Chinese immigrants had already sucessfully adjusted to Canadian ways and values in the course of establishing themselves. Most had attained their Canadian citizenship which allowed them to fully participate in the political life of the new country. At the same time, increasing number of Chinese University students graduated each year and began establishing themselves in their professional circles. Concomitant to their sucessful adjustment, establishment and secured legal statuses, the new ethnic awareness began to take place. Though there was still no single, generally accepted ideology or an articulated definition of a "Chinese Canadian identity", there were visible group efforts among a growing number of professionals in the community, to redefine their identity and role of their community in Canadian mosaic.

The second half of the 1970's thus witnessed an emergence of new groups and activities pertaining to this new ethnic awareness. In the wake of the Henry Fong incident in 1975, a group of established, middle-aged professionals set up the FCCP to protect what they saw as their rights and interests as Chinese Canadian professionals. Through their activities, such as the annual ball, the association had developed amiable relations with high government officials. In the same year, a group of

young, recently graduated students formed the Chinese Canadians Mutual Advancement (CCMA) "to raise the consciousness of the Chinese community and to fight for Chinese causes."[44]

Two years later in 1977, certain well-established professionals founded the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO), which attempted to act as a collective voice for all Chinese Canadians in Ontario.[45] The fledgeling organization was not known to a large segment of Chinese population in Ontario, and was thus not generally acknowledged by the people as representatives or spokesmen for Ontario's Chinese community. Nevertheless, the council had organized two conferences in 1978 and 1979, which echoed the social and political outlooks of some of these professionals. The 1978 conference "Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicutural Society--A Chinese Perspective" was the first concerned effort made by Toronto's Chinese community to define the role and identity of Chinese Canadians and to assess their needs and concerns within the context of Canada's multicultural society.[46] About 600 people attended the conference. One-sixth of them were non-Chinese, including federal and provincial officials, civil rights leaders and academicians. The other participants were mainly Chinese professionals, intellectuals, social workers and other organizations' representatives.

A follow-up conference was held the next year. This time, the title was "Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective". Comparatively speaking, this conference was more sophisticated than its predecessor. First, there was a strong emphasis on the Chinese Canadian identity. "We are Canadians first and foremost and should partake in everything Canadian society has to offer and in the process give something of ourselves as well."[47] Second, the Council openly urged the community members to participate in the political activities of the host society. Here, they meant "participation in the various riding associations and elections of the three levels of Canadian governments--to be more vocal in their endorsement of Candidates who espoused positions which found to be sensitive to their needs and aspirations."[48] These two characteristics could never be found in the pre-1960's Toronto's Chinese community, which was highly ghettoized and detached from the wider society. Most intriguing about this second conference was that among the many panels, the two most popular sessions were "Political Awareness and Participation" and "Discrimination and Prejudice". They attracted the largest number of attendents.[49] This scenario reflects the increased awareness of the Chinese Canadians about their roles and rights in the mainstream of Canadian society.

Aside from the FCCP and the CCCO, other smaller and less-known groups also emerged during the late 1970's. In

April 1978, a group of young Chinese, created the Asianadian Resource Workshop. Through its quarterly magazines, The Asianadian, the Workshop intended to provide an outlet for Canadians of Asian descent to speak out against any injustice and inequlity practiced on them, as well as to promote their unique Asian Canadian culture as arts.[50] In a word, the workshop attempted to bring forth a new dignity and pride among the Asians in Canada.

Finally, in the wake of the growing plight of the Southeast Asian boat people in the summer of 1979, a group of young Chinese professionals in Toronto organized the Action Committee for Refugees in South East Asia. Their aim was to aid the refugees and to urge the Canadian government to increase its intake of boat people to Canada.[51] Though its activities were not directly related to the general welfare of the Chinese community, the Committee evidenced the existence of a small but politically and socially active group in Toronto Chinese's community. During its boat people campaign, the Committee had organized an unprecedented, albeit small in scale, demonstration and rally in downtown Toronto. At the same time, Committee members had established some connections with various government officials, politicians,[52] and some media personnels in two Toronto's major English newspapers.[53]

The emergence of these new groups and activities during the latter half of the 1970's manifested the growing ethnic

and political consciousness among the new Chinese in Toronto. More important, through their organizations, these professionals had developed links with other ethnic groups and the establishment forces such as various government officials and politicians. As a result, the community became more identifiable and politically responsive. It was against this background that the W5 incident occured. Under these circumstances, it is not suprising that there was a core of professionals and intellectuals in the community who reacted seriously and actively to the issue. As Patrick Chen, then president of Vancouver's Ad Hoc Committee against W5, puts it:

> That this particular program should become the catalyst for protest is attributable to the growing maturity and self-confidence that Chinese Canadians are beginning to feel and articulate.[54]

Nevertheless, one might ask why it took so long after the broadcast before these professionals took concerted actions against the television network. Of course, part of the reasons was due to the fact that most of these professionals did not see the program when broadcast. However, two weeks after the broadcast, some of these professionals were informed by the students about the programme. For almost a month, their only response was letter-writing. There were no signs of joint action nor involvement of the whole community.

One reason for the delay of action was the lack od unity and coordination within the community, despite the social and political restructuring that had taken place. A close examination of the Chinese professionals and their organizations would reveal that despite their ethnic and community concerns, they were by no means a homogeneous group. Rather, they were highly diversified, divided and there was rivalry among the groups. Many of the new organizations formed during the late 1970's were mutually exclusive. There were little communication among them. In fact, some groups were simply unaware of the existence of the others.[55] The fact that most of these new associations were organized by first-generation, professionally trained immigrants might have obscured some important differences that set them apart.

These differences were largely based on their diverse philosophical and political outlooks. Perhaps, one can classify these active professionals and their organizations into two categories, though they might not be mutually exclusive as there were "go-with-the-flow" groups. The first was the conservative or conformist group.[56] It was mainly composed of upper- and middle-class professionals in their late 30's and early 40's. Their way of expressing their ethnic identity was through high profile activities such as conferences and annual balls. Through these activities, they established a close relationship with high-echelon government officials.

One of the themes constantly emphasized was integration into the wider society. Fir instance, during the two conferences, they urged the community people to participate in the social and political activities of the mainstream of the Canadian society. According to them, many racial problems stemmed largely from the failure of the ethnic community members to integrate into the larger society.[57] Attention was focused on the ability or failure of the ethnic members to "relate and go out and make it", rather than on the constraints imposed by the larger community in regulating the mode of integration of the ethnic group members.

Concomitant to their conformist outlook, they wanted to remain calm and non-controversial. According to one insider, the CCCO directors originally did not want to have the two panels "Political Awareness and Prticipation" and "Discrimination and Prejudice" in their conference.[58] They found the two topics too political and controversial. The reasons why the two panels were eventually held was largely due to the presence of some non-CCCO members on the planning committee of the conference.[59] They insisted on the value of having the two sessions. Not surprisingly, the two panels turned out to be the most popular.

In dealing with particular issues, such as the Henry Fong incident, they tended to eschew direct action. Their tactics were cautious and nonconfrontational. For instance,

they tried to contact the high-echelon officials and avoided any publicity or mass involvement. As Paul Huang himself suggested, these professionals assumed that they were playing a leadership role working for the community rather than working with its members.[60] In Gunnar Myrdal's terms, their leadership belonged to that of accomodation as contrast to the leadership of protest as discussed below.

The second type of professional-leaders were relatively more progressive, outspoken and action-orientated than the first group, though they were not necessarily politically active. Most of them were young, recently graduated professionals and social workers.[61] Many were originally university students in Canada or in the United States during the late sixties and early seventies. Thus some of them might have been inspired by or sympathetic to the student movement of the sixties, though they might not have been actively involved in it.

Their sense of identity and ethnic consciousness diverged in some ways from that of the established group. These younger professionals tended to see the failure of integration not so much as a fault and inability of the ethnic group itesef but more as a consequence of the host attitude towards the minority groups concerned. For instance, they sensed an emergence of a subtle form of anti-Chinese sentiment as an obstruction to full integration into the mainstream of Canadian society.[62] Aside from being

sensitive to issues such as racial inequality and injustice, they were also very aware of the existent discrepancy between the professional elites and the masses.[63] No matter how marginal they were to the grass roots, they did attempt to involve the latter in their activities. At least, during the Boat People campaign, some of these young professionals tried to involve the general public in the community by arousing their awareness and support through street-corner campaign and demonstration.[64]

Owing to the divergent political outlooks and inclinations, these two professional groups consciously stayed away from each other and pursued their own social programs and community activities. There were, however, other factors that contributed to the lack of cohesion in the community. First, unlike early Toronto's Chinese community which was highly homogeneous, and closely knitted with a well-defined spatial and ethnic boundary, the contemporary community was much more loose and diversified as a result of the different place of origins and socioeconomic backgrounds of the newcomers. Moreover, the new Chinese were no longer confined to Chinatowns, but were dispersed throughout the Metropolitan Toronto.[65] The loosening ethnic boundary accounts in part for the lack of cohesiveness of the community.

Second, unlike the early Chinese community, the present community has not been faced with any overt or institutionalized form of racial hostilities from the dominant society that could stimulate its people the need for solidarity.[66] At the same time, within the community there was the absence of a real channel or a physical structure that could provide its members a forum for social interaction. Although there were over a hundred voluntary associations in the community, the majority of the Chinese population in Toronto did not belong to any of them. Perhaps this was because they were skeptical about the political backgrounds of those associations or they did not see the benefits in joining them or they simply did not know of the existence of those groups.[67]

Furthermore, there was also a lack of generally acknowleged leaders or spokesmersons who could focus the consciousness of the community and personify its identity.[68] Hence, while one would record a proliferation of new organizations, even redundancy or conflicts in programs, the community remained without an umbrella organization to unite and coordinate the ever-increasing numbers of community associations. Each organization claimed to serve and to represent the community, or represent special groups or their own particular interests and backgrounds. As Lore puts it, the community was really a number of small splinter groups.[69]

Under these circumstances, some Chinese Canadians began to show growing concerns about the lack of unity in the community. They urged for a general organization which could be the real spokesman for its members and which could harness and coordinate the activities of different organizations that existed.[70] The CCCO conference was indeed an effort in this direction. It enlisted the involvement of various Chinese organizations on its conference planning committee.[71] Nevertheless, the Council still had not received general recognition as representative of Ontario's Chinese community.[72] Perhaps, as Alderman Ying Hope and others suggested, there was a lack of important issues or a real external threat that could stimulate the community members to see the need for solidarity.[73]

The W5's "Campus Giveaway" unintentionally provided a rallying issue for the community. However, it is clear that the issue itself was not enough for the outbreak of any movement. Without the right persons or advocates to bring about the movement, this potentially unifying issue would fade away. This was what was happening during the early stage of the W5 incident. Since there were no generally acknowledged leaders or an umbrella organization, the first community people that the students contacted were those with whom some students happened to be acquainted. They were the FCCP and CCMA executives. As mentioned previously, the CCMA was too small as a group to provide any substantial assistance, except for individual support. The FCCP, a

larger organization and having a certain degree of influence in the local and provincial governments, was able to do something about the issue. The Federation, however, was composed predominantly of conservative and well established community members, who did not want to rock the boat. Its actions thus remained cautious, nonconfrontational and limited to filing complaints to high government officials. No attempts were made to publicize the issue in the community. Thus, even though the students approached some community members as early as mid-October, there was still no massive collective action until a month or so after.

Fortunately for their cause, the activist students incidentally met a few socially active groups during a farewell party and during the CCCO conference. Once these young and active professionals had viewed the programme, they too saw the need to publicize the issue in the community and to take direct action. Thereafter, the dispute would no longer be confined only to the Chinese student body or solely to the FCCP, but would involve more people and actions.

Before the issue was completely taken over by these active groups, however, the students took an important move that greatly facilitated the outbreak of the community movement. That was the students' initiative to forge a united front among various groups, including both the conservative and progressive groups. It is highly doubtful

that these different community organizations would coalese on their own without the students' prodding. As mentioned earlier, these various groups were suspicious or simply ignorant of each other. As a matter of fact, before the student effort to forge an alliance, there were open disagreements between the young active professionals and the established groups, notably the FCCP, about the idea of forming a joint committee for collective actions.

In any event, this final push of the students set the stage for a large-scale community campaign. The very act of coalition (of nine different organizations) created a sense of unity and solidarity of the community. This had the psychological effect of fueling momentum, making the allies see the controversy as a community issue and, therefore, organize a full-fledged campaign representing the whole Chinese community. In other words, the students opened up the way for the active white-collar professionals, who finally brought about the success of the anti-W5 campaign.

CHAPTER VI

THE SUCCESS OF THE ANTI-W5 MOVEMENT

The success of the anti-W5 movement can be looked at from two different perspectives. The first and palpable success was the victory over CTV as formally marked by the April 16 apology. The second sucess, which was less tangible, but equally important, was the ability to mobilize public opinion and support from an ethnic community, which used to be politically docile and inactive. For the sake of convenience, we shall commence with the analysis of the second form of success, before examining why the national television network finally bowed to the demands of the Chinese community.

The Ability to Arouse Popular Support

It is true that not every sector of Toronto's Chinese populace was involved in the movement. The campaign did, however, receive widespread support from the community at large. At least, twenty thousand Chinese across Canada signed the petitions to CTV and the CRTC;[1] more than 2,000

young and old members of the community joined the anti-W5 demonstration; above a hundred Chinese organizations across the country officially endorsed the campaign; a number of bookstores, cinemas, restaurants in Toronto's Chinatowns lent their support by advertising the campaign free or at low cost; all local Chinese newspapers reported and publicized the anti-W5 cause;[2] more than $30,000 were collected from the community;[3] and over a hundred young volunteers dedicated their time organizing the campaign.[4] Although these figures did not represent the whole Chinese community in Toronto, they did demonstrate the broad-based support the movement was able to rally from it. For the first time since the late Sixties, which opened a new era of Toronto's Chinese community,[5] such a large force was gathered behind a single cause. This becomes even more striking when one bears in mind that the Chinese Canadian community had rarely involved in any large-scale political activities. How was it, then, that a small core of relatively unknown professionals could mobilize the grass roots of the community? In other words, why were the people ready to response to these professionals' initiative?

Although most Toronto's Chinese Canadians were disunited and had a low political profile, they were not at all unaware of or insensitive to problems of racial discrimination and prejudice--something that had direct bearing on their day-to-day lives rather than mere abstract or remote political questions. In fact, interviews with a

sample of Chinese people in Toronto suggest a consensus among the community members that anti-Chinese sentiment did persist in Canadian society, though it was less overt and pervasive than before.[6]

One cannot deny that in some instances this "anti-Chinese sentiment" was more imaginary than real; but their claims were not totally without grounds. Racial experiences of a personal nature--such as racial slurs, making fun of the pidgin English of the early Chinese immigrants, stereotyping, graffiti, home vandalism, job discrimination--were not uncommon.[7] While most of these incidents were often too subtle and diffuse to be pinpointed, there were several cases in which anti-Chinese sentiment was publicly expressed. Some of the examples have already been quoted in the previous chapter--the public remarks made by Dr. Bette Stephenson, Dr. Morton Shulman, and The Medical Post against medical students of Chinese origin. Other sectors of the ethnic community had also been the targets of attack. For instance, on August 24, 1979, the National Citizens' Coalition, a voice of ultra-conservative in Canada, took out a full-page advertisement in The Globe and Mail attacking Vietnam refugee programs and suggesting that Chinese of being unable to appreciate the Canadian parliamentary system.[8]

Although these instances were sporadic and represented the attitudes of only some individuals, they did foster

uneasiness and sometimes antipathy among Chinese Canadians. Before the anti-W5 movement, however, these frustration and anger were seldom translated into action. This stemmed not so much from the lack of awareness or response on the part of the people. Rather there were no conscious attempts by any groups or leaders to articulate their concerns and to initiate any grass-roots actions to deal with those anti-Chinese incidents.[9] Perhaps, those cases were not specific, concrete or imminent enough to provide a strong base and rationale for any organized actions.

On the other hand, the W5 issue was a clear-cut case. It was an accessible target, or put in another way, an embodiment of anti-Chinese sentiment, which gave good grounds and justification for a protest movement. Once there were persons or groups to define the issue and mobilize the masses, the issue became the dynamic for community action, and the people were ready to respond to the cause by offering their support.

Of course, the community members were not prepared to support all kinds of campaigns indiscriminately. Their responsiveness depended very much on the nature of the issues concerned. A comparison to the Boat People Campaign, which occured just a few months before the W5 incident, will illuminate this point. In terms of tactics and personels, both campaigns were very similar. Both attempted to court public support from the same ethnic community; and those

who had actively involved in the Boat People campaign were also active participants in the anti-W5 protest.[10] It turned out, however, that the former campaign was less popular and less successful than the latter movement.[11]

The disparity was largely due to the different nature of the two issues. The general public in Toronto's Chinese community was not very concerned with the Southeast Asian refugees problems.[12] This apathetic attitude had its roots in the different place and society of origin of the people, which entailed different customs, traditions, lifestyle, outlooks and sometimes languages. Many Chinese residents in Toronto, who originated from Hong Kong, felt that the refugees were more Vietnamese than Chinese, despite the fact that over 80 percent of the boat people were ethnically Chinese.[13] Some Chinese Canadians even held hostile attitudes toward the boat people, thinking the latter were "Vietnamizing" the face of Toronto's Chinatowns. This intra-ethnic tension accounts in large part for the failure of the Boat People campaign to win popularity and support in the community.

The W5 issue was, however, a different matter. Though the controversy was directly related to the Chinese university students, it became, especially after being interpreted and defined by the anti-W5 advocates, a community issue concerning the educational opportunities for the future generations of Chinese Canadians. Belief in

education is a persistent Chinese value. This high regard for education is particularly strong among those middle-class Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong.[14] They deemed academic achievement as a promised way toward upward social mobility. As a matter of fact, the quest for higher education--in this case university education--is one of the major reasons why so many young people and parents from Hong Kong moved to Canada. In the light of this, the "Campus Giveaway" was not only guilty of its inaccurate report but was also an attack on the community's value structure. As Sol Littman puts it:

> Curiously, by attacking the right of Chinese Canadians to be educated at Canadian universities, W5 touched a particularly sensitive Chinese nerve.
>
> For the past 2,000 years, Chinese society has taught respect for scholarship. Parents will sacrifice almost everything to guarantee an education for their children. Any threat, therefore, to access to education was bound to galvanize the community.[15]

This clearly explains why the anti-W5 campaign could strike a responsive chord with the community members.

The success in gaining popular support also owed much to the characteristics and tactics of the key participants themselves. Both their image and strategies were essential in mobilizing a community which was, in general, politically complacent or inactive. It is clear that the ethnic group members were not ready to support any campaigns that were

extralegal or militant. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons why the students failed to secure support and cooperation from the community was that they lacked the credentials and strong backgrounds to make their cause legitimate and forceful. When the students began to distribute flyers in the street corners of Chinatowns, the people tended to look upon them as radicals or leftists, or some irresponsible, hot-headed lots trying to disrupt the statusquo of the community. On the other hand, the leaders and organizers of the Ad Hoc Committee were mostly high-income professionals with established careers such as physicians, engineerers, and researchers.[16] Their professions and backgrounds lent them the important credibility they needed from the people. Moreover, the anti-W5 coalition was constituted of both the young active groups and the established conservative organizations, namely the FCCP, Mon Sheong Foundation and Cathay Lions' Club. The involvement of these established forces, at least at the initial stage, conveyed an impression that the campaign was not radical but legitimate and well-represented. Even though the conservative groups finally seceded from the Ad Hoc Committee, remaining Committee members deliberately downplayed the internal dissension so as to avoid any suspicions from the public that the Committee was radical or militant.

The tactics employed by the anti-W5 organizers were also carefully thought out in order to project a positive

image on the public. The Ad Hoc Committee was very discreet in making the tone of its position and slogans mild and reasonable, and its actions legalistic and nonviolent. This can be clearly illustrated by the January 26 rally and demonstration, which were by far the most direct and confrontational step taken by the Committee. Being aware that rally and demonstration were something new to the community, the campaigners were cautious in organizing them in such a way that they would encourage mass participation rather than arousing public antagonism. For instance, the slogans used in the demonstration were carefully worded and censored so that they were in tune with the Canadian multicultural rhetoric. The protest march was also meticulously planned and prepared to ensure that no radical groups would intervene. Moreover, politicians, high government officials and civil rights leaders were invited to address the people so as to reassure the community members that the demonstration was not only legal but well-supported. Nonviolence, legality and appeal to the public became a legitimation of their direct action tactics.

Furthemore, by gaining the backing of other institutions such as the two major English newspapers, other ethno-cultural groups, as well as various Chinese organizations and other community public sectors--such as local Chinese dailies, cinemas, restaurants and bookstoress, the campaigners were able to further establish legitimacy for their cause and the movement. These institutional

support and sense of legitimacy were important prerequisites in winning community opinion to the cause.

The Victory over CTV

The ability to win popular support from Toronto's Chinese community, however, did not necessarily promise a victory over CTV. The national television network might not feel threatened by a relatively small ethnic group, which composed less than five percent of Toronto's total population. Indeed, some insiders on the Ad Hoc Committees themselves admitted that while they were pleased with the positive response of their fellow ethnic group members, they did not have much optimism in getting CTV bow to their demands. Hence, when CTV made its public apology on April 16, 1980, the Committee as well as the Chinese community at large were caught by surprise. If so, what prompted CTV to back down suddenly after almost six months of impasse?

Some people argued that CTV apologized because it realized the programme was morally wrong.[17] While this might be true, it is a too simplistic explanation. If CTV apologized solely out of its own sense of guilt, why did it take more than six months before doing so? Whether or not the television network retreated because it really felt the programme was wrong, it is for certain that it yielded under mounting pressures on various fronts. This can be

illustrated by the fact that during the early stage, CTV had remained adamant, despite a barrage of letters and complaints from the various Chinese student associations, some U of T top officials, the university community, and a number of Chinese organizations. Since all the protest actions were limited to letter writings without any publicity, the television network was unperturbed. Not only did it retain its stand, CTV also sent a seven-page rebuttal letter and threatened to produce a follw-up programme to affirm its argument. However, once the previously obscure issue was in the full glare of the public eyes, the television network began to change its position. While the question of legitimacy was the key to win the support from the ethnic group members, publicity was the campaigners' trump card against CTV.

According to the anti-W5 organizers, one of the reasons for staging a public rally and mass demonstration was to gain massive and immediate publicity for the movement. The two events did capture the attention of the mass media, which helped promulgate the campaign. Through national television news, the local protest march caught the mood of other Chinese Canadians across the country, thus helping the campaigners spread their cause and momentum to other Chinese communities. It is no exaggeration to say that television helped escalate an originally local community movement to a national Chinese Canadian movement.

Another source of publicity was the press, mainly the two major English newspapers in Toronto--The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star. Their reports on the development of the dispute made the anti-W5 movement visible to the general public. More important, their series of commentaries, notably Dick Beddoes' columns in The Globe and Mail, which were sympathetic to the cause of the campaigners, cast doubt among readers on the credibility and reliability of CTV's news show. As a matter of fact, a week before the April 16 apology, CTV expressed annoyance through its lawyer about the continued adverse publicity, especially Dick Beddoes' articles, and requested the anti-W5 protesters to halt their publicity activities before further negotiations would be made.

Another pressure tactics employed by the Ad Hoc Committee was the libel and slander suit against CTV. Although there were heated arguments among the anti-W5 advocates over the viability of the legal action, it was later found that in a few occasions CTV did indicate uneasiness about the lawsuit. It is true, as Gordon Chong suggested in an interview, that CTV had all kinds of resources and money to win the case in court. This did not, however, mean that the television network was unconcerned about the possible negative image caused by the litigation. As a matter of fact, during the first negotiation meeting, which was initiated by CTV in February 1980, the television network asked the Committee to drop the lawsuit. This

confidential request clearly indicates that CTV was not completely unperturbed by the pending libel suit. After the March 16 statement, Ad Hoc Committee members made it clear through their lawyer that they would definately pursued the case if no settlement would be made. A week or so after, CTV made its full apology.

Of no small importance to the success of the campaign was the backing of the public officials and politicians. During the incipient stage, the government authorities were reticent about involving themselves in the dispute, despite the flood of complaint letters which pleaded their support and actions. Perhaps, they thought that the controversy would disappear after some time. However, instead of fading away, the dispute received increasing public attention, especially after the January 26 rally and demonstration. Under such widespread publicity together with intense lobbying by the campaigners, the government officials and politicians found it increasingly difficult to remain silent and uninvolved, especially when multiculturalism was officially proclaimed as a cultural of policy Canada. Furthermore, one should remember that it was a federal election time--a time when politicians could ill afford to remain unresponsive to their people's demands. Hence, it was not surprising to see members of Parliament from all national parties, and candidates for ridings with heavy concentration of Chinese population voice support during the January 26 rally.

Aside from the rhetorical support, some government departments did try to put pressure on CTV for a settlement. The most notable was Toronto City Council's resolution to condemn the programme and to press the CRTC for a public hearing. On January 25, 1980 Ruben Baezt, Ontario Minister of Culture and Recreation, recommended the Ontario Human Rights Commission act as a conciliator between the two parties; and the Commission did finally break its silence and volunteered to mediate for a settlement. The Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM), a 100-member advisory body to the Minister of State Multiculturalism, also openly urged for an immediate response from CTV, the CRTC and the Canadian Human Rights Commission.[18] All these institutional forces and power support added to the pressure on CTV.

Another factor that proved to be important was the involvement of other Chinese communities across the country. It is likely that Toronto's Chinese community alone might not have been forceful enough to press CTV for an apology. However, when the campaign involved other Chinese communities throughout the country, it became a different question. Each of the sixteen Chinese communities sent its protest letters to CTV's local offices, lobbied its politicians, filed complaints to its regional Human Rights Commission and the CRTC, solicited support from other ethnic communities, and publicized the dispute in its local newspapers. All these multiplied the public pressures on

CTV. More important, the active participation of other Chinese communites gave an impression that what was once a local community campaign had escalated to a national Chinese Canadian protest movement--a movement that CTV could no more ignore. Undoubtedly, the television network did not want to broaden the dispute, which would only be disadvantageous to its public image. Hence, a few days after the Ad Hoc Committee had announced its upcoming national meeting, which was intended to rally all Ad Hoc Committees from sixteen Chinese communities for some concerted actions, CTV expressed through its lawyer discomfort over the imminent national conference. A few days later, the television network made its public apology. It is possible that CTV wanted to resolve the dispute before it expanded to a national scale.

Finally, it must be remembered that the anti-W5 movement had the advantage of having the Boat People campaign as its precedent. The latter provided the anti-W5 advocates experiences, examples, connections and human resources. A comparison of those who joined the Action Committee for Soueast Asian Refugees to those in the anti-W5 movement would indicate that at least three of the Ad Hoc Committee executive members and a significant number of active volunteers were veterans of the Boat People campaign. Comparatively, these Boat People campaigners were more active and more ready to take direct actions than the other anti-W5 participants. The former also brought along many of

their early strategies and experiences to the anti-W5 movement. Tactics used during the Boat People campaign--such as rally, demonstration, signature campaigns, fund-raising activities, lobbying, street-corner campaigns and other publicity activities--were also employed during anti-W5 protest.[19] In particular, the Boat People demonstration set an important precedent for Toronto's Chinese community, which had never undergone any mass protest action. It provided some anti-W5 activists the experience in organizing peaceful and orderly protest march; ite also convinced them of the legitimacy of demonstration. Above all, they learned about the effectiveness of protest march in fueling momentum and publicizing their cause.

As far as public relations and publicity activities were concerned, through the Boat People campaign, a number of Ad Hoc Committee members had acquainted themselves with some reporters and columnists in The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star. At the same time, they had also developed amicable relationship with a number of politicians such as Peter Stollery, Liberal MP for Spadina, Bob Rae, NDP MP for Broadview-Greenwood, Bob Kaplan, another federal MP for York Centre, and Gordon Cressy, Toronto's Ward 7 alderman.[20] These connections explained in part why the Ad Hoc Committee could gain access to these high public officials and the press with relative ease, while the students could not.

Under all these social and political forces, which were adverse to its reputation and image, CTV finally gave in. This was a practical move. It became clear to CTV that the public pressures had become too heavy and costly for it to resist any further. On the other hand, an apology would get rid of the chronic dispute and the troubles once and for all. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that CTV apologized out of practicality and expediency rather than purely out of its repentence.

CHAPTER VII

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH--PART I

It has been two years since the end of the anti-W5 movement. Historically speaking, two years might not be long enough for a full appraisal of the historical significance of the movement.[1] Nonetheless, one can still discern some of its important consequences and implications for Toronto's Chinese community within the two-year context.

The fact that the anti-W5 campaign was the first large-scale political movement in Toronto's Chinese community and the fact that it was a success made the campaign a historic event; but what made it more historically significant was its far-reaching and widespread impact on the ethnic group at large. Unlike the Henry Fong incident and the Boat People campaign both of which had limited effect on Chinese Canadians, the anti-W5 movement had politically important ramifications for the community. One may classify its consequences and implications into three areas: (i) the general political behavior and consciousness of the ethnic group members, (ii) the power

structure and pattern of leadership within the community, and (iii) its image and external relations vis-a-vis the wider society. This chapter will examine the first area, and the other two sections will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Effects on the Political Behavior of the People

It is never a simple matter to study the political behavior of ethnic groups. Unlike leaders, governments, policies or any social and political movements which often have written records and are usually specific enough for close scrutiny, there are rarely detailed documentation about ordinary people, and masses are by no means homogenous. Recent scholars have used polls, extensive interviewing and other statistical techniques to infer some general trends about public opinion and attitudes. Owing to the scope of this thesis, instead of employing these empirical methods, most of the analyses are based on personal observations, interviews, inevitable speculation as well as the works of sociological and other studies. In order to substantiate the propositions, an overview of the post-W5 activities and situations in Toronto's Chinese community will also be made in the second half of this chapter.[2]

As Heinz Eulau points out, the political bahavior of man contains many different facets: "his acts, drives,

feelings, beliefs, commitments and values..."[3] In this study, the political behavior of the Chinese public will be looked at from three specific, but interrelated, perspectives: ethnic consciousness, ingroup feelings, and political awareness and participation. The term "ethnic consciousness" has already been defined as "shared feelings for group recognition and a desire for equal and open participation in the mainstream of Canadian life".[4] "Ingroup feelings" is defined as a sense of belonging to one's ethnic community, or "feelings of sympathy and loyalty towards members of the same ethnic group."[5] Although these inward feelings seems contradictory to ethnic consciousness, which tends to be outward-oriented, in reality both coexist simultaneously within an ethnic community. Finally, the term "political awareness and participation" is used to in a broader sense than mere voting or running for a public office. It includes general political interest, concern, knowledge, and sometimes action.

Before the W5 incident, these three traits--ethnic consciousness, ingroup feelings and political awareness--were rarely if ever mirrored in a strident activism. While most outside observers, including scholars such as Reitz and Berry, tend to view the Chinese community as one of the most cohesive ethnic groups in Canada, in reality the level of ethnic and community cohesion was low among most Chinese Canadians.[6] Furthermore, the community was by and large in a state of political complacency. For

years some community leaders and concerned individuals had tried to search for a rallying issue to mobilize and unify the ethnic group, but to no avail.[7]

It is both ironical and coincidental to see the W5 "Campus Giveaway", which was originally intended to provoke the general public attention and/or resentment against the foreign students, turned out to do the Chinese community a favor. As Wilson Head, president of the National Black Coalition, suggested during the January 26 Rally against W5:

> In its own way, the CTV did you a service by depicting you as it did. It's getting you together and now you are fighting back.[8]

The issue together with the movement helped arouse many Chinese Canadians from the state of apathy and complaceney to ethnic consciousness, community and group feelings, and political activism.[9]

(1) Ethnic consciousness and pride:

In the course of the movement, what at first was an on-campus issue--concerning the Chinese students, foreign students and the university community--was transformed by the anti-W5 campaigners into a crucial issue touching the rights and status of the Chinese ethnic group in the broader society. As discussed in Chapter 2, instead of focusing on the statistical errors or the argument against foreign students, the anti-W5 advocates emphasized on the negative implications the show would bring about for the ethnic

community. According to them, the programme was detrimental because it both advocated Chinese Canadians be denied access to equal rights and full participation in Canadian society and indiscriminately labelled all people of Chinese origin as foreigners. These two contentions became the central themes of the anti-W5 movement. Hence, during the campaign, questions concerning minority rights, equality and integration were pushed into the foreground. Through the various highly publicized and mass-oriented activities--such as community forums, street-corner campaigns, mass rally and demonstration, and local Chinese newspapers' reports--the people within the community were confronted with those ethnic issues.

Looking from this perspective, one may say that the anti-W5 campaign helped popularize and actualize the "quiet movement" into a Chinese community movement. Ethnic issues were no longer the sole concerns of a minority group of professionals, nor did they remain mere rhetorical or theoretical topics appeared only at conferences or in ethnic magazines.[10] While there were no concrete ideologies, specific strategies and goals in the quiet movement, the "Campus Giveaway" together with the anti-W5 campaign acted as a catalyst giving shape and substance to the vague and diffuse ethnic feelings. By defining and publicizing those issues as matters basic and essential to the lives of their ethnic group members, the campaigners stimulated the ethnic awareness of the ordinary Chinese Canadians and, at the same

time, strengthened the consciousness of those who had already shown some degree of ethnic concerns.

While the campaign itself served to educate and make the people more aware of their ethnicity and rights, the final success further accentuated the overall consciousness and pride of the community. It is true that most people did not gain anything substantial or tangible from the victory. The triumph, however, had its symbolic and psychological significance to the people. The feeling of victory conferred a sense of strength and pride among the community members; it also enhanced their self-image and self-esteem as an ethnic group. Furthermore, the success of the movement clearly demonstrated the improved power position of the Chinese community in the wider society. Many felt accepted and recognized; and that the apology, at least, signified that the Chinese Canadians were no more foreigners or second-class citizens but bona fide Canadians. These symbolic values--a symbolic recognition as well as a symbolic manifestation of power--helped strengthen the consciousness of the Chinese ethnic group as an identifiable community within the Canadian mosaic.

(2) Unity and Community Consciousness:

Aside from arousing ethnic consciousness, the anti-W5 campaign also acted as a centripetal force for the Chinese community. As mentioned earlier, most new Chinese Canadians

had a low degree of community spirit. There was, for instance, little evidence that the Chinese supported each other beyond a limited group of family and friends.[11] Beyond their common racial origins, there was a general lack of common feelings of solidarity, loyalty or belongingness. The W5 incident, however, worked to some extent to instill ingroup feelings among the Chinese. Being confronted with an external power that threatened their rights and values, many Chinese Canadians rallied together for the first time in a common cause.[12] It is doubtful how long this sense of unity would last. However, interviews with a number of Chinese Canadians indicate that the campaign did rouse community consciousness and group feelings among them. They admitted that its campaign, especially the success, made them feel part of a community, a feeling that they had never experienced before.[13]

The centripetal force of the movement also worked to drive various Chinese organizations, which had had little or no communication before, together for the first time. The initial anti-W5 alliance of various groups, including both the conservative and the progessive, was the first united front ever occured in Toronto's Chinese community. It is true that there were disagreements over the strategies of how to tackle the issue among various groups and leaders. Regardless of these tactical differences, however, the W5 controversy was blatant and serious enough to pull together diverse leaders and organizations and provided them with a

common goal. Even when the coalition finally collapsed, the various groups tried to cover up their dissensions from outsiders and continued to fight the issue from different directions.

What was most significant, however, was the unprecedented collaboration of seventeen Chinese Canadian communities across the country. Spatial dispersions, communication difficulties and different geographical origins of the Chinese population in different cities used to prevent the various Chinese Canadian communities from acting as a single, unified force. The W5 issue was able to pull together numerous Chinese communities from East to West to act under one collective voice. As one will see, this collaboration laid the groundwork for the creation of the first Chinese Canadian national organization after the campaign.

All in all, the mobilization created, at least a feeling of unity within the Chinese Canadian community. As a local Chinese newspaper hailed after the campaign, the Chinese Canadian community was no more "an incohesive lot".[14] This might be an overstatement; however, it did capture the imagination of the day. Of course, it remains doubtful how long this feeling of unity would last. Perhaps as Nagata suggests in her study, once any threats were not salient, "segmentary process of subdivision customarily takes over once more."[15]

(3) Political Awareness and Participation:

Another outcome of the campaign was increasing the overall political awareness of Toronto's Chinese community. Political passivity used to be the hallmark of the Chinese ethnic community. Most Chinese immigrants tended to view political activities with indifference and skepticism. When any issues or crises arose, only a few individuals were involved. They tackled the problems behind closed doors. The masses were apathetic, pessimistic and, above all, uninvolved. The anti-W5 campaign, however, taught the people a lesson. While many Chinese immigrants were hesitant to protest actively, the campaign clearly proved the legitimacy and effectiveness of using direct action in defending their rights. Many came to realize that nonviolent political actions--such as demonstration, mass meetings, dissemination of flyers and newsletters, and lobbying--were not only legal but might also be well-supported and fruitful. Furthermore, the final victory of the campaign demonstrated that justice and equality could not only be granted by the influential leaders, but also by mass-supported struggle.

It is still uncertain to what degree the community had been politicized as a result of the movement. Of course, it would be naive or unrealistic to expect the whole ethnic group becoming politically active. As indicated in many

political studies, it is a general phenomenon to have the majority of the population being politically passive or inert.[16] The masses were the last to be politicized. Nonetheless, there is little question that in the wake of the anti-W5 campaign the Chinese community as a whole had become more vocal and active than ever before.

This increased politicization was largely attributed to the emergence of a growing "cadre" of active and concerned Chinese Canadians germinated during the anti-W5 struggle. Prior to the W5 incident, the number of people who showed their concern with the community was limited. Indeed, for many anti-W5 advocates and volunteers, the campaign was their political debut.[17] They used to have little involvement in the community affairs, and many were anonymous individuals pursuing their own careers in the wider society. The anti-W5 campaign did, however, bring these individuals together for the first time, and kindle their ethnic awareness, sense of community and political consciousness. Following the six-month campaign, these once unknown and mostly young individuals became an identifiable, albeit small, group, which developed its interests in and commitment to the community. "Baptized" by the movement, these new converts were more prepared, experienced and less diffident than ever in fighting for their rights and equality in the larger society. It is, however, important to note that they were not leaders of the community. Instead, they formed the new "political stratum" in the

ethnic group;[18] and by joining the rank and file of various active Chinese associations, these recently awakened body became a new political force in Toronto's Chinese community.[19]

The Post-W5 Activities

While the impact of the above on the Chinese Canadian public remains to be seen, a brief study of the local Chinese newspapers and the various organizations following the W5 incident will indicate a visible rise in the level of ethnic consciousness and politicization within Toronto's Chinese community. As seen in Chapter 6, sporadic attempts by some voluntary groups to arouse community awareness have been going on since the mid-70's. However, it was not until the W5 controversy were there conscious and systematic attempts to organize and fight for community-wide interests. This can be illustrated by the creation of new groups and the revitalization of some existing ones, aimed at uniting the ethnic community, working on issues that were related to the rights of Chinese Canadians, and increasing their watchfulness against further discriminations and institutional racism.

(1)The progressive groups:

By far the best known newly formed organization was the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC) .[20] The Council, which was a direct outgrowth of the anti-W5 struggle, was the first Chinese Canadian national organization with representatives from seventeen cities across the country. It gathered all the local groups and individuals which had participated in the Ad Hoc Committee Against W5 to form a large-scale national association. The aim was to act as a base for unity and contact among different Chinese groups and communities in the country. Though the Council has not formally received the mandate of the people, during the past two years it established rapport with numerous Chinese organizations in different parts of Canada.[21] On the one hand, it maintained close communications with its local chapters and affiliated organizations in the seventeen cities. On the other hand, it developed contact with other non-affiliated voluntary associations in various Chinese Canadian communities. For instance, in Toronto the CCNC developed close interactions with some liberal-minded Chinese organizations, such as the CCMA, the CCCO and the Association of Chinese Community Service Workers in Toronto.[22] They often collaborate and assist each other in various projects, seminars and other activities related to the well-being of the community. Recently, the Council had also established relations with two newly created Chinese organizations in the west of Toronto--the Etobicoke Chinese

Canadian Association and the Missisauga Chinese Association.[23] They agreed to cooperate with each other through mutual consultation and joint efforts on issues of common concern.

Apart from its attempt toward a unified Chinese umbrella group, the Council also has its specific ethno-political goals.[24] While ethnic preservation and intercultural understanding are high among its objectives, first and foremost is its emphasis on the rights and position of Chinese ethnic population in the mainstream of Canadian society. In this respect, the CCNC is the first Chinese Canadian national organization which explicitly committed itself to such political ends.

With these professed aims, the Council plays an active and initiative role on various human rights issues that directly or indirectly affected their ethnic members. In 1981 the CCNC made its public stand about the proposed Canadian Constitution.[25] Through a submission to the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House on the Proposed Canadian Constitution, the Council expressed its general support for the Charter of Rights and Freedom in the proposed constitution, but voiced its strong objection to the insertion of "the notwithstanding clause" in the Charter. On November 30, 1981, the Council together with other ethnic and women groups co-sponsored a public meeting to lobby for the removal of the clause.

In the same year, the Council pronounced its position on the proposed amendments to the Ontario Human Rights Code, Bill 7, and the Ontario Police compliants bill, Bill 68.[26] At a public hearing on Bill 7 in October, the Council together with the CCCO made an oral and written submission to the Standing Committee on Resource Development of the Ontario Legislature. The Councils, while endorsing some apsects of the proposed amendments, recommended major changes in some items in the bill. As far as Bill 68 was concerned, the CCNC allied with the Coalition for Legislative Change, which was composed of forty community groups, and jointly presented a submission to the Committee of Justice of the Ontario Legislature. It mainly opposed the bill's proposal that for the initial period of thirty days after the filing of a complaint, the police had the sole authority to investigate the complaint.

Besides voicing its concerns about the government legislation, the CCNC also heightened its vigilance against further discrimination and stereotyping in the mass media and other forms of institutional racism. In early 1981, the CCNC and the CCCO jointly lodged a complaint to TV Ontario concerning its programme entitled "Boiling in the Melting Pot". Both Councils protested that the programme provided a forum for a spokesman for the National Citizens' Coalition to air his views on "why immigrants from [the] Third World countries would not fit into Canadian society."[27]

In the following year, with their determined efforts, the CCNC[28] and the CCCO convinced the Ontario Science Centre to change the name of the Chinese exhibition, which was to be held in the summer of 1982, from "Chinese Secrets--7000 Years of Discovery" to "China--7000 Years of Discovery".[29] According to the Councils, the words "secret" and "inscrutability", which had been used in a news release by the Centre, were not only incompatible with the contents of the exhibition, but also had the negative effects of mystifying and stereotyping the Chinese people as a whole.

Also, about the same time, the CCNC sent an open letter to the Toronto Star expressing concern that the broader implications of Gerald Regan, the Secretary of State and Minister for Fitness and Amateur Sports, had insulted the Chinese community when, in questioning an Ontario government action, he exclaimed, "The question is whether Ontario's priority in education or operating an office so that Chinese girl can be in Paris. What's her name? Adrienne Clarkson." The Council claimed Regan's remarks "errant", "racist" and "sexist".[30]

These inicidents might appear to outsiders innocuous or trivial, and the reaction of the two Councils might seem overreactive and far-fetched. Nonetheless, they did reflect two things: the mounting sensitivity by these groups to any manifestations of prejudice and racism, and their increasingly vocal and forthright attitude in expressing

their concerns and demands in the wider community.

While it has increased its say in the mainstream society, the CCNC remains conscious of the need to respond to and educate the Chinese ethnic group members. During the past two years, the Council had answered some of the calls and complaints made by the community members about discrimination and unfair treatments.[31] Among the various grievances it dealt with, the most notable case was the "London Students Issue". According to the CCNC report, a number of Chinese foreign students in London, Ontario, "had committed technical infractions of the rule regarding foreign student visa." After these students appealed to CCNC's London local chapter, the Council intervened in the case and was able to obtain an assurance from the office of the Minister of Immigration and Employment so the students would be allowed to continue their study in Canada if they satisfied the requirements set out for foreign students. In a similar incident, another Chinese foreign student in London was denied to stay in Canada reportedly due to poor academic performance. According to the Council, however, the case was an arbitrary ruling of the immigration officer involved. After the CCNC presented the case to the Minister, the student was allowed to renew her student visa. The immigration officer in question was reprimanded and the Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, apologized and promised to correct the procedure.

In addition to addressing these grievances, efforts have also been made to provoke the political awareness and participation of the Chinese Canadian public. As an offshoot of the CCNC, the Office of Women's Affairs was set up to develop a sense of awareness and promote equal rights among Chinese Canadian women.[32] In cooperation with the CCMA, the Council planned to hold a seminar on the health and working conditions in garment factories, in which significantly large number of Chinese immigrant women worked.[33]

Through the various English and Chinese media--such as the press, Chinese television and radio programmes--the Council keeps the Chinese Canadians informed about issues that affected them, for example, the proposed Canadian constitution, Bills 7 and 68.[34] During election periods, the CCNC sponsored all candidates meetings in order to get the community members familarize with the candidates and vote. For instance, on March 9, 1981 the CCNC in collaboration with the CCCO and St. Stephen's Community Centre organized for the first time in Toronto's Chinse community an Ontario election candidates meeting at the Cecil Community Centre.[35] Candidates and representatives from all political parties, including the Communist Party, were invited to speak. About two hundred Chinese Canadians attended the meeting. They enthusiastically questioned the candidates about issues such as those about the education and medical welfare systems. The ardent response of the audience indeed impressed the

candidates present.

(2) The conservative sector:

Apart from these various relatively young and progressive groups, which were either directly or indirectly related to the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee, the more established and conservative forces in the community also sharpened their alertness against negative stereotyping and other discriminatory practices. An illustrative example was a controversy over the National Ballet of Canada's production of The Nutcrackers.

In December 1980, Alderman Ying Hope saw the ballet and was enraged by the China segment of a scene called Tea featuring two figures wearing "Fu Manchu moustaches, pseudo-dragon outfits and skullcaps."[36] According to Hope, Tea "portrays all the bad features of Chinese that some Western people have, the shuffling coolie gait, that kind of thing."[37] The alderman found the ballet guilty of "unconscious racism" and that it would only reinforce the old stereotypes. A few days later, Hope complained to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) and called for a revision of the disputed scene in the next year's production.[38]

When Hope's appeal was made known in the Toronto Star, some readers immediately refuted Hope's argument for being over-sensitive and overreacting.[39] Although the controversy did not invoke much public response from Toronto's Chinese

community save the reports and support of local Chinese papers, Hope's protest did obtain endorsement from a number of conservative Chinese organizations--the Ontario Chinese Community Centre, the Chinese Community Planning Association, and the Toronto Chinese Business Association.[40] They issued a joint statement on February 2 to the OHRC and the National Ballet Company of Canada in support of Hope's complaint and demand. With OHRC's intervention, the Ballet Company finally negotiated with Alderman Hope and agreed to modify the Tea scene in its subsequent production.[41]

Hope's reaction might appear oversensitive. However, as he himself points out "It [the ballet] was acceptable years ago, but not now."[42] This is particularly so in the light of the growing consciousness and activism in the ethnic community. As Sol Littman aptly puts it:

> Ten years ago, Hope would have swallowed his complaint. But today, if his leadership is to count, he must keep up with the new generation.[43]

Another conservative organization which also expressed its heightened concerns over human rights and ethnic issues was the FCCP. In the wake of the W5 incident, the Federation formed a Steering Committee on human rights. Its aims were to act as a "watchdog" against "possible recurrences of similar racially motivated misrepresentation", to make recommendations to the FCCP board of directors for action, and to perform a liason role joining forces with various community groups in presenting

their views.[44] Furthermore, as a result of the W5 dispute, the Federation's legal section set up another subcommittee to study, research, investigate and review current Canadian law as to their relationship with Chinese Canadians, to "make submission to the Federal and Ontario Law Reform Commission and other appropriate authorities for changes", and to "sponsor, organize and conduct public discussions and debates and, if necessary, educate issues regarding human rights."[45]

So far, the FCCP had joined a liason group on law enforcement and race relations. They jointly presented a brief to the Metro Police Commission urging for a change in the standards for police recruitment from the mere restrictive criteria of height and weight to a point system.[46] The Federation also planned to establish with other Chinese associations an umbrella organization called the Toronto Chinese Cultural Centre to explore the oral history and contributions of the early Chinese immigrants in Canada.[47]

Of course, the activities of these various organizations, both the progressive and the conservative groups, do not necessarily represent the general Chinese Canadian public attitudes. It is understood that despite the six-month campaign, large sectors of the Chinese population remained unmobilized, and that those who joined these community organizations are still a minority group.

Nevertheless, the size of these groups grew significantly after the anti-W5 campaign and have become a political force in Toronto's Chinese community. Furthermore, the ability of these organizations to generate publicity and activate, if not influence, public opinion was far out of proportion to the numerical size of their membership. Most of their activities enjoyed ample press coverage in the local Chinese newspapers and often provoked positive editorial comments. In reporting and commenting their public statements and events, the press helped emphasize the dynamic role of these groups in the community. Hence, though no statistical study has been taken to measure the general Chinese public attitudes, the new community organizations' activities do manifest a changing climate in Toronto's Chinese community--a climate which marked a heightened degree of ethnic consciousness and political activism among, at least, a significant and growing minority of Chinese Canadians.

CHAPTER VIII

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT

PART II

Impact on the Community Power Structure and Pattern of Leadership

The rising level of consciousness and politicization within Toronto's Chinese community is also attributable to its changing power situation and pattern of leadership as a result of the anti-W5 movement. Before examining how the campaign affected the Chinese leadership pattern in Toronto, it is important to qualify the term "leaders", and to understand the power structure of the community prior to the outbreak of the movement.

When the W5 incident broke out, there were no widely recognized or publicly acknowledged leaders in the Chinese community. The so-called leaders discussed in this study were mostly the heads or executive members of several large community organizations. What leadership roles they assumed were a product of their executive profiles and because through their organizations they wielded a certain degree of power and social influence. the people. Most important, they were usually accepted by the external powers as

representatives of the ethnic community.

In the light of this, one may say that before the W5 incident there were two main powers within Toronto's Chinese community: the traditional pro-Nationalist merchant-elites and the conservative professional-leaders. Though, as seen earlier in Chapter 6, the undisputed authority and preeminent position of the old entrepreneurial elites have waned since the late sixties, they remained a respected group in the community, enjoying support from scores of traditional organizations such as the Chinese Community Centre, the Toronto Chinese Business Association, other fraternal associations, locality and family groups, martial arts clubs, and even some long established local Chinese newspapers.[1] Adding to this power base, they had maintained close relationship with the two Chinese politicians in Toronto, Ying Hope and Gordon Chong.[2] Thus, despite their faltering prominence, they still retained certain degrees of influence and legitimacy in Toronto's Chinatowns.

The other dominant force were the established conservative professionals, who secured their position in the 1970's. Through the various organizations they formed during the last decade, they assumed themselves playing an important role in the development of Toronto's Chinese community.[3] Nevertheless, these self-appointed leaders were either little known to the large majority of the Chinese population or generally acknowledged by the people as their

representatives.[4]

Prior to the W5 incident, Toronto's Chinese community had few occasions for these informal leaders to publicize themselves and to prove their leadership under fire. There were either no significant issues that were serious enough to galvanize the people or no ones to define and articulate any problems as crucial to the community concerns. Without the sense of urgency, the Chinese populace cared little who wanted to play leader. For most community members, their major preoccupations were their own careers, economic and social security, and their future generations.

The apathy of the Chinese population to their leaders had also to do with the latter's mode of leadership. To borrow Myrdal's term, many of these conservative professional-leaders were of "accomodating" or "compromise" types, emphasizing more on establishing rapport with the dominant forces of the wider society than on developing ties with the grass roots of the community.[5] If any issues arose, they tended to tackle them by quiet intercession with the authorities; few attempts had been made to involve the mainstream of the ethnic community. As Kurt Lewin aptly puts it, they were "peripheral leaders".[6] Partly because of their elitist style, these self-appointed leaders often invited distrust and skepticism from their own ethnic group members. The latter suspected that these leaders held their position mainly for their self-aggrandizement or for other

personal and politicial motives.

Yet, despite their marginal position, they enjoyed reasonable acceptance from the high ranking government officials, who recognized them as representatives of Chinese people in Toronto and granted their associations government fundings for their activities.[7] Thus, one may say that they held their position primarily because they were acceptable to the leaders in the wider society. In any event, they were a political force to be reckoned with in Toronto's Chinese community.

The relation between these conservative professional group and the elderly traditional leaders was an ambiguous one. On the one hand, they had different interests and concerns. While the former stressed on integration into the mainstream of Canadian society, the latter displayed strong allegiance to the Nationalist government in Taiwan and paid great emphasis on the traditional culture, values and morality. Notwithstanding these differences, on the other hand, the two groups had certain important commonalities which allowed them to coexist peacefully. For instance, both were conservative in outlook and did not want to make waves; and both did not publicize themselves too much so as not to outshine the other. Furthermore, their different interests kept overlap to a minimum, thus decreasing any chance of direct confrontations.

Beneath this dual power structure, however, one could also find a small group of young and recently graduated professionals who tried to play a role in the community by forming their own new groups.[8] During the 1970's, they had a much lower profile than the two established forces. In terms of community affairs and politics, many of these young professionals were "newcomers". Though some of them were community workers, most had rarely been involved in the community for long. Their newly created organizations often suffered from lack of membership and financial resources.[9] There were thus few large scale projects or activities which could bring them to the foreground. The Boat People campaign, by far their most publicized activity before the anti-W5 campaign, still received limited backing from the community. As discussed in Chapter 7, not many Chinese Canadians favored the idea of increasing the intake of the boat people. Even some of those who supported the notion found the tactics employed by the Boat People campaigners too radical and political.[10] As far as external relations were concerned, it is true that some of these young professionals had developed rapport with a number of white politicians during the Boat People campaign. It is, however, interesting to note that unlike the conservative groups which had forged close links with the power groups and government officials, these young leaders had most of their white allies among the oppositon parties or civil rights leaders.

With this power situation, the young professionals were by no means a menace to the two prevalent dominant forces. The anti-W5 struggle, however, dramatically altered the existing political structure by introducing these young and action-oriented professionals as a third power in the leadership echelon. Their active and leading roles in this well-publicized and highly visible campaign made these previously obscure professionals the focus of attention both within and without their ethnic community. During the campaign, they made themselves acquainted with the Chinese populace through community forums, mass rally, demonstrations, street-corner campaigns, and most of all the press coverage in local Chinese newspapers. Externally, by representing the Chinese Canadians as negotiators with CTV, lobbying with the government officials, soliciting support from other ethnic groups, and encountering with the mass media, these professionals made themselves known and acceptable to the outside groups as representatives of the Chinese community.

As a matter of fact, they drew so much public attention during the campaign that for some time they stole the show from the conservative leaders. This was not surprising, though. First, the old merchant-elites were disproportinately underrepresented and conspicously inactive during the campaign. Second, though the conservative professional-leaders played their part in fighting against the W5 programme, their behind-the-scenes maneuverings and

quiet intercession made them as inconspicuous as their elderly counterparts.

Nonetheless, the most important factor which put these previously anonymous ciphers in the limelight was their strategies. Unlike the established conservative leaders who tended to work at the backstage with high echelon government officials, these new young debutes favored direct, but nonviolent, actions, widespread publicity, mass involvement, and identification with the grassroots. Their names and activites thus frequently appeared in the local Chinese newspapers and occasionally in the English dailies. As a result of their press coverage coupled with their front lines activities, they became increasingly seen as the only force willing and able to fight for the cause of the community. It is true that their strategies such as protest actions were something new to the community and were not initially favored by most Chinese Canadians. However, the victory over CTV seemingly proved the efficacy of their tactics and, at the same time, demonstrated their ability to defend the community against discrimination. Thus, after the campaign, these once obscure, low-key professionals suddenly and quickly rocketed to centre stage in the Chinese community.

How long would their popularity and prominence last? Since their leadership was ascribed to the anti-W5 movement, would they lose their leverage as the campaign slowly faded

from the public mind? While these questions remain to be answered, evidences over the last two years show that these new leaders will probably maintain their position for the years to come. It is true that these young professionals were once "issue leaders"; indeed, they still strongly identified themselves with the movement and called themselves the "W5 Generation".[11] There are, however, no signs that they are ready to resign their roles after the campaign. As Dr. Joseph Wong, then president of the Ad Hoc Committee, pointed out, the victory over CTV did not mean an end of their struggle; rather it was the beginning of the second stage of the Chinese Canadian movement.[12] Even before the settlement of the W5 dispute, some campaigners had already contemplated the formation of a larger organization to promote and protect the rights of Chinese Canadians. Hence immediately after the movement when the spirit and momentum were still high, the campaigners set up the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC). It is also true that some retired after the anti-W5 struggle;[13] but many remain actively involved in the community affairs. Almost all executive positions of the CCNC and its seventeen local chapters are held by veterans of the anti-W5 movement.[14] Some assumed important roles in other organizations which were once headed by the conservative professionals. The most notable example was the CCCO, in which the newly elected president right after the campaign was one of the young anti-W5 activists.[15] With these organizations in their hands,

they brought about a new style of leadership to the community, characterized by the anti-W5 legacies--involvement, action, outspokenness, responsivenss to the people, and increased sensitivity to human rights and other ethnic issues.

The Chinese local newspapers have also done much to contribute to the status of these new leaders by seeking their opinions and comments on various matters affecting the Chinese community. A good example was the Nutcrackers incident. Although it was Ying Hope who set off the controversy, and the CCNC was not initially involved, a few Chinese local newspapers sought the Council's opinion on the issue.[16] This prompted the CCNC to investigate the incident and later send letters to the Ballet Company and the Toronto Star calling for modification in the Tea scene of the ballet.[17] In reporting CCNC's comments and activities, the press helped underscore the role of the Council in the Chinese Canadian community.

The leading role of these young professionals is further emphasized by the increasing recognition they receive from the governments and other external forces, which now accept them as representatives of the Chinese Canadian community. The government officials who once only sought the opinions and advice of the established community leaders on matters concerning the ethnic group now turn to these young leaders as well. For instance, Dr. Joseph

Wong, president of the CCNC, was appointed as a committee member of the Canadian Radio-Telecommunication Commission (CRTC).[18] In April 1981, again Dr. Wong as representative of the community was invited by the National Committee for the Human Rights Charter to meet with the Prime Minister to voice support for the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights in the proposed Canadian constitution.[19] Furthermore, the Council was invited by the Secretary of State for Multiculuralism to represent the Chinese Canadians on the Advisory Committee to participate in the Symposium on Race Relations and the Law to be held at Vancouver on April 20-22, 1982.[20] Indeed, the position of these young liberal professionals has elevated to the point that it overshadows, at least temporarily, the prominence and influence of the traditional elites and the conservative professional-leaders.

It is true that, notwithstanding their popularity, these newcomers have not yet displaced their precursors, who still retain their spheres of influence. The pro-Nationalist old elites still hold their prestige as the elders and traditional leaders of the community, while the conservative professional-leaders continue to represent their interest groups and maintain their relations with the non-Chinese community, especially the provincial Progressive Conservative Party members.[21] Nevertheless, though they are still far from being deposed from their positions, the recently risen young professionals are a force to be dealt

with. The uneasiness of the old and new elites stems not only from their wide chasm in ideological outlooks and political style, but also from the increased publicity and popularity the new groups relished since the anti-W5 movement.

One should remember that the young professionals and their conservative counterparts had once forged an unprecedented alliance during the campaign. However, it was soon evident that instead of a united front, the untested coalition brought the two groups into direct confrontation with each other, which left a legacy of bitterness and suspicion. While the conservative sector accused the young activists as hot-headed, inexperienced and irresponsible radicals, the latter denounced the former as too conservative, elitist and for not wanting to make waves.[22]

Their cold war did not subside even with the settlement of the W5 dispute. Instead of joining the CCNC to work together on human rights and other ethnic issues, the FCCP set up its own liason group with other community organizations to deal with the same problems. At the same time, while the CCNC collaborated with the Canadian Broadcasting Coperation in producing "the Golden Mountain"--a documentary film on the history of Chinese Canadians,[23] the Federation together with other traditional groups planned the Toronto Chinese Cultural Centre to explore the history of the early Chinese immigrants in

Canada.

While this was primarily a discord between the two groups of professionals, there was another internal dispute which estranged the new young leaders from another power force of the community, namely the traditional elites. The dispute was a bitter controvery over the erection of a statue of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese nationalist leader, in Toronto. This dissension, which lasted for more than four months, was a quintessence of the internal conflict between the old guards and the new activists.

The controversy over the Sun statue:

In late December 1980, a group of traditional pro-Nationalist organizations, notably the Chinese Community Centre and its affiliated associations, formed a special committee to erect a statue of Dr. Sun in a public place in Toronto.[24] Aldermen Ying Hope and Gordon Chong and some other "important people" were asked to be its honorary advisors.[25] On January 9, 1981, Chong referred the committee's plan to City Hall by proposing a motion for City Council to accept a statue of Dr. Sun as a gift from Toronto's Chinese community. According to Chong, the purposes were to commemorate Sun and to have the statue as a "visible reminder of the significant contribution the Chinese community has made in Toronto."[26] City Council unanimously passed the motion and accepted the donation in principle.

At first, there were no signs of any disagreement. A month later, however, a group of Chinese Canadians, who called themselves the Committee to Commemorate the Chinese Railraod Workers, strongly opposed the idea of erecting a Sun statue in a public place and asked for an ammendment in the Council's resolution. They argued that if the Chinese contribution to Canada was to be recognized, it should not be with a statue of a Chinese nationalist leader, but a monument of the 17,000 Chinese railway workers who came to Canada a hundred years ago. Dr. Sun, they protested, had no direct contribution nor relevance to the Canadian history. "Canada is our adopted country. We belong here," they continued, "A memorial should have some direct bearing on Chinese life in Canada."[27]

While these arguments can be found in the English newspapers, the opponents further suggested in the local Chinese press other reasons for rejecting the Sun statue.[28] They asserted that in the wake of the W5 incident and in the light of the undercurrent of racism, a statue of a Chinese nationalist statesman in a public place would only be an open invitation for the Ku Klux Klan and other racist elements to promote such anti-Chinese sentiments as "Yellow Peril" or "Asian threat".[29] Moreover, the statue might also invoked suspicion or even antagonism from the "righteous" Canadians who had once supported the ethnic community.

For their part, the pro-Nationalist groups countered that they did not oppose a monument for the Chinese railway workers; they strongly diagreed, however, it replace the Sun statue.[30] According to them, the two statues had different implications and should therefore be treated as seperate issues. Furthermore, they retorted that a statue of Dr. Sun was not in contradiction with the Canadian identity. First, Canada's multicultural policy, they argued, did allow different ethnic groups to preserve their own culture, traditions, and even some links with their old countries. Second, Dr. Sun's legacy could aptly represent the Chinese cultural distinctiveness, and his motto for love, equality and unity also corresponded with Canada's spirits. Finally, they contended that to be a Canadian citizen one did not have to repudiate one's roots; law-abiding and peace-loving were already sufficient to be qualified as a good citizen.[31]

The dispute, which started as a squabble in the local Chinese newspapers, eventually reached City Hall. Through Daniel Heap, another Ward 6 alderman, the Committee to Commemorate the Chinese Railroad Workers requested City Council to amend its earlier resolution.[32] In a petition letter signed by 500 Chinese Canadians to Mayor Art Eggleton and City Council, James Pon, a key spokesman for the Committee, pointed out that the Chinese people in Canada were already in a quest for identity, and

> A statue of Dr. Sun Yat-sen has the effect of promoting ties with the old country and

> consequently creating a false and unrealistic identity for many Chinese Canadians.[33]

The CCNC also made a submission to City Hall asking for a delay in the Council's decision.[34] The reason given was Chong's proposal was made without the first finding a consensus in the community. The CCNC thus called for an investigation of the public opinion within the ethnic group before any decision was made.

A public hearing was held on March 11, 1981 in City Hall, where both the supporters and opponents of the Sun statue presented their views before the City Council executive committee. No decision was made on the site. Instead, the Council executive committee assigned the two Ward 6 aldermen, Gordon Chong and Daniel Heap, and another alderman Patrick Sheppard to study the problem and report back.[35] Two weeks later, City Council finally decided to suspend the January 9 motion until further inquiry was made.[36]

Tension between the two sides escalated. Not only did the tone of the debate become increasingly stormy, personal and acrimonious, it took more and more space in the Chinese press, making the controversy the community's issue of the day. On the one hand, the supporters of the Sun statue attacked the opponents, in particular James Pon and Joseph Wong, as leftists disrupting the peace and tranquility of the community.[37] They also charged the Committee to Commemorate the Chinese Railroad Workers with bringing

disgrace to the community by unveiling the dispute to City Hall and thereby the general public.[38]

On the other hand, the pro-railway-workers groups expressed in the Chinese newspapers their doubts about the motives of Chong and the CCC in proposing the Sun statue. They suspected that Chong introduced the motion mainly for his personal political gain;[39] and that the CCC was trying to gain "some political and propaganda benefit from the exercise".[40]

As the dispute developed, the two sides not only exchanged blows in the local Chinese newspapers, but they also took the issue to the streets. While the Committee to Commemorate the Chinese Railroad Workers solicited signatures and distributed flyers and their position paper in the street corner,[41] the supporters of Sun statue held a peace march in Chinatowns on April 12, 1981.[42] The quarrel lingered on until the issue gradually faded away with neither side winning the battle.

Most outsiders, including the supports of the Sun statue, tended to view the dispute along political lines, as the left versus the right, the Communists versus the Nationalists, or the pro-Peking versus the pro-Taiwan.[43] This left-right analysis is, however, a misleading one. First, although Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the founder of the Nationalist government and the Guomindong, which are now represented by the Taiwan government, he is highly revered by all Chinese,

left or right, as the father of modern China. Thus, an erection of a Sun statue would not provoke, at least such an open, opposition from the sympathizers of the People's Republic of China.

Moreover, a scrutiny of the opponents' backgrounds would reveal that it was not so much of a left-right dispute, but an issue of identity. It is true that the supporters of Sun statue were undeniably pro-Nationalist. The CCC, the original advocate of the statue, candidly admitted that it supports nationalist China, Taiwan;[44] and in the list of supporters, almost all the endorsers were either affiliated organizations of the CCC or the associated groups of the Chinese nationalist party or the traditional family associations.[45] The backgrounds of their opponents were, however, less apparent because they did not parade their political affiliations nor did they fight the issue under any organizational banner, except the Committee to Commemorate the Chinese Railroad Workers. It is true that James Pon, chairman of the Committee, was once chairman of the local China National Day Celebration, which commemorates the establishment of the People's Republic of China. His personal background does not, however, represent the political persuasions of the other opponents. There were no indications that those who opposed the Sun state were leftists or Communists. As a matter of fact, most of the opponents were middle-class professionals, some businessmen and community workers.[46] If any classification is necessary

to understand their backgrounds, it is more appropriate to label them as the new generation of active and ethnically aware Chinese Canadians, who showed more concerns with their Canadian identity and rights than allegiance to their mother country. In fact, ample evidences suggest that many of these opponents were indeed the so-called "W5 Generation".

A perusal of the 500 signatures in Pon's petition letter would reveal that many of the endorsers were once directly or indirectly involved in the anti-W5 movement. Furthermore, though the CCNC, a direct outgrowth of the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee, played no active role in the controversy, it did make a submission to City Council calling for a delay in its decision and an inquiry of the community's opinion. CCNC's submission was a further deterrent to the erection of the Dr. Sun statue. Another clue to the background of these anti-Sun-statue elements was the name of Joseph Wong, president of the CCNC. He was publicly identified by the traditional groups in the local Chinese newspapers as their arch-opponent. It is also interesting to note that while the conservative local Chinese press sided with the proponents of the Sun statue, some liberal community dailies, which had once helped propagandize the anti-W5 campaign, provided channels for the opponents to voice their arguments.

The most telling and important evidence of all was the position advocated by the Dr. Sun statue's opponents.

Their basic arguments were very similar as those expounded during the anti-W5 campaign. For instance, the strong emphasis on the Chinese Canadian identity, which formed the underpinning of its anti-Sun-statue position, was the very gist of the W5 controversy.[47] Another example was the frequent use of the W5 incident and the National Citizens' Coalition's advertisement against the boat people as illustration of public anti-Chinese sentiments.[48] The constant reference to these two earlier episodes leads one to infer that many of the Sun statue's opponents were indeed the ones who strongly identified themselves with the anti-W5 movement and the Boat People campaign.

The significant involvement of this W5 generation reveals the nature of the controversy. The dispute was not the traditionally assumed left-right quarrel, but a conflict which developed out of the historical change in the ethnic community. Perhaps if the traditional groups made their proposal a few years earlier, they might not have met such opposition. The change of time and social climate complicated the matter. What made the erection of a Sun statue a controversy was not so much, or simply, the sympathizers of the mainland China, but a group of recently awakened Chinese Canadians, mostly post-1967 immigrants, who wanted to be Canadians first and foremost and who had been politicized by their experience in the W5 incident.

Anyway, the dispute went on for some time. Although it finally died down with no resolution, it did reveal and widen the breach between the new active elements and the traditional elites. Hence, while the anti-W5 movement had a centripetal effect on the Chinese Canadian community at large as seen earlier, in terms of Toronto's Chinese community leadership, it had an paradoxical impact as a centrifugal force. As a matter of fact, in an interview with an executive member of the FCCP, he pointed out that while the W5 issue had the potential effect of unifying the Chinese community, it turned out to have an equally divisive impact polarizing the people into opposite factions. He used the Sun-statue controversy as the example.[49] Whether his analysis was correct or not, it does indicate how the traditional and the conservative sectors view the W5 incident.

Before ending this section, it is also important to emphasize again that despite the many splits and quarrels, there were no partisan, ideological or political lines which firmly divided the so-called leaders into absolute camps. Some change alliances depending on the issues concerned. Indeed, in the recent annual report of the CCNC, one may discover that the once archenemy of the Ad Hoc Committee, namely Ying Hope, has joined the list of the Council's membership.[50] Perhaps, time might heal old wounds. The FCCP, another strong opponent of the Ad Hoc Committee, has also now undertaken joint projects with the CCNC.[51] In fact, the

conflict situation is often so complex and so diffuse that it is difficult to say definitely the relationships of these different groups of leaders. One could only conclude that as a result of the anti-W5 movement, a new active force was added to the community's leadership echelon; and that the rise of this new group has enhanced the potential for internal power struggle and conflicts.

The Image and External Relations of Toronto's Chinese Community

Since the anti-W5 campaign was not merely an internal community movement but a struggle which involved other institutions and forces in the larger society, the impact of the campaign would naturally be felt beyond the community's boundary. A cursory study of the English daily press, an examination of the external relations of various Chinese organizations, and interviews with some non-Chinese Canadians indicate that the campaign did entail some significant implications for the wider society. First, the campaign had the effect of modifying the outgroup perception of the Chinese Canadian community. Second, the movement indirectly enhanced the external relations of the ethnic group with various outside forces. Finally, the W5 episode did give the Canadian mass media a lesson.

(1) The changing image of Toronto's Chinese community:

It is understood that ethnic "image" or "stereotype" is often not an accurate reflection of a community's reality. The sheer lack of knowledge on the part of outsiders about a particular ethnic group together with the deliberate attempt of ethnic members or leaders to cover up its internal situation often produce a partial and, sometimes, distorted picture about the real nature of the community. Yet, in spite of the inherent biases and other undesirable elements, stereotypic images often do contain some kernals of truth and form the inevitable bases on which the general public perceived and treated the minority group concerned.[52] This is particularly true to the case of Toronto's Chinese community.

Before the W5 incident, despite its economic growth, geographical expansion and rise of population, Toronto's Chinese community generally maintained a low social and political profile in the mainstream of Canadian society. While there were increasingly loud cries for seperatism from Quebec and a "white ethnic revival" among Ukrainians and other Europeans Canadians, the Chinese ethnic group was, at least in the eyes of outsiders, reticent about their ethnic power and political rights. While a quiet Chinese Canadian movement had been underway since the mid-1970's, it was too quiet to be noticeable to the community members themselves, not to say the general public. While stereotypic images such as "superachievers", "moneyed, bright and ambitious", "pragmatic and astute" were often attributed to the recent

Chinese Canadians,[53] politically they were viewed as a "silent minority", a "serene group", a "peace-loving community" or a "politically docile group", receiving meagre attention from the general public. If these images were not overtly hostile, two recent sociological studies on Canadian ethnic groups have indicated that the majority members in Canada tended to rate the Chinese in the lowest scale of social standing.[54]

As a result of this highly publicized movement, however, the old images and low profile of Toronto's Chinese community were, at least, partly reversed. The unexpectancy and unprecedency of the campaign, its national scale, long persistency, widespread support and publicity, the commitment and intensity of the campaigners and, above all, the final victory had all attracted the public attention to the Chinese community. More importantly, they projected a new image about the ethnic group. Instead of being politically passive or docile, the six-month campaign demonstrated to outsiders that the Chinese Canadians were becoming more active and assertive.

Again, though no more recent statistical survey or polls are available to measure the general public perception of the Chinese community, a brief study of the major Toronto's daily press would provide important clues. Not only do newspapers echo mass attitude, but they also played an important role in creating public awareness and shaping

public opinion. Hence, the image and profile of the Chinese community also depended on how the press wrote about it. During the six-month dispute, both The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star had occasional reports on the development of the controversy and the Chinese community actions. Though their coverage was often sporadic and superficial, most of their reports, especially those written in the latter part of the campaign, were sympathetic to the cause of the ethnic community. In doing so, these newspapers played an important role in presenting the Chinese Canadian protest to the general reading public, and in emphasizing to the larger society the political muscle of the ethnic group.

Still more striking were the reports and editiorial comments written after the W5 victory. They protrayed a new picture of the Chinese community. In hailing the success of the campaign, a newspaper had one of its bold, black headlines reads as to this: "Chinese go from protest to power!".[55] Dick Beddoes, who had written a series of columns on the dispute, noted in his last series: "[The Chinese Canadians] began as amateurs confronting a telecasting giant, but persisted in pioneering on behalf of a group which, in the past, has been politically docile."[56] More revealing was Sol Littman's article, "W5 Generation: Changing Chinese", in the Toronto Star. He describes:

> [The new Chinese Canadians] don't hesitate to organize rallies, marches and picket lines to publicize their cause.... They do not fear officials, but see them as servants of all Canadians.[57]

For those who followed the anti-W5 movement closely might find Littman's remarks an overstatement in the characterization of the "W5 Generation". As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the campaigners were not at all fearless and militant. They were indeed very cautious and moderate, eschewed any radical or violent actions. Every move was taken warily after long deliberations. Nonetheless, these hesitations and reservations were obscure to outsiders. Instead, the January 26 demonstration and the refusal to accept CTV's first "apology" impressed media that the campaigners were committed, dauntless and unconciliatory. Though these images were misleading in some sense, they convinced the external groups the power and determination of the ethnic community.[58]

Well after the campaign, both The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star continued to have commentaries on the changing face of Toronto's Chinese community; and the anti-W5 movement was often used as a prototype of the new spirit. John Fraser's column, "Crossing Chinatown's boundaries", on May 6, 1981 in The Globe and Mail was particularly illustrative:

> .... A few years ago.... [the Chinese Canadians] kept such a low profile that it was easy to make generalizations. The fact that those generalizations were mostly benign--Chinese Canadians were industrious, kept in themselves and did not stir up trouble--was as much a reflection on how Chinese Canadians felt ethnic minorities should comport themselves as it was a legacy of decades of discrimination which necessitated group quietude.

> No longer....
>
> A year and a half ago, CTV's W5 programme did a dirty deed....
>
> The beneficial effect of the show was that it finally galvanized an important body of opinion in the Chinese community. No longer was quietude an appropriate response... Meetings were called, organizations formed and people spoke out publicly for the first time. What emerged was a community that was no longer frightened to move into the mainstream. The proof of this could be found in the forthright way internal problems [for example, the controversy over Dr. Sun statue] were aired publicly, something unthinkable a few years ago.[59]

It is still uncertain whether or not this image has filtered out to ordinary Canadians. The above extract, however, does at least clearly reflect how outside observers perceived the rapidly changing Chinese community in Toronto.

(2) The closer intergroup relations:

The improved image and profile of the ethnic community were accompanied by its closer relations with the external groups. For instance, politicians and government officials began to realize the potential political power of the Chinese community. After the victory of the anti-W5 campaign, representatives from all three levels of government offered their congratulations to the ethnic community.[60] In turn, these celebrities were often invited to be the guests of honour in various large-scale community's activities.

More significant than these polite and friendly gestures, however, was the motion passed in the House of Commons two months after the conclusion of the campaign. On June 19, NDP 1980 Ian Waddell, member of Parliament for Vancouver-Kingsway riding, introduced a resolution for the House to recognize "the contribution made to the Canadian mosaic and culture by the people of Chinese background."[61] Whether or not his motion was prompted by the W5 incident,[62] Waddell clearly mentioned in his presentation that the anti-W5 movement was an exemplification of the new mood in the Chinese Canadian community:

> [T]here is a renaissance, a growth of today like never before in the Chinese Canadian community. The community is alive, active and participating as never before in Canadian life. They are not about to take discrimination or stereotyping any more.[63]

Waddell's resolution was endorsed by other members. Interestingly enough, when the three parties' spokesmen presented their opinion before the Commons, each claimed credit of his represented party's contribution and involvement in the community's anti-W5 campaign. The most vivid example was when Peter Stollery, Liberal for Spadina, suggested that James Fleming, Minister of State Multiculturalism, had worked hard to resolve the controversy, Steven Paproski, former multicultural mininster in the Progressive Conservative Government, immediately retorted that he was the one who solved the problem.[64] In any event, the resolution unanimously passed, which marked the first official recognition of the contributions and position

of Chinese Canadians in the Commons. This significancy would become even more apparent when one is reminded that seventy years ago in the same House of Commons, debates were held on how to minimize the Chinese population and their involvement and influence in this country.[65]

Aside from the political arena, the Chinese community had also fostered closer relationship with other ethno-cultural groups in the wake of the anti-W5 movement. Toronto's Chinese community previously had little interaction with other ethnic minorities. During the campaign, however, the anti-W5 advocates actively pursued the backings and successfully secured active support from the Japanese, Southeast Asian, Black and the Jewish communities. Though most of their support was rhetorical, it set an important stage for future cooperation and alliance. Shortly after the campaign, the Chinese community, particularly the CCNC, established relations with the National Black Coalition of Canada, the B'Nai Brith and other ethnic communities, including the Japanese, Italians and Jamaicans. The CCNC joined the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the Council of National Ethno-cultural Organizations, the Ad Hoc Media Committee of the Intercultural Network Building Conference, and the Ad Hoc Advisory Group for the Symposium on Race Relations and the Law.[66] Through these various alliances, the CCNC works closely with other ethnocultural groups in promoting and protecting the rights of ethnic minorities in Canadian

society.[67]

(3) The implications for the mass media:

Aside from modifying the outgroup perception of the Chinese community and enhancing its external relations with the larger society, the anti-W5 campaign, especially its success, had also direct implications for the mass media in general. This long-running and highly publicized campaign together with CTV's public apology provided the media people a lesson. As the Toronto Star editorialized, "...the incident serves to give us pause before we call someone a foreigner..."[68] For sure, the public media would be more wary than ever of offending any ethnic minorities. In fact, as a result of the W5 controversy, Muticulturalism Minister James Flemming wrote to John Meisel, chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), in the hope of cooperating with the CRTC in devising a public appeals mechanism to counter racist and offensive television broadcasts.[69] He conceded in a press conference that his proposal was a direct result of the W5 incident, which clearly indicated the insufficiency of the prevalent Eraodcast Act in regulating and penalizing offensive broadcasts. Elizebeth Paterson, director of the International Centre of the University of Toronto, also talked with some press people and TV insiders, who admitted that the W5 incident was a lesson for all public media that

they did not have unlimited or unchallengeable power.[70]

By far, the most tangible example of the effect of the anti-W5 movement on the mass media was a case revealed by Joseph Wong.[71] Soon after the W5 incident, another television network, TV Ontario, planned to air six series of programmes called "Dr. Who", which, according to Wong, played upon a stereotype of Chinese people. Before airing the series, however, the network consulted the opinion of the CCNC, which rejected the portrait of the Chinese in the show. Subsequently, TV Ontario cancelled the whole series from being aired.

It is still uncertain how long this lesson will last. One thing is clear. For the first time in the history of Canada a major media network publicly apologized to an ethnic minority. Not only was it a victory for the Chinese Canadian community, but it also signified a triumph for the minority struggle against inequality and racism. At least, the successful campaign against CTV, a national media network, would set an important precedent for the Chinese community as well as other ethnic minorites in fighting their rights and equality in the mainstream of Canadian society.

CONCLUSION

In retropsect, the anti-W5 movement was a landmark in the history of Toronto's Chinese community both because of its extraordinary story and its implications for the ethnic group.

For the first time there was such a massive outburst from Toronto's Chinese community. The anti-W5 united front of both conservative and progessive Chinese groups was also the first of its kind in Toronto. Although the allinace did not last for long, it built the spirit and momentum of a full-fledged community-wide protest movement. The January 26 rally and demonstration, which marked the climax of the campaign, also publicly demonstrated the widespread support the campaigners were able to muster from both community members and outside groups such as politicians, the mass media and other ethno-cultural representatives. Later, the local campaign escalated into an unprecedented nation-wide Chinese Canadian movement. The protest grew larger and larger until, after six months, CTV finally aplogized to the Chinese Canadian community.

While all these achievements were in the glare of public eye, behind the scenes many interesting and important twists and turns dramatically affected the course and outcome of the campaign. Perhaps only in retrospect can one analyse the bitter internal dissensions over tactical differences, the withdrawal of the conservative forces from the anti-W5 alliance, the hesitation and reservations of some campaigners about staging a protest march, the internal debate over whether the Chinese communtiy should accept as final CTV's March 16 statement, the increasing difficulties faced by the campaigners in sustaining the spirit and momentum of the movement, the refusal of the anti-W5 activists to allow Alderman Ying Hope to join the negotiations with CTV, and finally the surprise with which the campaigners greeted the televison network's final concession. All these are not meant to reveal the weakness of the movement. Rather, it is only through this indepth analysis can one has a deeper understanding of the human character of theovement and a more realistic picture of the campaigners emerge.

A retrospective of events is, however, by no means adequate for understanding why an ethnic community which seemed previously to be politically inactive and docile could be mobilized into group action, and why the campaign was a success. The first question calls for a broad social, political and historical analysis. For example, it is important to consider the large inflow of well-educated and

middle-class Chinese immigrants as a result of the 1967's immigration policy; the changing social and political structure of the ethnic community ensued; the quiet movement of new ethnic consciousness among a small group of professionals and intellectuals; the proliferation of new community organizations since 1975; and the gradual emergence of a new group of young, recently graduated, and politically conscious professionals during the late seventies. All these factors explain in large part why there were activists willing and ready to launch a community-wide protest movement.

The success of the campaign can be looked at from two perspectives--the mobilization of widespread support from the Chinese Canadian public, and victory over CTV. The first success depended mainly on the ability of protest leaders to interpret and define the issue, their credentials as white-collar professionals which gave them community credibility, their nonviolent and legal tactics and actions, and finally their ability to solicit well-publicized institutional backing from non-Chinese politicians and the mass media. While the question of legitimacy was important in arousing the community's support, it was widespread publicity and sustained public pressure which caused CTV to back down. For instance, the January 26 rally and demonstration drew public attention to the controversy; the reports and commentaries in the two major Toronto's English language dailies had the effect of undermining the

reputation and credibility of CTV; and the pending libel and slander suit might incur further image problems for the television network. Other political support came from government officials and politicians, the intervention of Toronto City Council and the OHRC, and the escalation of the originally local protest to the national levels. All these became too difficult and expensive for CTV to withstand. Hence, after being intransigent for almost half a year, CTV finally yielded under mounting pressures to the demands of the Chinese Canadain community.

The campaign was also important for its manifold implications and repercussions for the ethnic community. One of the important result was the fostering of ethnic consciousness, ingroup feelings and political activism among the community members. It is still uncertain to what degree the community was being mobilized. Certainly, however, there was a growing segment of Chinese Canadians who were being ethnically awakened and politicized as a result of the anti-W5 movement. At least many of them, who had never joined any Chinese organizations or involved themselves in any community politics, enlisted as members of the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), which was a direct outgrowth of the anti-W5 struggle, and was by far one of the most active and vocal Chinese organizations in promoting ethnic rights and group recognition in the wider society. Conservative associations, such as the Federation of the

Chinese Canadian Professionals, also heightened vigilance of racial problems and human rights issues in the wake of the W5 incident. Even the traditional groups, such as the Chinese Community Centre and the Toronto Chinese Business Association, voiced their complaints against racism and negative stereotyping in the mass media as in the Nutcracker controversy. It is true that these organizations' activities are far from being a mirror of the Chinese Canadian public attitude; they do manifest, however, a new visible current of growing ethnic consciousness and political activism within Toronto's Chinese community. Even though only a minority of Chinese Canadians have caught up in the new wave, this minority has grown and would become a new political force to be reckoned with in the ethnic group.

The anti-W5 movement also wrought significant change in the power structure of the community by introducing a new type of leadership challenging the traditional elite and the conservative, established professional-leaders. They are the young anti-W5 campaign leaders. Not surprisingly, because of their forthright and action-oriented style of leadership, this third power was a threat and challenge to the two established forces. This erupted again in the bitter and long-standing dispute between the young progressive professionals and the traditional elite over the erection of a statue of Dr. Sun, a Chinese nationalist leader. Although the dispute finally faded with neither side winning the battle, it reflected a deepening of

suspicion and breach between these new leaders and the established powers.

Aside from affecting the internal political structure, the widely visible campaign, which had involved various external institutions, also effected the outgroup perception of the ethnic community. As a result of the highly publicized January 26 demonstration, the long-running struggle, the rejection of CTV's March 16 statement, and the final victory over the television network, the previously low political profile of the Chinese community was partly reversed. At least, the English language newspapers, the politicians and other ethno-cultural groups began to view the Chinese Canadians as increasingly vocal and assertive force in the broader society. The mass media became more wary than previously of offending the ethnic minorities, the politicians could no longer ignore the political force of Chinese Canadians, and the other ethnic groups were drawn into closer relations with the Chinese community as a result of the campaign.

In short, this unprecedented outburst, its extraordinary story, its victory, and its many implications have made the campaign a milestone in Toronto's Chinese community, opening a new chapter in the Chinese Canadian history. This time will prove how widespread and long-lasting its significance and impact will remain in the Chinese Canadian public. As Nancy Ing[1] concludes in her

anti-W5 documentary film:

> Some ... feel that this recent issue has marked a turning point in out history. Indeed, it ... set our new directions for our future generation. However, what remains to be seen is how lasting these changes will be.[2]

In conclusion, it is important to recall a group of people who had played an indispensable role in the movement, but who lost most at the end. They were a handful of Chinese students at the University of Toronto, who dedicated their efforts and fought relentlessly with their limited resources against CTV during the early stage of the W5 protest. Although their actions were ineffective in getting the television network apologize, they proved instrumental in awakening the Chinese community anti-W5 movement. It was the students who initiated the protest against the "Campus Giveaway"; and the students who informed concerned Chinese organizations about the programme, provided them with the indispensable videotape of the show, and convinced them of the urgency and seriousness of the issue. Without their initiative and prodding, it is difficult to imagine how a short television documentary about "foreign students", which had not raised any immediate outcry from Toronto's Chinese community, could eventually become a cause for the community outburst almost two months after the airing of the programme. Furthermore, one should note that it was also the students who finally forged an unprecedented coalition among various Chinese groups and individuals for concerted

actions against W5. It is thus no exaggeration to say that the students' initiatial efforts paved the way for the advent of the anti-W5 campaign.

Nonetheless, despite their important role, their names were largely forgotten, their contributions obliterated, and, most of all, their problems ignored. While the Chinese Canadian community as a whole gained from the success of the anti-W5 campaign, the students who had fought the early battles did not. At least, not a word about the Chinese Canadian students nor foreign students was mentioned in CTV's April 16 apology; and when most people hailed the efforts of the campaigners, very few remembered or referred to the work of the students. Perhaps, some may argue that the victory for the Chinese Canadian community is also a triumph for the Chinese Canadian students. But what of the foreign students, especially those who had fought for their cause? How about all those unfounded accusation made against the Chinese foreign students in the programme? Indeed, some students who actively involved in the dispute during the early stage now regard their actions and sacrifices meaningless and a waste of time. They never won their cause.[3] It is ironic that those who initiated and sparked the action were the ones who gained least at the end.

In any event, it is hoped that this thesis has provided a better understanding of the anti-W5 movement and has paid

due credit to all those who contributed to the campaign. It is also hoped that through the analyses in this study, the movement has provided a focus and a lens for understanding the little-explored recent history and internal politics of Toronto's Chinese community.[4]

NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

1. According to many theorists, the term "community" contains at least two characteristics: a specific geographical area and "community sentiment". (See S.J. Fitzpatrick and P. Joseph, "The Importance of 'Community' in the Process of Immigrant Assimilation," The International Migration Review 1 (Fall 1966):5-15; and Colin Bell and Howard Newby, Community Studies: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Local Community, [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971], pp.21-53.) In this context, the community we talk about fails to satisfy these two requirements. First, unlike the early Chinese community which was spatially defined within Chinatowns, the present Chinese Canadians tend to disperse in all parts of the city. Second, as we shall see in the following chapters, most Chinese Canadians have a low degree of community consciousness or group feelings. Nevertheless, they have shared some important common characteristics which qualify them, at least in the eyes of outsiders, to be called an ethnic community. For instance, they have common ethnic origin, common language, similar way of life, common cultural background and value system. Hence, in this thesis, the term "Chinese Canadian community" or "Chinese community" is used to denote all Chinese Canadians as well as their ethnic institutions such as Chinatowns, their business agencies, voluntary organizations, interest groups, community services, local Chinese language press, churches, etc. As far as the term "Chinese Canadian" is concerned, it is used to refer to all residents of Chinese descent in Caanada, except those with foreign status such as visitors and foreign students. Therefore, whether they are Canadian-born or landed immigrants with or without Canadian citizenship, they are all considered as Chinese Canadians.

2. Sing Tao Newspaper 14 May 1980, p.6.

3. Shortly after "Campus Giveaway" was telecast, these various institutions lodged complaints and strong protests against the programme. A flood of letters were being sent to CTV not only to protest against the inaccuracies and refute most of the statements presented in the report, but also file complaints about the insinuations made against students of Chinese descent. These various institutions also made known their protests in their internal press, for example, The Varsity and the Bulletin of the U. of T., the University Affairs and the "Communique" of the AUCC. Furthermore, the AUCC and CBIE filed submissions to the

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), requsting an inquiry into the programme. (For details, see W5 files of the International Student Centre of the U. of T., 1979-80.)

4. Even the Chinese communities in Vancouver and Toronto, the two largest centres of Chinese Canadian population, are distinctively different. One apparent example is the composition of the community members. In the former case, a large majority of the population are either the early immigrants or the second- third- and even fourth-generation of Canadian-born Chinese. In Toronto, it is the post-1967 immigrants mostly from Hong Kong who formed the majority members of the community. In recent years, Toronto's Chinese community has even surpassed Vancouver's, in terms of both population size and economic prosperity.

5. So far, there have virtually been no published academic works on this subject, except a few short papers written by the anti-W5 participants. Their papers can be found in the proceedings of Asian Canadians and Multiculuralism (Proceedings of the Asian Cultural Symposium III (University of Saskatchewan,1980), pp.268-279; and Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective (Proceedings of the Intercultural Conference) (Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario [CCCO], Toronto, 1978), pp.101-3.

6. Indeed, several interviewees conceded this point. They admitted that they were most unwilling to reveal the internal conflicts of the community to outsiders.

7. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded. But for those who refused to be taped, their comments and information were noted down immediately after interviews. Some telephone interviews were also conducted. Their remarks and data were recorded in writing.

8. A few interviewees requested confidentiality and anonymity in some of the points they made. Their wishes are respected.

9. Bell and Newby has discussed some of the drawbacks to using interview as a source of information, (see Bell and Newby, Community Studies [London: George Allen and Union Ltd., 1971], pp.54-81).

10. These "marginal figures" include a number of volunteers and a few observers within the community who did not play an active or leading role in the campaign.

11. Most of these documents are obtaind from Elizebeth Paterson (director of the International Student Centre of U. of T.), Norman Kwan (his papers and clippings), Lilian Ma (secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Council of Chinese

Canadians in Ontario Against W5), Joseph Wong (an executive member of the Ad Hoc Committee), Ying Hope (his files), and Frank Chui (1980-81 president of the Federation of Chinese Canadian Professionals). Their documents include CTV's letters, and correspondence and memorandum from some politicians and government departments.

12. Cheuk Kwan, one of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, wrote three papers on this subject: "The Anti-W5 Movement", "The Foreign Threat that Never Was!" and "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians: The Anti-W5 Movement". The first two can be found in The Asianadian (Asian Canadian Magazine) 2/4 pp.11-13 and 2/3 pp.21-22 respectively. The third paper is published in Asian Canadian and Multiculturalism pp.268-279. Irene Chu, another participant in the campaign, wrote an brief overview of the movement. See Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, pp.101-3.

13. Among the university newspapers, those with the most extensive coverage on the issue are University of Toronto's papers, such as The Varsity, the Bulletin, Contrast and Medium II.

14. This documentary film was released in June 1980. Indeed, most of the filming was done after CTV apologized to the Chinese community. Yet, it is informative in that it recorded how the anti-W5 delegates from different Chinese communities dealt with the issue. It also filmed the speeches made by a number of politicians, civil rights leaders, and other ethnic group representatives concerning the issue. Furthermore, appended to the documentary on the anti-W5 movement is an audio-visual analysis of "Campus Giveaway" presented by Stephen Lewis. (Lewis' commentary was produced by 590 CKEY on 9 November 1979.)

15. Christine Tausig, "W5 program criticized for 'deliberate distortions'," University Affairs, December 1979, p.2.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. The transcript of "Campus Giveaway" is appended to this thesis. It was prepared by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) on October 4, 1979 a few days after the programme was broadcast. CTV refused to release either the videotape or the script (see "CTV withholding transcripts of controversial W5 program on foreign students," Medium II, (November 1979, p.2).

2. All students interviewed were whites.

3. In order to provide an objective view of the programme, the analysis made in this chapter is based on the findings of these institutions because they are the principal and authoritative sources of information concerning university policy and foreign students in Canada. The interpretations of the Chinese students and the Chinese community will not be considered in this chapter.

4. Allan Earp to Donald G. Cameron, vice-president of CTV Television Network, 9 October 1979, pp.1-3. (International Student Centre [ISC] archives--W5 files).

5. CBIE, "The W5 Controversy: Round Four," Bureaugramme, 4 January 1980, p.3. (ISC Archives)

6. James M. Ham, president of the U. of T., letter to editor, Toronto Star, 20 October 1979, p.B3.

7. ibid.

8. Earp to Cameron, 9 October 1979, p.2; and "Fears of 'massive influx' unfounded," University Afairs, December 1979, p.6.

9. Christine Tausig, "W5 program criticized for 'deliberate distortions'," University Affairs, December 1979, p.2.

10. ibid., p.3.

11. Earp to John Meisel, chairman of the CRTC, n.d., p.3. (ISC Archives)

12. Tausig, "W5 program," p.2 (ISC Archives).

13. Elizebeth Paterson to Philip Wedge, vice-president of Programming, CTV, 3 October 1979, p.2. This was confirmed by the Chinese Students' Association of the University of Toronto (UTCSA). Interviews with several 1979-80 executive members of the association.

14. Indeed, W5 itself pointed out in its 7-page rebuttal letter that it included landed immigrants as foreign students. Its rationale was that there were "many" immigrant students who came to Canada "for the sole purpose of obtaining an education and gaining access to courses with limited enrollment." (See Donald G. Cameron to Alan Earp, 25 October 1979, pp.2-7 [ISC Archives].) However, according to Canadian official policy, landed immigrants cannot be classed as foreign students and should be admitted to Canadian universities on the same basis as Canadian citizens. (See "No longer 'landed immigrants'--certain immigration questions clarified," University Affairs, December 1979, p.5.)

15. Transcript of "Campus Giveaway", pp.2,8 and 9.

16. Paterson to Wedge, 3 October 1979, p.2; Tausig, "W5 program," p.2; and interview with Dinah Cheng, 1979-80 president of the UTCSA,

17. Donald Savage to Murray Chercover, president of CTV Television Network, Ottawa, 10 October 1979, p.1 (ISC Archives).

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. As far as the anti-W5 campaign in Toronto was concerned, the only anti-W5 activist who actually saw the "Campus Giveaway" on that evening was Norman Kwan. A few others such as Wai-man Lee, Cheuk Kwan and Gordon Chong learned about the programme the following day from the Toronto Star or friends. Star had a brief report titled "Foreign students crowding ours out?" on the telecast (1 October 1979, p.A7). In interviews, Lee, Cheuk Kwan and Chong admitted that though they were aware of the programme, without seeing it they did not sense the seriousness and urgency of the issue as they did after they actually watched it a month later.

2. Interview with Norman Kwan.

3. ibid.

4. ibid.

5. Interview with several 1979-80 executive members. As a matter of fact, UTCSA's members had known before this time that CTV would produce a programme on foreign students, since the television network had approached the association in September to film its orientation gathering. But CTV had not informed the students when the documentary would be aired; nor did they have the slightest idea that the show was a report against foreign students and/or students of Chinese descent.

6. The reason for informing the UTCSA is obvious--the programme directly involved the Association by filming part of its activities. According to one interviewee who does not want to be named, she learned about the programme from a friend and immediately told one of the executive members. But the executive she approached had not seen the programme and showed skepticism about the student's reaction by saying, "You must be overreacting. The television officials must have done their research before airing the programme to the public. Moreover, the sample used may not apply to all foreign and/or Chinese students."

7. Interview with Bernard Lau.

8. Interview with Elizebeth Paterson.

9. Nona MacDonald, public relations mananger of the U of T, to the University's officials, 3 October 1979. (ISC files on the W5 incident).

10. At this time, the tape was kept in the Sigmund Samuel Library by U of T officials, and was not allowed to be taken out of the library.

11. UTCSA's position paper on "Campus Giveaway", 10 October 1979. (Norman Kwan's files [the UTCSA itself has not kept a file of its own])

12. ibid.

13. Interview with Dinah Cheng, then president of the UTCSA.

14. Coincidently, at that time the representatives of these Chinese students' associations were gathering in Toronto for a planning meeting on the annual China's Week. The UTCSA, being one of the planning members, took the opportunity and invited these representatives to view the programme in Sigmund Samuel Library.

15. This point was confirmed by the executive members, who considered it was the main factor that prompted them to action. Some even conceded that if it were not because of this reason they probably would not have been so involved.

16. Interviews with Christina Chu and Bernard Lau.

17. UTCSA's position paper on "Campus Giveaway", p.3. (Norman Kwan's files).

18. Interview with Dinah Cheng.

19. ibid.

20. Interview with Cheng and Lau. Speaking in retrospect, Paterson herself admitted that at that time though she thought the issue was worth fighting for, she and many others did not have much optimism that CTV, a large national institution, would apologize to the students and the university. Partly for this reason, her suggestions were quite moderate and mild.

21. In fact, although the students disagreed with the programme, some of them admitted at closed-door meetings that the Chinese students as a group had its image problem.

22. All these problems were raised at their closed-door meetings. (The authress had attended some of these meetings.)

23. Interview with Cheng.

24. A joint letter by the UTCSA, the Chinese Pharmaceutical Soceity, the Erindale College Chinese Students' Association, the Scarborough College Chinese Students' Association, and the Engineering Student Association, 11 October 1979. (Norman Kwan's files)

25. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Cheng.

26. Interview with with Norman Kwan. As we shall see, the response of the Commission and some other institutions gradually became more positive as the issue developed into a public controversy a few months later.

27. ibid.

28. ibid.

29. CTV's seven-page rebuttal letter to all those who complained about the prog

30. Interviews with with Norman Kwan and Cheng. From October 2 to 30, the Toronto Star had published about ten letters about the pros and cons of the programme: seven from individuals and three from U of T officials.

31. Flyers and posters (Norman Kwan's files).

32. Interviews with Cheng and Kwan.

33. Interview with Kim, a pharmacy student at the University of Toronto.

34. Interview with Chap-yung Yeung. According to Dr. Yeung, he first heard about the programme from his relative, who was a medical student at the U. of T. He then made arrangement with some other medical students to see the film in Sigmund Samuel Library, and was asked by the medical students to attend the forum. He went to the meeting with some other FCCP representives, without any knowledge that Ken and Mark were also there. According to Yeung, he was not familiar with the two lawyers at that time. It is important to note that both Mark and Ken were also chartered members of the Federation; but on that occasion the two lawyers attended the students' forum as individuals instead of representatives of the FCCP.

35. Interviews with Cheng and Kwan; and authress' own obseravtion at the forum.

36. ibid.

37. During a closed-door meeting, some students expressed doubt about the lawyer's rhetoric and cautioned against his motives.

38. Interview with Norman Kwan.

39. The meeting was held in U of T's Robert Library. About 30 students from different Chinese students' groups were present.

40. Most Chinese students in the Engineering Faculty were Canadian citizens or landed immigrants. But at that time the president of the Chinese Engineering Society, who also represented the group in the "5 Union" was a visa student.

41. Interview with Norman Kwan.

42. ibid.

43. Interview with Cheng and Kwan.

44. By this, the students meant to approach the Chinese lawyers. At this time, they had not yet decided to publicize the issue in the Chinese community, with which they were unfamiliar.

45. Interview with Cheng.

46. It is true that even some of these students were unfamiliar with and hence skeptical about the Chinese organizations. They thought, however, that they had no other ways in view of their own limitations. Moreover, Norman Kwan argued that as university students, they could steer the course of actions and would thus avoid being controlled or manipulated by any Chinese organizations.

47. Interview with Kwan.

48. ibid.

49. ibid.

50. ibid.

51. Some students on the winning party did try retain the three CSAs on the Union, by saying that they also realized the inconvenient positions of the foreign students, but that the latter could still endorse their support to the other students who would fight the issue in the name of Chinese Canadian students. If they succeeded, the foreign students would also benefit. However, the three Associations were not convinced by the argument.

52. In interviews with three ex-active students, they denied that they had consciously overlooked the foreign student issue. In effect, Norman Kwan pointed out that in the April 16, 1980 negotiation between the Ad Hoc Committee of the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario Against W5 and CTV, he reminded the negotiators to raise the foreign student issue during the talks. But the Ad Hoc Committee's representatives at that time did not raise the point.

53. They were Norman Kwan (dentistry), Dinah Cheng (president of the UTCSA), W.I. Lam (medicine), Kai-wing Tsang (law), Jenny Lee (arts and science), Joseph Ho (pharmacy) and Steven Ng.

54. Interviews with Cheng and Kwan.

55. ibid.

56. ibid.

57. ibid.

58. ibid.

59. Interview with Kwan.

60. Interview with Kwan and Cheng.

61. These students were Norman Kwan, Wai-arm Lam and Dinah Cheng. Later on, they were joined by two other students--Jenny Lee and Steven Ng. Altogether these five students filed their writ to the Supreme Court of Ontario on 18 December 1979. (Norman Kwan's files).

62. Interview with Joseph Wong.

63. Peimei News, 9 February 1980, p.16.

64. This meeting was attended by six students--Wai-arm Lam, Kai-wing Tsang, Norman Kwan, Dinah Cheng, Jenny Lee and Steven Ng on the one side, and three community activists--Joseph Wong, Wai-man Lee, Bosco Cheng on the other side. Also it is important to note that the Action Committee and the CCMA have been closely affiliated.

65. This was the first donation the students received from the Chinese community. Before this time, all the expenses used on protesting the programme were borne by the students themselves.

66. Interviews with Kwan and Wong.

67. Flyers produced by the students, November 6, 1979. (Norman Kwan's Files)

68. Interview with Kwan.

69. According to Joseph Wong who knew Irene Chu, he helped persuade her to allow the students to present the case at the conference.

70. Interview with Kwan.

71. From that very copy, hundreds of copies were made. The videotape itself was very important to the later development of the movement. By simply hearing about the programme from someone, or even by reading the transcript, most people would not be as disturbed as seeing the film itself. It was for the most part the audio-visual effects that incited the emotion and anger of the viewers.

72. However, there were some organizers who remained cautious and skeptical about the students' action. According to Norman Kwan, there were one or two of them who said that the programme might be true since the programme officials must have done their research. They also questioned whether it was because the students had not mixed well with other Canadian students. In an interview, Gorden Chong said that he did feel some sense of truth in the programme; but the way the show was presented did anger almost all people of Chinese descent.

73. For instance, right after the keynote speech, Norman Kwan raised the W5 question. Gordon Chong tried to stop him questioning the issue until the appointed time at the conference. But Kwan ignored his remark, grapped the microphone and talked about how "weak and lonely" the students were in fighting the issue. (Interview with Norman Kwan.)

74. Cheuk Kwan, one of the panelists, even volunteered his phone number to the students for further contact.

75. Irene Chu, "After the Conference: A Commentary," Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, p.101.

76. Gordon Chong, "Brief to the National Meeting of the Canadian Consultative Council of Multiculturalism," 16 November 1979, p.2. (Ad Hoc Archives)

77. Interviews with Kwan and Cheng.

78. Chu, "After the Conference", p.101

79. Interview with Kwan.

80. ibid.

81. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Cheuk Kwan

82. Interviews with Joseph Wong, Norman Kwan.

83. Interview with Norman Kwan.

84. Interview with Dinah Cheng.

85. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Dinah Cheng.

86. The reason why Norman Kwan wanted to be active throughout the movement was mainly due to his own personalities. Although he was the one who insisted on approaching the Chinese community at the very beginning and was the one who initiated the Mon Sheong organizational meeting, at that time he did not wholly trust the community. He did not want to put the issue completely in the hands of the community without the participation of the students. Moreover, since he and the other four students were the plaintiffs, he wanted to be clear about the course of action, and to ensure that the both the Chinese Canadian and foreign students' causes were being looked after. As a matter of fact, he was the one, who during the students' conflict, said that as university students, they could steer the course of action and avoid being manipulated. That is why he continued in the movement in order to keep close eyes on the Committee. But in an interview, Norman Kwan himself admitted that at that time he was too optimistic and naieve. In retrospect, Kwan commented that once the issue were in the hands of the community, he, as a representative of the students, had little say in the movement. As we shall see in the next two chapters, the W5 controversy gradually became a community issue and movement. The foreign student problem was almost forgotten.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Interview with William Tam. At that time the organization had about thirty to forty members.

2. Interview with Tam.

3. FCCP's correspondence files and a calendar of events related to W5 programme.

4. Chap-yung Yeung to Murray H. Chercover, president of CTV, 23 October 1979. (FCCP correspondence files).

5. FCCP correspondence files.

6. ibid.

7.ibid.

8. Ibid.; and FCCP's calendar of events.

9.Peimei News, 9 February 1979, p.16.

10. Norman Chan, director of tjhe Hamilton Chinese Cultural Association, to Mr. Alexander, minister of Labor, 14 November 1979.

11. Interview with Joseph Wong.

12. Joseph Wong, however, said in an interview that somehow the Action Committee would still do "something" about the issue after his out-of-town trip. But before it took any actions, the students had already invited the Committee together with other groups to form an alliance against the programme.

13. Before this time, Gordon Chong, one of the CCCO's directors, had already learned about the programme first from his patients, and later from FCCP excutive. (Chong was also a charter member of the FCCP). He did write once to CTV for permission to release the videotape for the CCCO conference; but CTV ignored his request.

14. CCCO, news release, 12 November 1979. (Ad Hoc Committee archives)

15. Interview with Gordon Chong.

16. "Foreign students crowding ours out?" Toronto Star 1 October 1979, p.A7. The report gives a brief summary of the arguments used in the programme.

17. Interviews with Chuek Kwan and Wai-man Lee.

18. See Anna Wong, "Report on foreign students irresponsible, she argues"; Paul Wong, "We are not here to compete with you"; and C.F. Chin, "Report on foreign students called 'misleading'". The first two letters can be found in the 8 October issue of Toronto Star and the last letter to editor in 10 October issue.

19. Interview with Cheunk Kwan.

20. While the FCCP took efforts to file complaints with various institutions, there were no signs that the Federation wanted to cooperate with the students or to publicize the issue in the Chinese community. Instead, it confined its contact to high-level authorities hoping the latter would do something about the programme... Yet there was no indication that this newly formed committee intended to unite all concerned individuals and organizations in the community for some concerted efforts. Perhaps the incipient

committee might do so as it developed. Before it had time to begin its work, the students had already invited members of this newly created committee together with other concerned organizations in the community to forge an alliance against CTV. For example, after the students' forum in mid-October, there was little or no communication between them and the Federation. While the FCCP had not actively approached the students, the latter after being disillusioned by the indifferent and skeptical attitude of a FCCP lawyer, shrunk from approaching the Federation until much later in mid-November. That was why in early November when Norman Kwan pleaded for support at the CCCO Conference and told the audience that the students were fighting the issue alone, Dr. Chap-yung Yeung swiftly retorted him by saying that the students were not the only ones who fought the programme, and that the federation had already written a number of protest letters to various institutions. This dialogue points to the exclusiveness of the FCCP's actions.

21. Toronto Star, 7 December 1979; and Peimei News, 11 February 1980, p.16.

22. Interviews with Cheuk Kwan, Norman Kwan and Wai-mam Lee.

23. They were Lilian Ma, Stephen Lam, Kai-wing Tsang and Bosco Cheng. All of them were young recently graduated professional--researcher, educator, lawyer, and engineer.

24. The CCC was a traditinally renowned Chinese community organization in Canada. See Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chiese Community," Ethnicty 6 (1979), p314-15.

25. For example, Gordon Chong, Bob Mark and Fred Ken were all charter members of the FCCP and the Mon Sheong Foundation Home.

26. These two groups were closely affiliated. In fact, many of the members of the Action Committee were originally members of the CCMA. Joseph Wong, Wai-man Lee, and William Tam were some of the examples.

27. In fact, before the coalition, Joseph Wong, president of the Action Committee, simply did not know the existance of such organizations such as the FCCP and the Toronto Cathy Lions' Club.

28. Cheuk Kwan, "Youth and Political Participation," in living and Growing in Canada: A Chinse Canadian Perspective, pp.95.

29. See Yeut-wah Cheung, "Dependence on Institutional Completeness and Ethnic Community Discernibility of a Satellite Chiese Community: Aa Case of Multicultural

Dominance," in Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society.

30. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Joseph Wong.

31. Interview with Norman Kwan.

32. Position paper of the Ad Hoc Committee of CCCO Against W5 Programme, 6 December 1979, p.1. (Ad Hoc Committee archives)

33. Interviews with Cheuk Kwan and Joseph Wong. Also in Wong's speech to a meeting in Ottawa in March, 1980: "Although the apparent target this time is the university, the Chinese students. Next time it could create another story attacking the Chinese engineers or doctors or lawyers or businessmen ... anything that looks yellow." (Joseph Wong 's speech draft)

34. Ad Hoc Committee, Minutes of the 22 Novemmber 1979.

35. ibid., 26 November, 1979.

36. ibid., 17 December 1979.

37. ibid., 19 December 1979.

38. ibid.

39. ibid.

40. Ad Hoc Committee, Special issue on January 26 rally and picketing against CTV - W5, p.7.

41. Dinah Cheng pointed out in interview that the conflicts and disagreements were so intense that she was tired of the quarrels and dissensions.

42. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 26 November 1979.

43. These expressions can be found in his letter to his Federation's members, 15 January 1980, (FCCP newsletter, vol.4 no.1, January 1980.)

44. Interview with Joseph Wong.

45. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee,20 , 22 November, 1979.

46. ibid.

47. Interview with Joseph Wong.

48. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 10 December 1979.

49. ibid., 13 March 1980.

50. Interview with Joseph Wong.

51. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 22 November 1979.

52. Interview with Gordon Chong.

53. Interviews with Wai-man Lee, Joseph Wong, Norman Kwan and Gordon Chong.

54. See the two years' proceedings--Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicultrual Society: A Chinese Perpspectives; and Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinse Canadaian Perspective.

55. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 26 November 1979.

56. Interviews with Chap-yung Yeung and Norman Kwan.

57. Interview with Frank Chui, 1980-81 president of the FCCP.

58. Interview with Chap-yung Yeunng.

59. Interview with Joseph Wong.

60. ibid.

61. Interviews with William Tam, Joseph Wong, Norman Kwan and Cheuk Kwan.

62. Interview with Norman Kwan.

63. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Dinah Cheng.

64. ibid.

65. FCCP, newsletter, vol.4 no.1, January 1980, p.9.

66. ibid.

67. Interview with Chap-yung Yeung.

68. ibid.

69. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 6 December 1979.

70. The names of these law firms can be found in Chong's letter to Peter Tsang, president of the CCCO, 14 January 1980.

71. Interview with Norman Kwan

72. The lawyer who wrote the letter requested that the letter be kept confidential. A copy of this letter was obtained from Norman Kwan.

73. William Roland, lawyer from Thomson, Rogers, to Gordon Chong., 20 December 1979, pp.3-9.

74.ibid.

75. Gordon Chong, memorandum, 7 January 1980. (Norman Kwan's files)

76. Interview with Joseph Wong.

77. Donald Chu, also expressed this in his interiview in Sing Tao Newspaper 14 May 1980, p.6.

78. This idea can be found in Joseph Wong papers and files.

79. See Sing Tao, 14 Mayy 1980, p.6.

80. Joseph Wong's speech draft (handwritten), p.7. (Joseph Wong papers).

81. Joseph Pomerant's written legal opinion, n.d., p.1. (Norman Kwan's files)

82. ibid., p.2.

83. ibid., p.3.

84. FCCP, newsletter, January 1980, p.10.

85. ibid., p.9.

86. ibid., p.10.

87. Ad Hoc Committee's rebuttal letter to the FCCP''s members, 8 February 1980.

88. ibid., p.2.

89. This date was significant. It was a day before the students filed the writ to the Supreme Court, two days before the Ad Hoc Committee decided to stage a demonstration on January 26, and also a day before FCCP council decided to withdraw from the Committee.

90. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 17 December 1979.

91. Gordon Chong's resination letter to the chairman of tthe Ad Hoc Committee, 9 January 1980, p.1.

92. Interivews with Joseph Wong and Norman Kwan.

93. Sing Tao Newspapers, 14 May 1980, p.6. No matter how active and progressive these young members were,

94. Interview with Joseph Wong.

95. His letter was published in the Federation's newsletter, January 1980.

96. FCCP, Newsletter, January 1980.

97. ibid.

98. Ad Hoc Committee rebuttal letter, p.1.

99. Gordon Chong, proposal for the CCCO to reject the students' legal action, 7 January 1980.

100. ibid.

101. Gordon Chong to Peter Tsang, 14 January 1980,

102. ibid., p.1.

103. Chinese Express, 17 January 1980, p.6.

104 Interviews with Dinah Cheng, Norman Kwan, and Joseph Wong.

105. Ad Hoc Committee rebuttal letter, 8 February 1980. The letter was also signed by some FCCP's members.

106. Interview with Joseph Wong.

107. ibid.

108. The only Chinese community press reported on this was the Chinese Express; yet the report was a brief and short one.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Sing Tao Newspaper, 14 May 1980, p.6.

2. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 14 January to 4 February 1980.

3. Donald Chu, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to Ontario Human Rights Commission, Canadian Human Rights Commission and other Cabinet Ministers, 21 January 1980.

(CCNC archives).

4. Interviews with Joseph Wong and Wai-man Lee. In fact, the "Rally and Picketing Regulations" evidently point to the meticulous plans and preparations of the Committee for the dual events. For instance, rules such as these were laid down.

> "Please be in order and follow the instruction of the marshals."
>
> "All signs from participating organizations must be first approved by the slogan sub-committee.
>
> Please participate in the chanting and follow the instruction of chant leaders.
>
> "Please do not litter."
>
> "Flags, slogans and signs other than those approved by the slogan subcommittee are not permitted."
>
> "The same slogans will be chanted five times by each group at one time."

The four assigned slogans were:

> (1) "Biased show, W5 got to go!"
>
> (2) "Black, Brown, Red, Yellow and White, We Canadians must unite!"
>
> (3) "All Canadians, Equal Rights!"
>
> (4) "CTV, apologize now!"

The regulations and the tone of the slogans clearly suggest how cautious and determined the members were to prevent the rally and picketing from fostering any radical and negative images to the Committee or the community.

5. Ad Hoc Committee, special issue on the "January 26 rally and picketing", p.1.

6. They were Ron Atkey, Minister of Employment and Immigration; John Sewell, Mayor of Toronto; John Foster, New Democratic Party's candidate for Spadina riding; Philip Dene Gigantes, Liberal candidate for Broadview and Greenwood riding; Eric Jackman, Progressive Conservative candidate for Spadina; Bob Kaplan, MP for York Centre; Bob Rae, MP for Broadview and Greenwood; and Peter Stollery, MP for Spadina.

7. The eleven civil rights leaders and ethnic groups' representatives invited were Bromley Armstrong, Ontario Human Rights Commissioner; George Bancroft, a professor of

Faculty of Education in University of Toronto; Allan Borovoy, President of Canadian Civil Liberties Association; Angelo Delfino, President of Italian Canadian Congres (Toronto district); Wilson Head, President of National Black Coalition; John Helliwell, Director of Canadian Bureau of International Education; George Imai, National President of Japanese Canadian Citizens Association, Chaitanya Kalevar, Past Chairperson of the Continuing Committee on Race Relations; Rabbi Plaut, National President of Canadian Jewis Congress; Rosenthal, a professor of Mathematics at University of Toronto and spokesman for International Committee against Racism (ICAR); and Rosanna Scotti, Director of Multicultural Relations (Metro Toronto).

8. The Globe and Mail, January 1980; and Toronto Star, 24 January 1980.

9. Ad Hoc Committee, Special issue on "January 26 rally and picketing", p.7.

10. *ibid.*

11. *ibid.*

12. Cheuk Kwan, "The Anti-W5 Movement," The Asianadian (Spring 1980), pp.11-13; and "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians: The W5 Movement," in Asian Canadians and Multiculturlism, pp.268-279.

13. See "1,500 march to protest CTV program," Globe and Mail, 27 January 1980.

14. Globe and Mail's figure was 1,500; and Toronto Star's was 2,000. According to Cheuk Kwan, who counted the number of demonstrators during the march, there were "exactly" 1902. (See Dick Beddoes, "Tempest over CTV," Globe and Mail, 28 January 1980, p.8.

15. Irene Chu, "After the Conference--A Commentary," Living and Growing in Canada, p.102.

16. Cheuk Kwan, "Political Acitivism and Chinese Canadians3.

17. Interviews with Joseph Wong and Frank Chui.

18. Ad Hoc Committee's documentary film on anti-W5 movement.

19. Alan Bass and Randy Johnston, "2,000 demand CTV's apology," The Newspaper, 30 January 1980, p.3.

20. *ibid.*

Faculty of Education in University of Toronto; Allan Borovoy, President of Canadian Civil Liberties Association; Angelo Delfino, President of Italian Canadian Congress (Toronto district); Wilson Head, President of National Black Coalition; John Holliwell, Director of Canadian Bureau of International Education; George Imai, National President of Japanese Canadian Citizens Association; Chaitanya Kalevar, Past Chairperson of the Continuing Committee on Race Relations; [illegible], National President of Canadian Jewish Congress; [illegible], a professor of Mathematics at University of Toronto and spokesman for International Committee against Racism (INCAR); and Rosanna Scotti, Director of Multicultural Relations (Metro Toronto).

8. The Globe and Mail, January 1980; and Toronto Star, 28 January 1980.

9. Ad Hoc Committee, Special issue on "January 26 rally and picketting", p.7.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Chuck Kwan, "The Anti-W5 Movement," The Asianadian (Spring 1980), pp.11-13, and "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians: The W5 Movement," in Asian Canadians and Multiculturalism, pp.[illegible]-419.

13. See "1,500 march to protest CTV program," Globe and Mail, 27 January 1980.

14. Globe and Mail's figure was 1,500; and Toronto Star's was 2,000. According to Chuck Kwan, who counted the number of demonstrators during the march, "There were "exactly" 1996." (See Dick Beddoes, "Tempest over CTV," Globe and Mail, 28 January 1980, p.8.

15. Irene Chu, "After the Conference--A Commentary," Living and Growing in Canada, p.102.

16. Chuck Kwan, "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians."

17. Interviews with Joseph Wong and [illegible] Chui.

18. Ad Hoc Committee's documentary film on anti-W5 movement.

19. Alan Bass and Sandy Johnston, "2,000 demand CTV's apology," The Newspaper, 30 January 1980, p.3.

20. Ibid.

21. Ad Hoc Committee, Special Issue on January 26 rally and picketing.

22. Cheuk Kwan, "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians,"

23. *The Globe and Mail*, from January 23 to April 22, 1980.

24. Alan Bass and Randy Johnston, "2,000", p.3.

25. Ad Hoc Committee, news release, 12 February 1980.

26. Interview with Joseph Wong. This request was kept confidential at that time.

27. Leaflets to urge the people to continue their support for the campaign, see CCNC archives.

28. ibid.

29. Report from the secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, 4 March 1980.

30. Interview with Joseph Wong.

31. Later on, the students also changed their lawyer from Joseph Pomerant to Ian Scot.

32. Joseph Wong's speech draft, n.d. (handwritten), p.4.

33. Interview with Joseph Wong.

35. ibid.

35. ibid.

36. FCCP to CRTC, 23 October 1979.

37. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 4 February 1980

38. Interview with Chuek Kwan; Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 7 March 1980; and Ying Hope's memorandum to all members of City Council, 13 February 1980.

39. Ying Hope"s draft resoultion to City Council, 13 February80; and his memorandum, 18 February 1980. (Ying Hope files)

40. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 7, 13, 20, and 27 March 1980. According to Dr. Wong, both opposition leaders had attempted to raise the issue in Queen's Park, the provincial cabinet meeting. But before they could do so, CTV had already apologized on April 16, 1980.

41. *ibid.*, 21 February 1980.

42. *ibid.*, from February to April 1980

43. *ibid.*, 28 February, 20, 27 March 1980.

44 Reports from the various subcommittes and treasurer. (CCNC archives).

45. Chuek Kwan's financial report at March 13 meeting, and Ad Hoc Committee secretary's report, 15 March 1980, p.2.

46. *ibid.*, from January to late March 1980.

47. Interview with Joseph Wong.

48. Patrick Chan to Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee, 29 February 1980.

49. *ibid.*; and Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 21 February 1980; and secretary's report 15 March 1980.

50. *ibid.*, 7 March 1980.

51. *ibid.*, 21 February 1980.

52. *ibid.*

53. *ibid.*; and Ad Hoc Committee secretary's report, 15 March 1980.

54. Interview with Gordon Chong.

55. *ibid.*

56. *ibid.*.

57. FCCP, a calendar of events on W5 issue.

58. *ibid.*

59. *ibid.*

60. Interview with Frank Chui.

61. FCCP, calendar of events.

62. Dick Beddos, "W is for the way--CTV upsets them," 29 January 1980, p.8. *Globe and Mail*.

63. "CTV's 'Campus Giveaway' discriminatory, CCCM," *Contrast*, 6 March 1980, p.4.

64. Lionel Lumb, W5 producer, to Elizebeth Paterson, 17 March 1980.

65. Sing Tao Newspaper, 14 May 1980, p.6.

66. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Joseph Wong.

67. Interview with Norman Kwan. According to Dr. J. Wong, looking in retrospect, the fear was in some instances only imaginative. After the March 16 statement, he talked with some non-Chinese supporters like Rabbi Plaut of the Jewish Community, Sol Littman of Toronto Star, Alan Borovoy of.... and Howard Edelman of Operation Lifeline. All agreed that the statement was not thorough enough.

68. Ad Hoc Committee (Montreal), news release, 19 March 1980; and Ad Hoc Committtee (Vancouver), position paper on the March 16 statement on W5.

69. ibid.

70. Interview with Joseph Wong.

71. Peimei News, 22 March 1980, p.1.

72. Ad Hoc Committee, press release, 20 March 1980.

73. Ad Hoc Committee (Toronto), news release, 20 March 1980.

74. Ad Hoc Committee (Toronto), an analysis of CTV's statement on the W5's "Campus Giveaway" issue, 25 March 1980.

75. Interview with Joseph Wong.

76. ibid.

77. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 20 March 1980.

78. Paterson to Alan Earp, 17 March 1980. (ISC files)

79. "CTV backs down on W5," The Varsity, 19 March 1980, p.1.

80. ibid.

81. Sing Tao Newspapers, 21 March 1980

82. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 3 April 1980.

83. Dick Beddoes, "CTV, Chinese still apart," Globe and Mail, 8 April 1980, p.8.

84. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee,

85. ibid.

86. Mark Makamura, Telex to Joseph Wong, 24 March 1980.

87. Peimei News, 9 February 1980, p.16.

88. Ontario Human Rights Commission, newsletter, vol.1 no.1, September 1980.

89. ibid.

90. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 3 April 1980.

91. ibid.

92. ibid.

93. ibid.

94. ibid.

95. Interview with Joseph Wong.

96. ibid.

97. Interviews with Norman Kwan, Joseph Wong and Wai-man Lee.

98. Interview with Joseph Wong.

99. ibid.

100. ibid. It was later discovered that before the two Ad Hoc's representatives and the lawyer met CTV's officials, Alderman Hope had already contacted CTV. Fortunately, CTV, though being unaware of the internal situation in the community, rejected to have another negotiation when there was already one underway.

101. Ying Hope to Ontario Human Rights Commission, 8 April 1980. (Ying Hope files)

102. Interview with Wai-man Lee.

103. Interviews with Norman Kwan and Joseph Wong.

104. Interview with Norman Kwan; and Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee,

105. Interview with Joseph Wong.

106. ibid.

107. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 10 April 1980.

108. Dick Beddoes, "CTV, Chinese still apart," Globe and Mail, 8 April 1980

109. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee, 10 April 1980.

110. *ibid.*

111. Ad Hoc Committee secretary's report, April 1980

112. *ibid.*

113. *ibid.*

114. CTV's April 16 statement.

115. Interview with Norman Kwan.

116. Joint statement released on April 16, 1980.

117. *ibid.*, p.1.

118. Interview with Norman Kwan.

119. *ibid.*

120. Interview with Cheuk Kwan.

121. Ad Hoc Committee, documentary film on the anti-W5 campaign.

122. *ibid.*

123. *ibid.* It is striking that no Ontario Progressive Conservative representatives attended, though they had also been invited.

124. Interviews with Norman Kwan, Dinah Cheng and some other anonymous interiviewees.

125. *ibid.*

126. *ibid.*

127. Ad Hoc Committee, documentary film.

128. *ibid.*

129. The interviewee did not want to be named.

130. Ad Hoc Committee, documentary film.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1. See Stephenson's remarks in "Medical schools flooded by foreigners," Toronto Star, 24 September 1974. Also see Val Ross, "Can the Canadian Elite Tolerate the Chinese Invasion?", Saturday Night (June 1977), p.13; and Alan Bass and Randy Johnston, "Dr. Stephenson's skeleton," The Newspapers, 30 January 1980.

2. Jay-dell Mah, "Struggle for Recognition", Canada and the World, October 1976, p.16.

3. Val Ross, "Can the Canadian Elite Tolerate the Chinese Invasion?", Saturday Night (June 1977), p.13.

4. ibid. For further examples of discrimination and prejudice against Chinese medical students in Toronto, see Maria Yau, "Anti-Chinese Sentiment: Still?", (January 1981), pp.6-8.

5. All interviewees, including Dinah Cheng (then president of the UTCSA), Dr. Joseph Wong (then president of the Action Committee for South East Asian Refugees), Dr. Gordon Chong (one of the ex-directors of the CCCO), and many others, conceded this point.

6. Val Ross, "Can the Canadian Elite Tolerate the Chinese Invasion?", Saturday Night (June 1977), p.13.

7. Interviews with Dr. Joseph Wong and Dinah Cheng.

8. Most of these students were senior students in third and fourth year or at graduate level. The younger students were generally less socially and politically concerned. Instead, they were more "pragmatic" and career-oriented.

9. Although the Chinese student body at the U of T had not invited the ICAR to its first forum in mid-October 1979, representatives of the ICAR attended the meeting and offered to help the students organize a demonstration. The Chinese students' union executives were cautious about the group and avoided association with it.

10. Altogether there were only five or six core activists. They included Norman Kwan (a very enthusiastic and dedicated dentist student), Dinah Cheng (then president of the UTCSA), Jenny Li (an executive member of the UTCSA who had also been elected to represent the U of T Chinese student union against W5), Kai-wing Tsang (a law student who sought the legal advice of his boss, Pomerant), Wai-arm Lam (a medical student who requested the assistance of the Action Committee for South East Asian Refugees), and two committed pharmacy students. Having committed themselves to the cause and invested so much of their time and energy in

it, these handful of students were clearly reluctant to cease their actions without having achieved any of their goals.

11. Of the original nine organizations which formed the Ad Hoc Committee Against W5, only the Mon Sheong Foundation was formed before 1975. It was set up in 1960 by a group of Chinese professionals who saw the needs of many Chinese elderlies in areas of medical cares and social and recreational services. Over a span of 14 years, 1.4 million dollars were raised from the general community along with govrnment aid to establish an old aged home and to provide necessary services for the Chinese senior citizens. In 1975 the major project was finally finished--that is, the construction of the Mon Sheong Home for the Aged. Today, the Foundation's board of directors is still headed by well-established Chinese professionals.

12. For further details on the transformation of Toronto's Chinese community, see Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Ethnicity, 6 (1979), pp.308-16; Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life (December 1976):27. Julia Kwong, "Transformation of an Ethnic Community: From a National to a Cultural Community," Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium II), eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayaashi (University of Saskatchewan, 1978), pp.97-98; C.P. Sedgewick and W.E. Willmott, "External Influences and Emerging Identity: The Evolution of Community Structure among Chinese Canadians," The Canadian Forum, (Septemver 1974), p.11.

13. Chinese settlement in Toronto dated back to 1870's. For almost a century, however, the community remained small and poor. According to George Woo, during the turn of the century, there were only about 100 Chinese immigrants in the city of Toronto. (See George Woo...p.) In 1949 the Chinese population was no more than 6,000. This small number was largely maintained by the early restrictive immigration laws and later the 1923 Exclusion Act, which totally disallowed further Chinese immigration into Canada. Although the Exclusion Act was repealed in 1947, the Chinese community in Toronto still did not grow significantly, since restrictions on Chinese immigration were not entirely removed until 1967. (See Vivien Lai, "The New Chinese Immigrants in Toronto," in Minority Canadians (Vol. 2): Immigrants Groups, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1971), p.122; and Graham E. Johnson, "Chinese Family and Community in Canada: Tradition and Change," in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1979), p.365.) According to Richard Thompson, in 1966, a year

before the 1967 new immigration act, Toronto's Chinese population was about 8,000. After 1967, however, the number increased rapidly. Aside from the small population, the early Chinese immigrants were predominantly poor manual laborers. According to the 1922-23 Canada Year Book, over 90 percent of these early settlers were unskilled workers, while the remainings were either students, merchants or professionals. For further references on the history of early Toronto's Chinese community, see Lao Bo, "Hostages in Canada: Toronto's Chinese (1880-1947)," The Asianadian, vol.1, no.2 (summer 1978), pp.11-13; Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life (December 1976):27-35, 62- ; and Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Ethnicity, 6 (1979):306-26.

14. These merchant elites played their leadership role through the numerous voluntary organizations--such as, locality, clan, fraternal and community associations. These entrepreneurs filled the executive positions of these associations, which catered to the social, recreational, and economic needs of the community members. Further findings concerning the power of these merchant elites appear in Lao Bo, "Hostages in Canada: Toronto's Chinse (1880-1947)", The Asianadian, vol.1, no.2, (Summer 1978), pp. 11-13; Yeut-wah Cheung, "Dependence on Institutional Completeness and Ethnic Community Discernability of a Satellite Chinse Community: A Case of Metropolitan Dominance", Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium III), eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayaashi (University of Saskatchewan, 1979), p.89; Julia Kwong, "Transformation of an Ethnic Community: From a National to a Cultural Community," in Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium II), eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayaashi (University of Saskatchewan, 1978), pp. 84-106c; C.P. Sedgewick and W.E. Willmott, "External Influences and Emerging Identity: The Evolution of Community Structure among Chinese Canadians", The Canadian Forum (September 1974):8-12; and Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Ethnicity, 6 (1979).

15. Jean L. Elliott, "Immigration and the Canadian Mosaic", in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, ed. Jean Leonard Elliot (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1979), p.166.

16. Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life, December 1976, p.65. According to C.P. Sedgewick, over 15,000 ethnic Chinese arrived in Canada in 1973. See C.P. Sedgewick and W.E. Willmott, "External Influences and Emerging Identity: The Evolution of Community Structure among Chinese Canadians," The Canadian Forum (September 1974):11,12fn.

17.

Year	Chinese population in Tornto
1966	8,000 (Thompson, p. 310)
1971	26,285 (Cheung, p.84)*
1975	50,000 (Cheung, p.84)*
1976	60,000 (Stollery, p.27)
1977	70,000 (Thompson, p.310)

The above figures are gathered from different sources. *Yeut-wah Cheung, "Dependence on Institutional Completeness and Ethnic Community Discernability of a Satellite Chinese Community: A Case of Metropolitan Dominance", in *Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium III)*, eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayaashi (University of Saskatchewan, 1979).

18. Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", *Ethnicity*, 6 (1979):310. According to the Canadian Census of 1971, since 1967 Toronto has consistently attracted more Chinese immigrants than Vancouver, the once largest Chinese community in Canada.

20 In recent years, the Canadian government did not collect population census based on ethnic or racial origins. As a result, there are no official figures on the number of Chinese population in different cities or in the country as a whole. The figure "100,000" is cited from Sol Littman, "W5 Generation," *Toronto Star* (April 19, 1980):B4. This figure is also agreed by Wai-man Lee, chief editor of a local Chinese newspaper *Peimei News*. See also Liam Lacey, "They're breaching the Great Wall," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 December 1980, p.F3.

20. These included Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, other Southeast Asian countries, India, South Africa, South and Central America and the United States. See Wes Lore, "The Diverse Origin of Chinese Canadians and Changing Perspectives", in *Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicultural Society: A Chinese Perspective*, eds. George H.K. Woo, Gayle C. Edwards, Fuk-man Poon, and Peter Y. Poon (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO), 1979), p.30.

21. Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", *Ethnicity*, 6 (1979); and Liam, "Great Wall," p.F3. There were several reasons why so many Hong Kong people migrated to Canada. When the Canadian government adopted the new immigration policy in 1967, Hong Kong, a British colony, was coincidentally having a leftist political riots. Many well-to-do or rich Hong Kong citizens, who could afford to leave, moved to North America for security and new opportunities. Although the political turmoil did not last for long and did not significantly disrupt the political statusquo of the colony, there were other push factors that

17. Year   Chinese population in Toronto

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1977	70,000 (Thompson, p.310)

The above figures are gathered from different sources. *Tony-yan Cheung, "Persistence of Institutional and Interference and Ethnic Community Characteristics of a Group: the Chinese Community: A Case of Metropolitan Toronto", in Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium IV, 1980, eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayashi, (University of Saskatchewan, 1980).

18. Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Ethnicity, 6 (1979):310. According to the Canadian Census of 1971, since 1967 Toronto has consistently attracted more Chinese immigrants than Vancouver, the once largest Chinese community in Canada.

20 In recent years, the Canadian government did not collect population census based on ethnic or racial origins. As a result, there are no official figures on the number of Chinese population in different cities or in the country as a whole. The figure "300,000" is cited from Mel Laforge, "Y? Generation," Toronto Star (April 16, 1985):H4. This figure is also agreed by Wai-man Yan, chief editor of a local Chinese newspaper Shing Wah. See also Rose Laver, "They're breaking the Great Wall," The Globe and Mail, 27 December 1983, p.17.

20. These included Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, other Southeast Asian countries, India, South Africa, South and Central America and the United States. See Wah Jeng, "The Diverse Origin of Chinese Canadians and Changing Perspectives", in Inclusive Citizenship in Canada's Multicultural Society: A Chinese Perspective, eds. George C. Lee, Paula C. Hanson, Tze-man Yuen, and Peter Y. Yuen (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO), 1979), p.70.

21. Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Ethnicity, 6 (1979); and Chan, "Great Wall," p.17. There were several reasons why so many Hong Kong people migrated to Canada. When the Canadian government adopted the new immigration policy in 1967, Hong Kong, a British colony, was coincidentally having a leftist political riots. Many well-to-do or rich Hong Kong citizens, who could afford to leave, moved to North America for security and new opportunities. Although the political turmoil did not last long and did not significantly disrupt the political status quo of the colony, there were other push factors that

contributed to the large outflow of people from Hong Kong. In face of extremely dense population and keen competition in education and job market, many emigrated to search for more opportunities and prospects. Another force was the fear of China's takeover of part of Hong Kong in 1997, when the lease of part of Kowloon to Britain is expired. The apprehension of the uncertainty of the future political change provoked many upper- and middle-class families to migrate for political and economic security. (It is, however, important to note that many rich citizens still stay in Hong Kong; but, at the same time, they have invested part of their money and/or secured citizenship status in other countries in other countries.) Canada has been the desirable destiny for many Hong Kong people for a number of reasons: first, the 1967 more liberal immigration system; second, it is a commonwealth country; and thirdly, it has an image of security and opportunity. Also see Vivien Lai, "The New Chinese Immigrants in Toronto," in Minority Canadians (Vol. 2): Immigrants Groups, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1971), pp.124-25.

22. Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community," Ethnicity 6 (1979):310. Many current citizens were originally foreign students in nada during the early Seventies. They intended to return home after their education. Unexpectedly, in 1972 the federal government adopted an amnesty, which allowed only in that particular year all foreigners in Canada to legally become landed immigrants. With the great opportunity, many students applied to change their status from visa students to immigrants in Canada. It is not known exactly how many of these students became Canadian citizens as a result of the 1972 amnesty; but it is for certain that the number would not be small.

23. See Thompson, Ethncity versus Class," pp.314-16.

24. There is no exact figure on the percentage of the white-collar professionals among the Chinese population in Canada. Vivien Lai, in her 1970 survey of the new Chinese immigrants in Toronto, estimated that about ..per cent ... (p.). Jeffery Reitz also points out that the professional groups constituted a large proportion of Chinese immigrant group. (p.86). Also see Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community," Ethnicity 6 (1979):315-16. For a general analysis of the growing importance of professional-elites in ethnic communities, see S.J. Fitzpatrick and P. Joseph, "The Importance of 'Community' in the Process of Immigrant Assimilation," The International Migration Review 1 (Fall 1966): .

25. In this study, the term "ethnic consciousness" is used to denote "shared feelings for group recognition and a desire for equal and open participation in the mainstream of Canadian life".(See Harold Troper, An Uncertain Paast: Reflections on the History of Multiculturalism," Immigration and Multiculturalism [Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation] Summer 1979, p.13; and Michael Novak, "How American Are You if Your Grandparents Came from Serbia in 1888," in The Rediscovery of Ethnicity, [New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973], pp.17.)

26. This identification with the Old Country had also to do with the "sojourner mentality" of these early immigrants. Many expected to return home after they had accumulated enough wealth. It is, however, important to note that this mentality was not an static outlook; rather it was subjected to change or modification as residency of these early immigrants in Canada became longer. For instance, after a period of time, some immigrants began to think of staying in this country and fight for Canadian citizenship. Anyway, their allegience to the homeland was undeniable, especially before the Second World War. For example, political organizations such as the Freemason and the Chinese Community Centre were set up to direct the loyalty of the community members toward China. Local Chinese newspapers, which were sponsored by various voluntary associations, "did much to extend the political favor of the community" toward the homeland. Moreover, contributions were collected to finance schools and welfare activities in their ancestral villages. More significant, these sojourners, though poor, contributed substantially to support the revolutionary cause (during the turn of the century) and war efforts (during World War II) at home. See Julia Kwong, "Transformation of an Ethnic Community: From a National to a Cultural Community," Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium II), eds. Victor K. Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayaashi (University of Saskatchewan, 1978), p. 90; C.P. Sedgewick and W.E. Willmott, "External Influences and Emerging Identity: The Evolution of Community Structure among Chinese Canadians," The Canadian Forum (September 1974):10; Lao Bo, "Hostages in Canada: Toronto's Chinese (1880-1947)," The Asianadian 1 (2) (Summer 1978):13; and Graham Johnson, "
Chinese community. Although the 1923 Asian Exclusion Act

1888," in The Rediscovery of Ethnicity, [New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973], pp....)

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27. Interview with Wai-man Lee. No statistics are available to prove this point. However, one can speculate it on the following bases. As mentioned earlier in the text, before the mid-twentieth century the number of Chinese people in Toronto was small, and many were single males. Hence, there were very few family units in early Toronto's Chinese community. Although the 1923 Asian Exclusion Act was repealed in 1947, this provision did not appreciably increased the Chinese population in Canada. (Thompson, p.309) This is partly because the 1947 provision only allowed the early settlers to sponsor their wives and unmarried children to Canada for reunion. This strictly limited the inflow of Chinese immigration into Canada. As a result, though there was the presence of Canadian-born Chinese in Toronto after the mid-twentieth century, their

number remained small. Moreover, a simple calculation will indicate that those who were born in the mid and late 1950's were only in their early twenties by late 1970's. Hence, the dominant force and the majority of Chinese community members in Toronto were the first-generation immigrants.

28. As Bobby Siu, a professor at McMaster University, pointed out, the second generation North American Chinese tried to be more North American than the North Americans (see Liam, "Great Wall," p.F3).

29. Reitz talks about the effects of recency of immigration on ethnic groups' attitudes. See Jeffery Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), p.227.

30. For further information on Toronto's blue-collar workers, see "..." in Effective Citizenship: A Chinese Perspective, ed. George H.K. Woo (Toronto: CCCO, 1979), pp.34-35.

31. ibid.; and K.C. Tan, "On Being a Chinese Canadian," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective eds. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: CCCO, October 1980), pp.15-16.

32. Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life (December 1976):28. Stollery's article talks about the rise of recent wealthy entrepreneurs in Toronto's Chinese community.

33. In his study, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community", Thompson examines a class conflict that occured in Toronto's Chinese community in 1977 between the wealthy entrepreneurs and the young social workers, who claimed to represent the blue-collar workers and residents, over a land use issue in Chinatown.

34. Even Nancy Ing, who was a second-generation Chinese Canadian and who is a researcher in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, concedes that in Toronto the most "militant" Chinese activists were not the Canadian-born Chinese but the post-1967 immigrants, mostly from Hong Kong. (See...)

35. For details on the concept of "middle-class ethnicity", see Jeffery Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerso,n Ltd., 1980) pp.178-203.

36. This does not mean that the early immigrants did not want to establish themselves in the new environment. Rather it was the hostile climate that precluded them from full participation in Canadian society. Therefore, after the changing government policy and the improving social

climate since the 1960's, the old immigrants attempted to climb the socio-economic ladder through the efforts of their children. See Graham Johnson, "Chinese Family and Community in Canada," in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1979), pp.359-60.

37. See Judith Nagata, "One Vine, Many Branches: Internal Differentiation in Canadian Ethnic Groups," in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1979), p.178. Bobby Siu has also a brief analysis on why these educated immigrants have a higher degree of ethnic consciousness (see Liam, "Great Wall," p.F3).

38. Jeffery Reitz G., The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp.16-52. Reitz discusses in length how racial and cultural factors enhanced ethnic group cohesion.

39. Anthony Chan, "Neither French nor British: The Rise of the Asianadian Culture", Canadian Ethnic Studies 10/2 (1978):114-15; and Cheuk Kwan, "Youth and Political Participation," Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: CCCO, October 1980), p.94.

40. Jeffery Reitz G., The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), p.184.

41. Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life (December 1976):30 ; and "The Role of Professionals in Community Development" panel at the 1978 CCCO Conference. See "The Role of Professionals in Community Development," in Effective Citizenship: A Chinese Perspective ed. George Woo (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, 1979), pp. 23-26.

42. ibid. These professionals themselves admitted that their unique and advantageous position provided them the leadership role in the community.

43. Many of active Ad Hoc Committee members and volunteers, like Dr. Joseph Wong (medical doctor), Cheuk Kwan (engineer), ...Tsang (recently graduated lawyer), Lilian Ma (science researcher), Lee Wai-man (editor of Pei-mei newspaper),...., were university students either in the United States or Canada during the early 70's.

44. Howard Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees (Regina: L.A. Weigl Educational Associates Ltd., 1982), pp.132,178.

45. Peter Tsang, "President's Address," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, eds. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), p.3.

46. Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicultrual Soceity: A Chinese Perspective (Proceedings of the Intercultrual Conference, 8-9 April 1978), Toronto: n.p., 1979.

47. Peter Tsang, "President's Address," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), p.3.

48. ibid.

49. Irene Chu, "Summary Report," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), p.97.

50. Anthony Chan, "Neither French nor British: The Rise of the Asianadian Culture", Canadian Ethnic Studies, 10/2 (1978):117; and Cheuk Kwan, "Youth and Political Participation," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), p.95.

51. Howard Adelman, op cit., p.132.

57. I am indebted to Dr. Joseph Wong, president of the Action Committee for South East Asian Refugees, for providing the necessary information and papers concerning the Committee and the Boat People campaign.

52. These leaders--such as Flora MacDonald (Secretary of State for External Affairs), Ron Atkey (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Peter Stollery (M.P. of Spadina, Toronto), Boe Rae (M.P. of Broadview-Greenwood, Toronto), Bob Kaplan (M.P. of York Center, Toronto), Margaret Campbell (M.P.P. of St. George, Toronto), and Gordon Cressy (Alderman Ward 7, Toronto)-- were the ones who showed most sympathy to the Boat People cause. See the position paper of the Action Committee for Southeast Asian Refugees.

53. Through this campaign, Dr. Joseph Wong, president of the Action Committee for Refugees in South East Asia, developed connections with Sol Littman of the Toronto Star and Dick Beddoes ofThe Globe and Mail.

54. Patrick Chen, letter to Toronto's Ad Hoc Committee against W5, February 29, 1980, p.2.

55. For instance, before the anti-W5 coalition, the Action Committee for Refugees in South East Asia was not aware of the existence of the FCCP, Cathay Lions' Club, etc.

56. This included the FCCP, Cathay Lions' Club, Mon Sheong Foundation, and, at that time, the CCCO as well.

57. This attitude is evident in Dr. Gordon Chong's reply to the floor during the....panel of the 1978 CCCO Conference. See George Woo... pp.91,93.

58. Interview with Cheuk Kwan.

59. These non-CCCO members included Dr. Khim Tan (a Guelph University's professor), Dr. George Bancroft ( ), Dr. Wilson Head (president of Black coalition), Dr. Malawala ( )...., all of whom were politically inclined. See Irene Chu, "Acknowledgements," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, eds. Irene Chu, C. K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: CCCO, October 1980), p.106.

60. George Woo, Effective Citizenship: A Chinese Perspective, p...

61. Some of them were community workers catering to the needs and social services of their ethnic members. There were also some who did research work about the community.

62. Dr. K.C. Tan, a professor at Guelph University, expressed this feeling in the opening of his keynote speech during th 1979 CCCO Conference. See K.C. Tan, "On Being a Chinese Canadian," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), pp.8-9.

63. ibid., pp.15-16.

64. A report of the Action Committee for the South East Asian Refugees, pp.1-2.

65. Though they dispersed throughout the Metro area, one can still witnessed pockets of Chinese settlement in Scarborough, Willowdale and Don Mills in the north, and Spadina-Dundas and Broadview areas in the south. Most upper and middle-class groups lived in the north, while blue-collar workers and other low-income groups settled in the two Chinatowns in the south. See Peter Stollery, "The Emergence of the Chinese Establishment," Toronto Life (December 1976):27; and George Woo, Effective Citizenship: A Chinese Perspective, p.

66. Reitz takes a sociological look at how external constraints, such as social prejudice and discrimination,

and status equality, can reinforce minority group cohesion. See Jeffery Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp,204-215. For an in-depth look at the early anti-Chinese sentiment in Toronto, refer to K Paupst, "A Note on Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Toronto before the First World War," Canadian Ethnic Studies, 9/1 (1977):54-59.

67. See Viven Lai, "The New Chinese Immigrants in Toronto," in Minority Canadians (Vol. 2): Immigrants Groups, ed. Jean Leonard Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1971), p.135.

68. This phenomenon also occured in Toronto's Italian community. See Clifford J. Jansen, "Leadership in the Toronto Italian Ethnic Group," International Migration Review, 4 (1969):25-41; and his more recent article, "Community Organization of Italians in Toronto,"in The Canadian Ethnic Mosaic: A Quest for Identity, ed. Leo Driedger (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1978), pp.322-323.

69. Wes Lore.....Woo, pp.30-31. For further discussion on ethnic leadership, see Sengupta.., Stasiulus, and Saram....

70. This concern was constantly raised during the 1979 CCCO Conference. See the proceedings of the conference in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, ed. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, October 1980), pp. 30-31, 57, 90.

71. In the 1979 Conference, thirteen Chinese organizations were involved. See Irene Chu, "Summary Report," in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, eds. Irene Chu, C.K. Fong, and Jew May seung (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario), p.96.

72. This is evident in the heated debate over the name of Committee (refer to Chapter 4, page...). Some members, notably the FCCP, did not recognize the CCCO as representative for the community. The general public was even more ignorant about the Council.

73. He mentioned that during the CCCO Conference in 1978. See Effective Citizenship, p.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. Cheuk Kwan, "Political Activism and Chinese Canadian W5 Movement," in Asian Canadian and Multiculturalism, ed. Victor Ujimoto, Guelph: University of Guelph, 1981, p.271. Indeed, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Council of Chinese Canadian in Ontario Against W5 (hereafter cited as the Ad Hoc Committee), had tried to look for 50 to 100 thousand target figure. (Ad Hoc Committee, Minutes of Meetings of the Executive Members, meeting of 4 February 1980. [Typewritten.])

2. By far, Pei-mei Daily News and Sing Tao Newspaper had the largest converage on the event. Other papers included the Chinatown Commercial News, Shing Wah Daily News, World Daily, and the Chinese Express.

3. This figure is based on the July 12, 1980 financial report of Cheuk Kwan, treasurer of the Ad Hoc Committee.

According to Cheuk Kwan's paper, "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians--The W5 Movement", there were as many as 600 volunteers, of which about 50 to 60 were the most active.

4. This new era was marked by the new inflow of Chinese immigration since the late 60's, which drastically changed the compostion of Toronto's Chinese population as well as the social, economic and political structure of the community. Some of these changes have already been discussed in Chapter 6.

5. Virtually all interviewees of Chinese descent, including those actively involved in the anti-W5 campaign--such as Joseph Wong, Cheuk Kwan, Lilian Ma, Lee Wai-men, agreed with this point. There are also written sources that echo this feeling. These include Angela W. Djao, "Social Services for Immigrants: A Sociological Explanation of Racial Discrimination"; Cheuk Kwan, "Youth and Political Participation"; and K.C. Tan, "On Being a Chinese Canadian". All these articles can be found in Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective (Proceedings of the Provincial Conference held in Toronto, November 10, 11, 1979), CCCO, Toronto: n.p., October 1980), p.89-92, 94-95, and pp.8-17 respectively. It is important to note that though these speeches were published in 1980, they were made during the 1979 CCCO Conference, a time when the W5 issue was still largely

unknown in the ethnic community.

6. See Bobby Siu, "Asian Employment in Canada: Slippery Road Ahead?" in Asian Canadians in a Multicultural Society (Proceedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium III), (Saskatchewan: n.p., May 1979), pp.209-40; and Eileen Duh, "Thoughts in the Suburbs: The Journey Home," The Asianadian Fall/Winter, 1978, pp.20-21.

"Canada's Great Humanitarian Gesture--The Boat People of Vietnam," The Globe and Mail, 24 August 1979, p.3.

This analysis is also supported by Joseph Wong, who expressed his view in Sing Tao Newspaper, 14 May 1980. Also, see Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p.138.

7. Three of the founding members of the Action Committee for Refugees in Southeast Asia (hereafter cited as the Action Committee)--namely Joseph Wong, William Tam and Bosco Cheng--were also executive members on the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee. Many of the active volunteers of the latter had also been once involved in the Boat People campaign.

8. According to Joseph Wong's cursoy survey, at least one out of ten people in the Chinese community strongly disagreed with increasing the intake of the refugees, and four showed indifference. In the case of the anti-W5 campaign, none disagreed, but 30 to 40 percent expressed little or no concern over the issue. (Sing Tao Newspaper, 14 May 1980).

9. No one can deny the fact that the Chinese Canadian community had played an active role in helping the Indochinese refugeess. As Howard Adelman's study cleary suggests, the Cinese community had been involved in four areas of activity: political pressures on the Canadian government, direct services to refugees in resettlement, sponsorship of refugees, and fund-raising for overseas relief. Nonethelesss, these were largely limited to a number of Chinese organizations, social service agencies and a few Chinese Christian Churches. As Adelman himself writes: "...it would appear that a segment of the Chinese community, and only a segment, was active in all four areas." This can be further illustrated by the fact that among the four areas of activity, the actual sponsorship, which required more direct support and involvement from the community public than the other three areas, had proved to be the least successful. (Adelman has provided a number of social factors for the low sponsorship rate in the Chinese community.) For details, refer to Howard Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees (Regina: L.A. Weigl Educational Associates Ltd., 1982), pp.131-136.

10. Adelman, Indochinese Refugees, p.133.

11. See Liam Lacey, "They're breaching the Great Wall," and Carole Corbeil, "Class Struggle: Why Education holds the key for the Chinese of tomorrow," The Globe and Mail 27 December 1980, pp. F3,F4. Also, refer to Graham Johnson, "Chinese Family and Community in Canada: Tradition and Change," in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, ed. Jean L. Elliott (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1979), pp.367-68.

12. Sol Littman, "'W5 generation': changing Chinese," Toronto Star, 19 April 1980, p.B4.

13. Among the thirteen executive members, there were three physicians, four engineers, one educator, one researcher, two community workers, one articling lawyer, and a dental student.

14. Larry Au, one of the anti-W5 volunteers, strongly believed this point.

"CTV's 'Campus Giveaway' discriminatory--CCCM," Contrast, 6 March 1980, p.4.

For details of the Action Committee's activities and tactics, see the Committee's "Action News" (A newsletter published by the Committee) 17, 31 August, 1979; and also the position paper of the Committee. Adelman's study, Indochinese Refugees, had also briefly mention its activities. (pp.132-3.)

15. Action Committee, "Statements of Support," Toronto, 1979. (Typewritten.)

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

1. According to Arthur Danto, "historical significance" can be of four types: pragmatic, theoretical, consequential, and revelatory. The first form is usually used to refer to the moral importance of an event or events. Theoretical significance has to do with "an evidential or illustrative relationship to some general theory" a historian tries to establish or disestablish. Consequential significance deals with the "important" consequences spelled out by an event or events in question. Finally, an incident is considered as having revelatory significance when it reveals something heretofore unknown, and which can be used to explain or substantiate another event. For details, refer to Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, (London:Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp.132-139. In this and the following chapters, we are looking at the third kind of significance--consequential significance. It is the

outcomes and implications of the movement that we are concerned, and not the moral, theoretical or revelatory importance.

2. This is mainly based on the two-year context between the end of the anti-W5 movement and early 1982.

3. Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, p.3.

4. This is quoted from Harold Troper, "An uncertain Past: Reflections on the HIstory of Multiculturalism," Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation, Immigration and Multiculturalism: A Decade to Review (Toronto: n.p., Summer 1979), p.13.

5. Wsevoldd W. Isajiw, "Definition of Ethnicity," Ethnic Relations, Part I (....), p.23.

6. Jeffery G. Reitz, The Survival of Ethnic Groups (Toroto:McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), pp. 86-87, 119-123; and John W. Berry, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism, Ottawa: n.p., 1977), pp.190,207.

7. See Victor Sim, "Chinese Canadians in Canadian Politics," in Effective Citizenship in Camada's Multicultural Society: A Chinese Perspective (Proceedings of the Intercultural Conference, April 1978), (Council of Chinese Canadian in Onario, Toronto: n.p., February 1979), pp.53-7; "Chinese go from protest to power".....

8. Alan Bass and Randy Johnston, "2,000 demand CTV's apology," The Newspaper 30 January 1980, p.3.

9. The anti-W5 advocates themselves pointed out that even if CTV did not bow to their demands, they still regarded the campaign a success--success in the sense that they could "educate and mobilize" the community member. In short, they considered the movement a lesson of arousing the people's consciousness.

10. The conferences refered to were the two CCCO conferences, "Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicultural Society: A Chinese Perspective" and "Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective" held in 1978 and 1979 respectively. The two most notable publications which espoused the problems of Chinese and Asian minorities are the Chinatown News (a Vancouver-based publication) and The Asianadian (a nation-wide magazine).

11. See Clifford J. Jansen, "Leadership in the Toronto Italian Ethnic Group," International Migration Review 4 (1969):25-41.

12. An analysis of how external threat can have cohesive effects for an ethnic group can be found in Jonathan D. Sarna, "From Immigrants to Ethnics: Toward a New Theory of 'Ethinicization'," Ethnicity 5 (1978):370-378; and Nagata....

13. These interviews were largely informal and open-questioned.

14. The Chinese Express 18 April 1980, p.2.

15. Judith A. Nagata, "One Vine, Many Branches: Internal Differentiation in Canadian Ethnic Groups," in Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada ed. Leonard Elliot (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1979), p.181.

16. For some general information, see Robert A. Dahl, ed., Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 55-63; Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," in Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, eds. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp.160-69; and Gunnar Myrdal, American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper Row, Publisher, 1964), pp.

17. Many of them had never been involved in the community politics, not even the organizations. Chinese community to them had largely been a vague concept.

18. According to Robert Dahl, the political strata consist of individuals who are psychologically "involved" in political questions. By this, he means political interest, concern, awareness, and involvement; but these political strata are differennt from power-seekers or political leaders for they do not actually seek political power. Furthermore, they are often a minority, while the majority of society remains apolitical. See Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp.56-58.

19. Most of these newly awakened individuals joined the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), which was a direct outgrowth of the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee.

20. The original name of the organization was the Chinese Canadian National Council for Equality (CCNCE), a name which clearly defined the aim of the association. After its first national meeting in late October 1981, however, the Council decided to shorten its name to the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC). Aside for the sake of convenience, the change was made in order to broaden the "concerns, objectives and potential of the Council." (See CCNC, "An Activity Report to the Secretary of State,

January 1-December 31, 1981." [Typewritten.])

21. See CCNC, "Activity Report, January 1-December 31, 1981," and "Activity Report, January 1-March 31, 1982."

22. As a matter of fact, the CCMA and the CCCO were once members of the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee.

23. CCNC, "Activity Report, 1982," p.3.

24. The four stated objectives were (i) to promote the rights of all individuals, in particular, those of Chinese Canadians and to encourage their full and equal particpation in Canadian society; (ii) to create an environment in this country in which the rights of all individuals are fully recognized and protected; (iii) to promote understanding and cooperation between Chinese Canadians and all other ethnic cultural and racial groups in Canada; and (iv) to encourage and develop in persons of Chinese descent, a desire to know and to respect their historical and cultural heritage; to educate them in adapting a creative and positive attitude towards the Chinese Canadian contribution to society.

25. CCNC, "Activity Report, 1981," pp.16-17.

26. ibid., pp.17-18.

27. ibid., pp.15-16.

28. The CCNC was indeed a member on the advisory committee of the Ontario Science Centre reponsibile for the Exhibition on the Science and Technology of Ancient China to be held in Toronto in 1982.

29. CCNC, "Activity Report, 1982," p.6; and CCNC (Toronto Chapter), "Communique," March 1982, p.8.

30. CCNC, "Activity Report, 1982," p.6.

31. CCNC, "Activity Report, 1981," pp.18-19.

32. ibid., p.12.

33. Chinatown Commercial News, 25 January 1981, p.2.

34. CCNC, "Activity Report, January 1-December 31, 1981," pp.19-20.

ibid.; and Pei-mei Daily News, 13 march, 1981.

35. John Munch, "Nutcracker's not racist, ballet fans sa," Toronto Star 3 January 1981, p.A19.

36. Christie Blatchford, "Nutcracker racist? Ballet people are aghast," *Toronto Star* 2 January 1981, p.A1.

37. In specific, Hope asked for the elimination of the ptgtails, the Fu Manchu moustache, and the theatrical Chinese gait used by the dancers.

38. Munch, "Nutcracker's not racist," p.A19.

39. Sol Littman, "Nutcracker battle no laughing matter," *Toronto Star* 13 February 1981, p.A8.

40. *Sing Tao Newspaper*, 9 February 1981.

Blatchford, "Nutcracker racist?" p.A1.

41. Littman, "Nutcracker battle," p.A8.

42. Federation of Chinese Canadian Professionals (FCCP), "Newsletter," 4:2, July 1980, p.2.

43. *ibid.*, pp.5,6.

44. *ibid.*, p.2.

45. Interview with Frank Chui, president of the FCCP in 1981, Toronto, 25 April 1981.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1. These included two of the oldest and largest Chinese newspapers, namely the *Chinese Express* and *Shing Wah Daily News*. In the former case, its editor was Bob Chow, who came to Canada in 1948 and had once been a member of the Nationalist Chinese embassy staff. (See Peter Stollery, "The emergence of the Chinese Establishment," *Toronto Life* December 1976, p.33.) In the case of *Shing Wah*, its publisher/editor, was the president of the Chinese Community Centre of Ontario (CCC) and a well-established family association. (Refer to Richard H. Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community," *Ethnicity* 6 [1979]:325n.; and *Pei-mei* 28 March 1981.)

2. Alderman Ying Hope has always been closely related with the traditional groups, particularly the CCC and the Toronto Business Association. As seen in Chapters 5 and 8, his actions, especially those related with the Chinese community, were often endorsed by these traditional forces. Two examples were his complaint letter to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) concerning the latter's refusal to allow him join the negotiation with CTV, and his another complaint to the commission about the Nutcracker issue. His

close relations with these traditional and business groups can also be seen in Richard Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class," pp.319-320; and Liam Lacey, "They're breaching the Great wall," The Globe and Mail 27 December 1980, p.Fanfare 3. As far as Alderman Gordon Chong is concerned, the traditional forces pledged full support for him during local election time in 1980. (See Shing Wah 7 March 1981.)

3. Some of their created organizatons were the Federation of the Chinese Canadian Professionals (FCCP), the Mon Shong Foundation, the Toronto Cathay Lions Club, and the Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario (CCCO). As clearly indicated at the CCCO 1978 conference, these professionals saw themselves playing a leading role in the community. (See Paul Huang [moderator], "The Role of Professionals in Community Development," Effective Citizenship in Canada's Multicultural Society: A Chinese Canadian Perspective [Proceedings of the Intercultural Conference, April 1978] [CCCO, Toronto: n.p., 1979], pp.23-28.)

4. As K.C. Tan points out at the CCCO 1979 conference, there had been little communiction between the professional elite and the large majority of the Chinese populace in the community (refer to K.C.Tan, "On Being a Chinese Canadian," Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective [Proceedings of the Provincial Conference, November 1979], [CCCO, Toronto: n.p., 1980], pp.15-16).

5. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper Row, Publisher, 1964), pp.

6. Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts (Selected Papers on Group Dynamics) (New York: Harper Brother, 1948), pp.194-197.

7. The FCCP had succeeded to develop amicable relationship with some provincial Cabinet ministers, while the CCCO gained recognition from both the federal and provincial governments as representative of Chinese Canadians in Ontario. The CCCO further gained finanical support from the Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation as well as the Federal Department of the Secretary of State for its 1979 conference.

8. The most notable examples were the Chinese Canadian Mutual Advancement (CCMA), the Chinese Interpreter and Information Service (CIIS), and the Action Committee for Refugees from Southeast Asia.

9. For instance, though the CCMA was formed as early as 1975, by late 70s it still had a small membership of 30 to 40 people.

10. Howard Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees (Regina: L.A. Weigl Educational Associates Ltd., 1982), pp.132-133.

11. Irene Chu, "After the Conference--A Commentary," Living and Growing in Canada: A Chinese Canadian Perspective, p.104. It is striking to find in the local community newspapers that while the established leaders seldom mentioned the W5 incident, these youong activists often referred to the episode as a lesson and landmark for the ethnic community.

12. Dr. Joseph Wong, speech at the CCNC banquet, Toronto, 20 April 1980.

13. The most vivid example was Dr. Donald Chu, chairman of the anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committee. He withdrew from any direct involvement in the community politics after the end of the anti-W5 campaign.

14. Josehph Wong, who had been an active member on the Ad Hoc Committee, was elected as two-year president of the CCNC. Other executive members on the Ad Hoc Committee also held important positions in the CCNC.

15. The 1980-81 president was Cheuk Kwan, another active executive member on the Ad Hoc Committee. Henceforth, the following terms were also held by young professionals of late twenties or early and mid-thirties.

16. These papers include ~The Chinatown Commercial News, Pei-mei, and Sing Tao Newspaper.

17. According to Susan Eng, a member on the CCNC's executive committee, the Council preferred to send a private letter to the National Ballet Company of Canada. She said, "We didn't like the publicity splash the issue received. But the letter definitely confirms the merit of the [Hope's] complaint." (See Sol Littman, "Nutcracker battle no laughing matter," Toronto Star, 13 February 1981, p.A8.)

18. CCNC, "An Activity Report to the Secretary of State, January 1-March 31, 1982," (Typewritten), p.5.

19. CCNC, "An Activity Report to the Secretary of State, January 1-December 31, 1981," (Typewritten), p.10.

20. ibid., p.11.

21. For example, a member of the legal section of the FCCP was appointed in 1981 by the provincial government as the vice-chairman of the Advisory Council on Mulicilturalim and Citizenship (see FCCP, newsletter, vol.4, no.2, July 1980 [Typewritten] p.2).

22. See Chap-yung Yeung, 1979-80 president of the FCCP, to FCCP mebmers, Toronto, 15 January 1980, FCCP newsletter, January 1980, pp.8-10; and Cheuk Kwan, "Political Activism and Chinese Canadians--The S5 Movement," in Asian Canadians and Multiculturalism (Proccedings of the Asian Canadian Symposium III), (University of Saskatchewan: n.p., May 1979), p.276. This mutual criticism is futher supported by interveiws with representatives on both sides, for example Frank Chui, 1980-81 president of the FCCP, and Joseph Wong, 1980-82 president of the CCNC.

23. The preparation of the documentary had been started in early 1980 and was aired in 1981.

24. According to the Shing Wah daily news, the idea was originated fom D.K. Choi, ex-chairman of an established traditiona group and president of a renowned family association. He did not see anything wrong with erecting a statue to commemorate Dr. Sun in Toronto, since the same thing had been done in the Los Angelos and San Francisco's Chinatowns. Again according to Shing Wah, before the committee was set up, the CCC had sent more than a hundred letters to different Chonse organizations, including the CCNC and the Chinese Christian groups inviting them to the meeting; but they did not show up. Therefore the committee executives were mainly composed of CCC members, its affiliated associations, family and clan groups, and the Toronto Chinese Business Association.

25. Gordon Chong, "Chance 'to put aside historic difference'," Toronto Star 26 May 1981, p.A9.

26. Sol Littman, "Toronto Chinese seek symbol," Toronto Star 7 Mrrch 1981, p.B4.

27. ibid.

28. The local Chinese newspapers became a battlefield for the two contending groups. The conservative dailies, notably the Shin Wah Daily News and the Chinese Express, conspicously sided with advocates of the Sun statue, while the relatively new and liberal press such as Pei-mei, Sing Tao Newspaper and the Chinatown Commercial News provided channels for the opponents to voice their arguments.

29. Pei-mei 17 March 1981, p.6.

30. They made this clear during a public hearing held by the City Council's neighborhood committee on March 11, 1981.

31. Their arguments can be found in the Shing Wah Daily News from late February to April 1981. Many pro-Sun-staue individuals or groups vehemently countered their opponents in this newspaper.

32. Denys Horgan, "Chinese squabble reaches City Hall," The Globe and Mail 12 March 1981, p.3.

33. Littman, "Toronto Chinese seek symbol, p.B4.

34. Sing Tao Newspaper and Pei-mei, 11 March 1981.

35. Horgan, "Chinese squabble," p.3.

36. Sing Tao Newspaper, ????

37. Shing Wah Daily News, 7, 24 March 1981.

ibid., 24 March 1981.

37. Pei-mei 17 March 1981, p.6.

38. John Fraser, "Go easy on statue of Sun," The Globe and Mail 16 March 1981. According to an opponent, who wanted to remain anonymous, the tradition elite was trying to regain its reputation and leverage, which had been overshadowed by the young activist during the anti-W5 movement.

39. Sing Tao Newspaper

40. Shing Wah Daily News, 11 April 19.

41. For example, Denys Horgan of The Globe and Mail describes the dispute as "a squabble...that has roots in the conflict between Taiwan and China..." (see Horgan, "Chinese squabble," p.3). John Fraser's commentary, "Go easy on statue of Sun" (16 March 1981), also tended to perceive the controversy as one between pro-Taiwan and pro-Peking factions. However, a month and a half after his first commentary, Fraser revised his early view and apologize to the opponents of Sun statue for labelling them as leftist or elements (see Fraser, ""First Step: delay the statue," The Globe and Mail 4 May 1981, p.8). 42. Gordon Chong and other traditional groups in the Chinese community also treated the dispute as left-right quarrel as clearly indicated in the Shing Wah Daily News.

43. Horgan, "Chinese squabble," p.3.

44. This can be illustrated by the supporter list gathered by the CCC. The list included 49 organizations. According to Pei-mei's analysis, 10 of the endorsed associations were under the same building, that was the builiding of the CCC and the Chinese Nationalist Party Counsel. Other groups which pledged their support were also closely related to the CCC. (See Pei-mei 28 March 1981, p.6.)

45. Littman, "Toronto Chinese seek symbol," p.B4.

46. These references can be easily found in Pei-mei and Sing Tao Newspaper.

Pei-mei 24 February, 28 March 1981.

47. Interview with Frank Chui, 1980-81 president of the FCCP, Toronto, 25 April 1981.

48. CCNC (Toronto Chapter), Communique, March 1982, p.4.

49. One of the joint functions was fund-raising for relieving China's earthquake disaster in the summer of 1981.

50. See Donald M. Taylor, "Stereotypes and Intergroup Relations," in A Canadian Social Psychology of Ethnic Relations eds. Robert C. Gardner and Rudolf Kalin (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981), pp.151-171.

51. .....

52. John W. Berry, Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism, Ottawa: n.p., 1977), pp.190,207.

53. Bob Reguly, "Chinese go from protest to power,"..

54. Dick Beddoes, "The reward of gnawing," The Globe andMail 22 April 1980, p.8.

55. Littman, "'W5 Generation': changing Chinese," Toronto Star 19 April 1980, p.B4.

56. For instance, Kathleen Ruff, a former human rights director, made it clear in her speech at the 19 April 1980 anti-W5 Ad Hoc Committees' national meeting that the campaign was a milestone. She said, "I think it's a milestone because of the means that you used. You took a public approach, a public stand. You spoke up publicly and persistently; and you didn't allow a whitewash, which is the first response and usually that's when all end. But you didn't buy the whitewash, and you said no way, that's just not good enough...." (Film produced by the CCNC.)

57. Fraser, "Crossing Chinatown's boundaries," The Globe and Mail 6 May 1981, p.8.

58. Congratulation letters from various politicians and government officials to the CCNC. (CCNC's archive.)

59. Canada, Parliament, Commons Debates, 1880-1980 (Hansard, vol.), pp.2145, 16 June 1980, "Contribution Made by Chinese Canadians."

60. As a matter of fact, on April 18, 1980 Waddell had also proposed a resolution before the House of Commons in response to the W5 controversy and the CTV's final apology. He asked the House to condemn racism in any form, applaud the efforts of the committees of concerned Chinese Canadians, welcome the admission of President Chercover and urge the CRTC, CTV and other media to take steps to ensure that this sort of programming would never be aired again. (Ian Waddel, M.P. for Vancouver-kingsway, "Resolution under standing order 43," April 18, 1980.

61. Canada, Parliament (Commons), Hansard 1880-1980 p.2147.

62. ibid., p.2149.

63. ibid., p.2148.

64. CCNC, "An Activity Report, 1981," p.9-11; and "An Activity Report, 1982," pp.2,4-5,7-8.

65. For example, in the Ad Hoc Advisory Group for the Symposium on Race Relations and the Law, the CCNC worked with other ethnic groups in making recommendations on the format of and proposing priorized issues and resource persons for the Symposium workshop held in Vancouver on April 22-24, 1982. Also as a member of the Ad Hoc Media Committee of the Intercultural Network Builiding Conference, the CCNC and other ethno-cultural organizations participated in fighting stereotypes and the image of all-white Canada in advertising and the mass media. (See CCNC, "An Activity Report, 1981," p.11,13; and "An Activity Report, 1982," p.5.)

66. "An apology with a lesson," Toronto Star 18 April 1980, editorial.

67. "Minister seeks an appeal device to counter offensive broadcasts." The Globe and Mail, 21 April 1980, p...

68. Interview with Elizebeth Paterson, director of the International Student Centre of the University of Toronto, Toronto, 23 March 1981.

69. Interview with Joseph Wong, president of the CCNC, Torotno, 19 March 1981.

NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

1. Interviews with Norman Kwan, Dinah Cheng, and Bernard Lau.

2. Nancy Ing is a Canadian-born Chinese. At present she is working at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). She was one of the researchers for a CBC's producation entitled "The Golden Mountain".

3. Chinese Canadian National Council, a documentary film on the Ad Hoc Committee of the Chinese Canadian Council in Ontario against W5, 1980.

4. Although Toronto's Chinese community has recently become one of the largest and most prosperous Chinese communities in North America, there is very little academic work exploring the early and recent history of the ethnic community. There have been even fewer systematic studies on its social and political structure. Two non-Chinese who have tried to study the community are: K. Paupst, "Anti-Chinese Sentiment:.....,".....; and Richard H. Thompson, "Ethnicity versus Class: An Analysis of Conflict in a North American Chinese Community," Ethnicity 6 (1979).

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Frank Chui	25 April 1981
C.K. Fong	February 1981
Cheuk Kwan	28 February, 8 March 1981
Norman Kwan	1,23 March, 28 April, 3 May 1981
Kim	May 1981
Bernard Lau	December 1982
Wai-man Lee	17,27 March, 2 April 1981
Lilian Ma	February 1981
Elizabeth Paterson	23 March 1981
William Tam	25 February 1981

Joseph Wong	26 February, 19 March, 29 October, 8 December 1981
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*All of the above interviews took place in Toronto, except Chap-yung Yeung who was interviewed in Hong Kong.

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APPENDIX

transcript W-5 (aired 30 September)

Host:

Helen Hutchinson

"Here is a scenario that would make a great many people in this country angry and resentful.

Suppose your son or daughter wanted to be an engineer, or a doctor, or a pharmacist. Suppose he had high marks in high school, and that you could pay the tuition -- but he still couldn't get into university in his chosen courses because a foreign student was taking his place. Well, that is exactly what is happening in this country. But hardly anyone wants to talk about it. It is not hard to understand why the public hasn't been given a chance to debate the foreign student problem. The statistics that show it is a problem aren't easy to find. Here are some:

- at least 100,000 foreign students in our schools;
- at least one out of 10 students in B.C., Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia are foreign -- and the ratio is much higher in Ontario and Quebec; and
- at least 20 per cent of kids in high technology courses (engineering, computer science) are foreign, while these courses are turning down thousands of young Canadians.

"Barbara Allan has been working on and off in her father's St. Catharines, Ontario, pharmacy since she was 12. She graduated from high school with 79.5 per cent. Good marks, but not high enough to get into pharmacy at the University

of Toronto. When Barbara saw the pharmacy class, she couldn't believe it. Although only 165 of a thousand applicants qualify, students from overseas make up 10 to 30 per cent of the class. The difference lies in whether you believe the official statistics or the estimates of the students."

student 1

"All these people are in, and you're just -- you're knocked out of a seat. You're not getting the education that you feel you should be, because it's just -- the classes are just packed with foreign students."

Barbara
Allan

"When someone talks about doing something for the longest time -- and they work for it -- and then someone else says "Well, no, I'm sorry you just can't do this, it hurts -- it hurts a lot."

Helen H.

"Barbara is studying honors History now at a suburban University of Toronto campus, and thinking about going into Law. But she still thinks about what she really wanted to do."

Barbara A.

"You go through the nurse stage, the secretary stage, all little girls want to be this. But I've always wanted to be a pharmacist. I mean, what can I say? I drew pictures of being a pharmacist when I was little. It's always been something I've wanted to be."

Helen H. "Barb Allan is not a racist. It's the policy she's fighting not the participants. And she isn't alone. A university admissions officer says, privately, that "Canada is being suckered as a nation by countries which won't pay for education themselves". Many professors complain that Canada is not only gambling with its future, it's giving it away. To use Barbara's own words, she says she was "done in by the system -- and something should be done about 'it'".

Barbara A. "They talk about minorities in Canada, alright, so that you're -- you want to give the other guy a chance too, but charity begins at home, doesn't it. Like, you have to work at -- within the country first and build up your own country and -- and then you can work with other people".

Helen H. "We are not saying we should rid our universities of outside influences. We are saying that as long as qualified Canadian students can't get into schools, the foreign students' program has gone too far. And make no mistake -- this is not charity or even legitimate foreign aid. Study after study shows that we are educating the children of the wealthy. And 60 per cent of the students are from southeast Asia, 30 per cent from Hong Kong -- places which apply strict quotas on education.

"Here's how the problem is growing. Students come to Canada

to repeat their final years of high school. Many go to $5,000-a-year private schools. Across the country, 30 such schools have recently been established to serve the foreign influx. The students enter on special visas, but easily become landed immigrants, if they need to, in order to get into courses which restrict enrolment. Many take courses they have already taken at home, getting excellent marks. Canada is the only country we know of which accepts students so easily as immigrants. And educators tell us that most are temporary immigrants.-- they are here to get a university education, learn English, and leave.

"Last year, every student from this school [a private school is shown] went directly into an applied science or business course at college or university. So courses such as computer science are dominated by foreign students. At least one student in five, often more, is foreign. While we don't have enough computer scientists in Canada to meet our demands.

"These are first year medical students registering at the University of Toronto. Thousands of Canadian students, who can't get into medicine, are forced to study in private foreign schools. While in Canadian schools, almost 400 students are foreign.

...5

"Engineering and applied science. 20 per cent of the students are foreign, and there're twice as many visa students as landed immigrants — students who must leave Canada. So we are not only exporting knowledge and technology, but engineers who will go home and compete with our industries.

"By teaching the elite of other lands, we relieve those countries of the burden of supporting schools of their own. Only five per cent of the students in education are foreign, so few are going back to contribute to education at home.

John Helliwell "I agree. There is a perponderance. Uh, ya know, there's a significant number -- very, very significant number in courses like Engineering -- like business and commerce. Uh, yah, that, that's part of the problem."

Helen H. "John Helliwell is the foreign affairs director of the Canadian Bureau for International Education. He calls himself the lobbyist for the foreign students, but when he looks over the more than 100,000 foreign students on our campuses -- when he sees that bulletin boards in science departments are bilingual [showing chinese script signs] he still refuses to admit the obvious effect of the influx...

"How can you be so sure that some Canadian kid hasn't missed a place at one of these universities or colleges that's been filled by a foreign student?"

John H. "Well, I have -- nobody has ever given me any evidence that that has happened."

Helen H. "It wasn't hard for us to find Barbara Allan. And she knows of others with first class high school marks who have been refused admission to university. So do we.. And so do professors and admissions personnel who complain bitterly to us, off the record, but refuse to talk publicly because they're afraid of being called racist.

"But money talks. Barb's father, Robert Allan, is paying taxes that support the student who took~~s~~ his daughter's place in school. There are no education taxes in Hong Kong. None. There are here."

Mr. Allan "Over 50 per cent of my property tax dollar goes towards education, I know that."

Helen H. "Robert Allan is hardly a racist. He's an understandably upset parent, and concerned taxpayer."

Mr. Allan "I see that the government is giving grants of millions and millions of dollars to universities -- which is fine -- but I feel that our own people should have preference over the use of those tax dollars, rather than other people."

Don McInnis	"When I was president of the college, various pharmacists had contacted me -- uh, in fact their sons or daughters couldn't get in to pharmacy."
Helen H.	"Don McInnis has been on many school admissions boards. He's angry about the system and its silent critics."
Don McI	"And the anger is foscused on the fact that here, uh, codes that are, for laudable purposes, to help protect minority groups from, uh, blatant discrimination, is have entirely opposite effect. And, in fact, it's discriminating now against the students of Ontario citizens themselves, and this is what makes me so angry -- that nothing has been done -- or they say nothing can be done -- I don't believe that that is so. So I think something can and should be done."
Helen H.	"The government sponsored Canadian Bureau of International Education says it's good for us to allow foreign students into Canada. First, they bring in money -- it's true they bring in money for their tuition and for their keep -- but remember, tuition accounts for only 20 per cent of the entire cost of educating a student. The rest comes from grants and our taxes. A seemingly more important rationale is that it's part of our foreign aid. But to us, the time

and money spent educating the elite of the third world here, could be better spent helping the needy there. The poor. The illiterate.

"It's also argued that foreign students will go home and trade with Canada. But this has never been the case before. ? Or, that Canadian students will benefit from contact with other cultures. But there are so many oriental foreign Racism students that they rarely mix with their Canadian classmates. It's as if there are two campuses at Canadian universities -- foreign and domestic. Certainly this Chinese theatre attracts a full house, but not one Canadian ISC student attended."

female student #1 "I went to the University of Manitoba last year, and it was like 70 per cent are foreign students."

male student #1 "Foreign students? A lot."

male student #2 "We think it's a little more than it should be."

female student #2 "If people who want to get in aren't being accepted because of foreign students being accepted over them, then I resent that."

John Helliwell — "Uh, we certainly are aware of--of--of Canadian students complaining."

Helen H. — "We don't argue with John Helliwell when he praises the diligence of foreign students. But we do, when he demeans Canadians."

John H. — "Should we be admitting sub-standard Canadians, or should we be seeking to encourage the Canadian to excell by increasing the stimulus around him?"

Helen H. — "Sub-standard Canadians? Reactions such as that inspired Barbara Allan to talk with us -- and almost sent a first class honors student to the United States -- a country which allows only a third per capita the number of foreign students that we do."

Barbara — "I considered going to the University of Buffalo for pharmacy. I applied. Um, I went and I looked over everything and I realized that um I had an even less chance of getting in there than I did at the U of T. They don't accept foreign students very readily, and I'd be a foreign student."

Helen H. — "We estimate it will cost Canadians about $1 billion to educate these 100,000 foreign students. Kids whose families, still abroad, escape much of the education burden in their own country. One Hong Kong boy at an Ontario community

...10

college said that he likes studying in Canada because it's so cheap. We think the costs both in money, and the futures of our kids, is much too high." #

4 October, 1979
/bh